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SUMMARY
User input plays an essential role in computer security because it can control system
behavior and make security decisions in the system. System output to users, or user output, is
also important because it often contains security-critical information that must be protected
regarding its integrity and confidentiality, such as passwords and user’s private data. Despite
the importance of user input and output (I/O), modern computer systems often fail to provide
necessary security guarantees on them, which could result in serious security breaches.
This dissertation aims to build trust in the user I/O in computer systems to keep the
systems secure from attacks on the user I/O. To this end, we analyze the user I/O paths
on popular platforms including desktop operating systems, mobile operating systems, and
trusted execution environments such as Intel SGX, and identified that threats and attacks
on the user I/O can be blocked by guaranteeing three key security properties of user I/O:
integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity.
First, GYRUS addresses the integrity of user input by matching the user’s original
input with the content of outgoing network traffic to authorize user-intended network
transactions. Second, M-AEGIS addresses the confidentiality of user I/O by implementing
an encryption layer on top of user interface layer that provides user-to-user encryption.
Third, the A11Y ATTACK addresses the importance of verifying user I/O authenticity by
demonstrating twelve new attacks, all of which stem from missing proper security checks
that verify input sources and output destinations on alternative user I/O paths in operating
systems. Finally, to establish trust in the user I/O in a commodity computer system, I
built a system called SGX-USB, which combines all three security properties to ensure the
assurance of user I/O. SGX-USB establishes a trusted communication channel between the
USB controller and an enclave instance of Intel SGX. The implemented system supports
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common user input devices such as a keyboard and a mouse over the trusted channel, which
guarantees the assurance of user input.
Having assurance in user I/O allows the computer system to securely handle commands




1.1 Motivations and Goals
User input plays an essential role in computer security because it can control system behavior
and make security decisions in the system. System output to users, or user output, is also
important because it often contains security-critical information that must be protected
regarding its integrity and confidentiality, such as passwords and user’s private data. Despite
the importance of user input and output (I/O), modern computer systems often fail to provide
necessary security guarantees on them, which could result in serious security breaches.
Hence the machine infected by malware can send/alter the command that user has never
supplied, and keyloggers can steal passwords from the system; cloud service providers can
easily read user’s messages, and any attackers can take control of the device across the
security domain by injecting a fake user input to a system.
To block a class of attacks that target weaknesses in the user I/O in computer systems,
this dissertation aims to build trust in the system’s I/O path to keep the systems secure by
fundamentally cutting off attack pathways. To this end, we analyzed the user I/O paths
on popular platforms including desktop operating systems, mobile operating systems, and
trusted execution environments such as Intel SGX, and identified that threats and attacks
on the user I/O can be blocked by guaranteeing three key security properties of user I/O:
integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity.
This dissertation includes four projects that address the three essential security properties
of user I/O: integrity (GYRUS [85] in §2), confidentiality (M-AEGIS [101] in §3), and authen-
ticity (A11Y ATTACK [86] in §4), and the SGX-USB project (in §5) guarantees assurance as




1.2.1 The Integrity of User Input
GYRUS [85] (in Chapter §2) is a security system that protects the integrity of text user input
that can be sent as security sensitive network transactions such as sending an e-mail message
and online banking transactions by allowing only user-intended network transaction to
be sent from a system even if the operating system is compromised by attacks. GYRUS
takes a new approach on inferring the user intent from input because prior attempts on
extracting user intent from keystrokes is a difficult problem by cause of the complexity
of text operations. The key observation on keystroke user interaction is that the user not
only uses the input device but also looks at the screen output to check if his/her typing
is captured correctly. GYRUS exploits this feedback loop to capture the text data and the
user’s intent from the UI layout, such as text boxes on the screen. Then, GYRUS enforces the
policy called “What You See Is What You Send (WYSIWYS)” to match the user’s intent with
the outgoing network traffic. Under this policy, GYRUS preserves the integrity of text that
embodies user intent, and allows the network transaction only if the network traffic matches
the prior intent as shown as the text on the UI. The enforcement of this policy either requires
a direct matching of text or allows a simple transform (e.g., encoding) from the captured
text from UI to the content in the network traffic, which many text-based applications meet
this requirement. GYRUS can be applied to protect several real-world applications, including
e-mail messages in Outlook, postings on Facebook, and the financial transactions in online
banking applications such as Paypal. Evaluation of GYRUS against real-world malware has
shown that GYRUS blocks all malware-generated network traffic while allowing all the user
intended transactions, and incurs negligible performance overhead (only 39 ms of delay on
each keystroke) while adding less than 6% of network latency.
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1.2.2 The Confidentiality of User I/O
Public messaging services, such as GMail, Outlook, Facebook Messenger, etc., claim to pro-
vide the end-to-end encryption by using Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL). Unfortunately,
the encryption is only from the user to the server, not from the user all the way through to
the other users, which means that the server can access the plaintext data. Since applying a
user-to-user encryption like PGP is difficult because of the change in user experience and
requirement of protocol reverse-engineering, M-AEGIS [101] (in Chapter §3) took a new
approach. M-AEGIS is a system that not only provides the user-to-user confidentiality of
plaintext data but also preserves the user experience through the creation of a UI overlay
called Layer 7.5, which is interposed between the application (OSI Layer 7) and the user
(Layer 8). This approach allows M-AEGIS to implement a true user-to-user encryption of
data while achieving goals in security, usability, and adaptability. To preserve the exact
application workflow and look-and-feel, M-AEGIS uses Layer 7.5 to put a transparent win-
dow on top of existing application GUIs to both intercept plaintext user input then encrypt
before feeding it to the underlying app, and to decrypt the (encrypted) data from the app
before displaying the (plaintext) data to the user. Moreover, to support the search operations,
which is essential in e-mail services, M-AEGIS implements the easily-deployable efficiently-
searchable symmetric encryption scheme (EDESE) to enable text search operation over the
encrypted text data. This technique allows M-AEGIS to be transparently integrated with the
most of messaging services without hindering usability or requiring reverse engineering.
A prototype of M-AEGIS is implemented on Android and demonstrates that it can support
a number of popular services, e.g., Gmail, Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, etc. The
performance evaluation and the user study show that M-AEGIS incur minimal overhead and
no compatibility problem when adopted on Android.
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1.2.3 The Authenticity of User I/O
The A11Y ATTACK [86] (in Chapter §4) is a new class of attacks caused by the failure to
properly verify (i.e. authenticate) the source and the destination of the user I/O on operating
systems. Major operating systems (i.e., Windows, Linux, Android and iOS) provide the
means of programmatically generating user input and programmatically reading UI output to
build assistive technology for supporting accessibility (a11y) for disabled users, in which the
federal law mandates the support. Unfortunately, having such alternative ways of generating
inputs and reading outputs introduces new security vulnerabilities. For example, an audio
speech generated by an unprivileged application can control privileged applications through
the voice commander on the system. The A11Y ATTACK defines assistive technologies as I/O
subsystems that either transform user input into interaction requests for other applications
and the underlying OS, or transform application and OS output for display on alternative
devices. While the user I/O is considered critical for the system’s security, inadequate
security checks on these new I/O paths make it possible to launch attacks from accessibility
interfaces. The A11Y ATTACK evaluated accessibility supports for four popular operating
systems: Microsoft Windows, Ubuntu Linux, iOS, and Android. We identified twelve
new attacks that can bypass state-of-the-art defense mechanisms deployed on these OSes,
including mandatory access control in both Windows and Linux, and bypassing sandbox in
both iOS and Android. Further analysis illustrates that the root cause of the attack is that
the design and implementation of accessibility support involve inevitable trade-offs among
compatibility, usability, security, and (economic) cost. The A11Y ATTACK also proposed
a number of countermeasures to either make the implementation of all necessary security
checks easier and intuitive, or to alleviate the impact of missing/incorrect checks.
1.2.4 The Assurance of User I/O
One promising approach to protecting a system from software based attacks is to implement
the anchor of security in hardware. Processor chips from major manufacturers, such as
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Intel, have recently embedded several new hardware extensions for the trusted execution
environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Intension (SGX). Although the trsuted
execution environment is available in hardware today, unfortunately, the effect of them does
not come out as expected because Intel SGX cannot support user-facing applications due
to missing trusted user I/O path. In order to harvest the security benefits from the TEE,
We design SGX-USB (in Chapter §5), which establishes a trusted I/O path between a USB
port and the trusted execution environment (TEE). The design of SGX-USB introduces a
new trusted hardware, the USB Proxy Device at a USB port of a system, and this hardware
component establishes a trusted communication channel between the USB port and an
enclave instance through the remote attestation process of Intel SGX and its extension.
After establishing a trusted channel, SGX-USB can support typical user input devices
such as keyboard and mouse as well as more complex user-facing devices such as camera,
microphone, speaker, and display devices by forwarding USB packets over the trusted
channel. Because the trusted channel guarantees all three security properties, such as
integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity, SGX-USB can ensure the assurance of user input
and allows the enclave instance to handle commands and data from the user securely. While
the currently discussed applications of Intel SGX only perform the network and the file I/O
securely, this new design enables secure user I/O in the TEE so that Intel SGX can facilitate




GYRUS: A FRAMEWORK FOR USER-INTENT MONITORING OF
TEXT-BASED NETWORKED APPLICATIONS
2.1 Motivation
Host-based security systems have traditionally focused on detecting attacks. Misuse detec-
tion targets attacks that follow predefined malicious patterns, whereas anomaly detection
identifies attacks as anything that cannot be the result of correct executions under any input
or execution environment. Over the time, systems following this approach have shown that
they usually have a too narrow definition of “attacks”, which often necessary to keep their
false positive rate acceptable. Thus misuse detection generally cannot detect new attacks,
while anomaly detection is known to suffer from mimicry attacks.
Instead of perpetuating the cycle of attack analysis, signature creation, and blacklist
updating, we believe a more viable approach is to create an accurate model of what is the
correct, user-intended behavior of an application, and then ensure the application behaves
accordingly. The idea of defining correct behaviors of an application by capturing user
intent is not entirely new, but previous attempts in this space use an overly simplistic model
of the user’s behavior. For example, they might infer a user’s intent based on a single mouse
click without capturing any associated context. While in some cases (e.g. ACG [133]),
the click captures all the semantics of the user’s intent (e.g. access the camera), in other
cases (e.g. BINDER [38] and Not-a-Bot [72]), the user’s intent involves a richer context,
and failure to capture the full semantics will again allow for attacks to disguise as a benign
behavior. For example, imagine a user who intends to send $2 to a friend through PayPal. A
mouse click can identify the user’s intent to transfer money, but not the value or recipient of
the transfer. So this $2 transfer to a friend could become a $2,000 transfer to an unknown
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person. Without context, it is simply impossible to properly verify a user’s intent, regardless
of if we are protecting a financial transfer, an industrial control system, or a wide range of
other user-driven applications.
In this chapter, we propose a way to capture the richer semantics of the user’s intent. Our
method is based on the observation that for most text-based applications, the user’s intent
will be displayed entirely on screen, as text, and the user will make modifications if what
is on screen is not what she wants. Based on this idea, we have implemented a prototype
called GYRUS1, which enforces correct behavior of applications by capturing user intent.
In other words, GYRUS implements a “What You See Is What You Send” (WYSIWYS)
policy. GYRUS assumes a standard VM environment (where GYRUS lives in the dom-0 and
the monitored applications live in dom-U2). Similar to BINDER and Not-a-Bot, GYRUS
relies on the hypervisor to capture mouse clicks from the user, and use these as an indication
that the user intends the application to perform certain actions. To capture the semantics of
user intent that cannot be inferred from just observing a mouse click, we take the approach
of drawing what we think the user should see in the dom-0. In particular, the dom-0 will
draw a secure overlay on top of the dom-U display window (the VNC viewer in KVM
environment), covering editable text area of targeted applications in dom-U, while leaving
the rest of the dom-U display visible. We stress that this rendering is isolated from dom-U
– software in dom-U cannot overwrite or modify what has been drawn. Since we render
all editable text the user sees, we can easily confirm that what is intended is what we have
drawn. By drawing all the text the user is supposed to see in our overlay, GYRUS can also
handle scrolling properly. Even if only part of the text is displayed at any time, GYRUS
can keep track of what has been displayed over time and derive the full content of the user
intended input.
To determine what text to display in the overlay, we deploy a component called the UI
1 The fusiform gyrus is a part of the human brain that performs face and body recognition.
2 In this chapter, we adopt the terminology from the Xen community. In other settings, the dom-0 is
referred to the Security-VM, while dom-U is referred to the Guest-VM.
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monitor in dom-U. We stress that the UI monitor is not trusted since incorrect behavior in
this component will be immediately noticed by the user and only result in a denial-of-service
(DoS) in the worst case. The UI monitor is also responsible for telling the dom-0 logic the
location of buttons that signify the user’s intent to commit what is displayed to the network
(e.g. the “send” button in an email client), and when the user finally clicks on such buttons.
Using such information, GYRUS will make sure the outgoing network traffic matches the
text displayed. In short, GYRUS enforces the integrity of user-generated network traffic and
prevents malware from misusing network applications to send malicious traffic even if the
malware mimics legitimate applications by running an application’s protocol correctly or
injects itself into benign applications. Note that GYRUS only checks network traffic under
protocols used by the protected applications, and it does not interfere with traffic from
other applications, such as background services, RSS feed readers, and BitTorrent clients.
Additionally, GYRUS can support asynchronous or scheduled traffic like e-mail queued for
sending in the future. From our evaluation, GYRUS exhibits good performance and usability,
while blocking all tested attacks.
Any attempt to make sure an application behaves according to user intent will have
some application-specific logic, and GYRUS is no exception. This is inherently true for our
approach because: 1) different applications will have a different user interface, and thus
user intent will be interpreted differently and, 2) different applications will have different
logic for turning user input into network traffic or other forms of output. The best we can
do is to make the per-application logic as easy to build as possible. In GYRUS, we simplify
the UI-related part of the per-application logic by making use of an existing library called
UI Automation, which is for supporting assistive technologies and UI testing. As for the
logic to map user intent to the expected behavior of an application, the complexity mostly
depends on the application, and GYRUS and the WYSIWYS policy is not suitable for all
applications. In particular, applications with an arbitrarily complex encoding of their text,
or those using proprietary protocols cannot be easily supported by GYRUS. Nevertheless,
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we have shown that it can be used on email clients, instant messenger applications, online
social network services and even online financial services. §2.5 discusses what applications
are best protected by GYRUS.
The per-application development cost for GYRUS is justifiable since GYRUS is attack-
agnostic: GYRUS makes assumptions about what the attackers are trying to achieve but
not how. In other words, once one builds the logic for an application, GYRUS will be able
to protect that application against an entire class of attacks, no matter how attacks evolve.
Therefore, over time, the cost of deploying GYRUS will be lower than existing host-based
security systems, which usually need continuous updating to stay current with the latest
attacks.
Finally, we emphasize that GYRUS does not replace existing host-based security systems.
Instead, GYRUS uses a different philosophy to fill a gap in traditional security systems
by defining and monitoring normal behavior. Thus, GYRUS fits best when it is used to
complement other security systems, such as antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection
systems (IDS).
The primary contributions of this chapter include: 1) the “What You See Is What You
Send” concept that includes securely capturing what the user sees on the screen at the time
an event triggers outgoing traffic. Using this, we can determine what the user intended
outgoing traffic should be for an important class of applications. Furthermore, our idea
is transparent to the OS and applications, and only requires standard assumptions about
the virtualized environment. 2) The demonstration of how we can use common features
such as accessibility libraries3 for inter-VM monitoring without knowing the internals
of the monitored applications. And 3) the demonstration of the viability of GYRUS by
implementing the framework along with support for real-world applications in Microsoft
Windows 7. The prototype of GYRUS currently supports email, instant messaging, social
3 Similar capabilities should be available on most systems that support screen reader for visually impaired
users.
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networking applications, and online financial applications, effectively covering the most
common network applications in everyday use.
2.2 Related Work
This section discusses the related work and how GYRUS improves on the current state-of-
the-art. The discussion is also intended to provide some context for our work. We group the
related work into three areas: 1) capturing user intent, 2) trusted execution environment, and
3) verifiable computation.
Capturing Human Intent. Like GYRUS, BINDER [38] and Not-A-Bot (NAB) [72] also
try to determine if outgoing traffic is legitimate based on observed human intent; in particular,
both systems enforce a policy which states that outbound network connections that come
shortly after the user input are user intended. However, as mentioned in §2.1, in some cases
only capturing the timing of user-generated events is not enough. In contrast to BINDER
and Not-A-Bot, GYRUS captures more semantics of the user’s intent, so only traffic with
the correct content can leave the host. Additionally, since BINDER and Not-A-Bot use
timing information to determine if traffic is user intended, they cannot handle asynchronous
network transactions (such as emails queued to be sent later). GYRUS solves this problem
by relying on the semantics, but not the timing of user generated events, and by decoupling
the capturing of user intent from the enforcement of its traffic filtering policy.
User-Driven Access Control [133] captures the user’s intent for security purposes using
an access control model that grants permissions based on a user’s GUI interactions. It
uses access control gadgets (ACGs) to capture a user’s intent. Clicking on an ACG grants
permission on a resource associated with the ACG. GYRUS uses a similar approach on UI
widgets to identify traffic-triggering user input. However, in User-Driven Access Control,
the permission is bound to certain user-owned resources, not to the content the user intends to
send to these resources. In other words, when the user clicks on an ACG that has permission
to use the network device, any outgoing traffic, even with malicious intent, will be allowed.
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On the contrary, GYRUS captures both the user’s intent to send something and also the
intended content of that outgoing traffic and can stop any unintended network traffic.
Trusted Execution Environment. Virtualization has enjoyed a resurgence in popularity in
recent years. Proponents have argued that by using small, verifiable hypervisor kernels, the
isolation of one virtual machine from another can be assured [108, 76]. Recent research has
aimed to enhance this security by reducing the size of the hypervisor’s code [144, 162], mod-
ularizing its components [35], or verifying its security [96]. These isolation properties make
virtualized environments an attractive way to implement security applications. Virtualization-
based solutions have been used to implement trusted computing architectures [57, 111],
intrusion detection systems [58], malware analysis systems [89], and zero-day intrusion
analysis systems [91]. However, none of these take user intent into account. Thus, we
believe GYRUS can enrich research in each of these areas by showing how to build on the
isolation provided by a virtualized environment to perform simple checks that will improve
the system’s security.
Verifiable Computation. GYRUS has some common goals with the field of verifiable
computation, which has focused on ensuring correct code execution by an untrusted third
party. This work has taken many forms including general-proof protocols [66, 67, 59],
Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs) [12, 138, 139], or relying on fully-homomorphic
encryption (FHE) [60, 33]. While these systems can prove that a third party has processed a
requested execution correctly, they cannot tell whether the input of this execution is correct.
GYRUS fills this gap by checking that the input used for computation is what was provided
by the system’s user. GYRUS then completes the validation by also checking whether the
outcome (e.g, network packet) of application execution is the correct result for a given input.
Recent work [128] shows that verifiable computation can be used in practical settings, so we
believe that the complementary aspects of GYRUS and verifiable computation could prove to
be a powerful combination in future security systems.
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2.3 Overview
In this section, we present a high-level overview of GYRUS. First, we describe our threat
model, and then we introduce a policy called “What You See Is What You Send” (WYSI-
WYS), which is integrated and enforced by GYRUS to address the threat model. Then, we
describe the essential elements of GYRUS and discuss suitable applications of GYRUS.
2.3.1 Threat Model
GYRUS is designed to utilize a standard virtualized environment with a hypervisor (VMM),
a trusted dom-0 that executes most parts of GYRUS, and an untrusted dom-U that runs the
applications to be protected as well as with some untrusted components of GYRUS. We
collect data for determining a user’s intent from the hardware input and output devices,
including the keyboard, mouse, and screen. We make the following security assumptions:
• The hypervisor and dom-0 are fully trusted.
• Attackers cannot have physical access to the machine, and we trust the hardware.
• All hardware input events must be interposed by the hypervisor, and they must first be
delivered to dom-0. The hypervisor provides complete isolation of input hardware,
preventing hardware emulation originating from dom-U.
• Dom-U is not trusted; therefore it can be compromised entirely.
We stress that we do not apply any security assumption on dom-U. This implies that
GYRUS could function correctly even if the dom-U is entirely compromised (including
kernel-level attacks). In other words, even though GYRUS extracts information from the
memory of dom-U by running a helper component called UI Monitor inside of it, we do
NOT assume the correctness of such information. Instead, we designed a trusted component
called Secure Overlay to verify the validity of this information. Detailed information for
these components will be described in the next section.
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2.3.2 User Intent
As mentioned in §2.1, the goal of GYRUS is to capture rich semantics to understand a user’s
intent. This semantics is used to ensure that only user intended traffic can leave the system.
In this context, user intent is limited to what we can infer from the system’s input devices.
In BINDER and Not-a-Bot, user intent is captured by directly observing input hardware
events (mainly from keyboard and mouse). However, this approach is limited due to the
missing contextual information and the challenges of reconstructing user content without
“seeing” the screen. To make a sound security decision, we must capture further details
about the user’s intent. For example, the task of reconstructing a message from a mail
client using only keystrokes and mouse clicks would require us to reconstruct the entire
windowing system and the logic behind text boxes (e.g. how to update the location of the
caret upon receiving keyboard/mouse input), as well as to reproduce the logic to handle
application-specific function keys.
2.3.3 What You See Is What You Send
Instead of capturing and reconstructing user intent strictly from hardware input events, our
solution is to monitor output events from the target applications. The main observation
behind our approach is that in almost all text-based applications, the text that the user types
will be displayed on the screen. This output allows the user to know that she has typed
correctly and made the necessary correction when there is a mistake. Therefore, we can
capture an accurate representation of the user intent if GYRUS can “see” what a user sees.
With this information, we can determine what the user-intended outgoing traffic should look
like and make sure that this is the only traffic that the target application sends. We call this
approach “What You See Is What You Send” (WYSIWYS).
To enforce WYSIWYS, GYRUS is required to correctly and fully capture textual content
that is displayed to the user. Additionally, GYRUS needs information about the UI structure.
In GYRUS, we have two components that implement these features: a dom-U component
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Figure 1: Secure Overlay working with the GMail application in Internet Explorer 10. Overlaid
edit controls are highlighted with green bounding boxes. Gyrus changes the border color to red if it
detects any infringement.
called UI Monitor, which extracts textual content and a high-level UI structure of the current
screen, and a dom-0 trusted component called Secure Overlay which verifies if the captured
text matches the user’s intent.
The UI Monitor operates on top of the UI Automation [120] library in Microsoft Win-
dows, which is originally intended for building accessibility utilities such as screen readers
for visually impaired users (i.e., this library is designed to capture text displayed on the
screen and fits our purpose very well). Not only does the UI monitor capture the displayed
text, but it also allows us to determine if the mouse click event observed by dom-0 signifies
the user’s intent to commit what is displayed on the screen to the network.
Since the UI monitor relies on the code in dom-U, we stress that we cannot and do not
trust the output of this component. Instead, we use the Secure Overlay to show the data
captured by the UI monitor to the user. As a result, the user can either validate what the
secure overlay displays by not modifying it, or disagree by correcting what she sees (and
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this will be captured by the UI monitor again). We call this idea reflective verification.
Figure 1 illustrates how WYSIWYS works with the UI Monitor and the Secure Overlay.
The UI Monitor grabs the UI structure information from the current screen, including the
location of windows, text boxes, and buttons, along with textual content from the text boxes.
Then the Secure Overlay positions a transparent overlay screen, and for each text box on
the current dom-U screen, it will dynamically draw a matching text box with the same text
content at the exact same location. This Secure Overlay component is always drawn on top
of the whole dom-U screen, so it always hides any text boxes of applications running in
dom-U. While input interaction stays the same from the user’s perspective, the output that
user sees is actually the text that is captured by the Secure Overlay. And the text shown on
the screen will be updated as the user interacts with the application, so the user will naturally
verify that this captured content matches her intent.
GYRUS needs to ensure that for all cases, the text shown on the Secure Overlay is
exactly matched with the text that the underlying application is presenting. However, in
our reflective verification scenario, the user can only verify changes in the currently visible
part of the text. If some lines of text scroll out of view and then get updated while they
are hidden, this verification process is no longer valid. To handle hidden updates, GYRUS
keeps track of the text and its changes. To indicate the status of verification, we place a
border around the text box. When everything is as expected, the border is green. When
the hidden text changes, the border turns red, indicating that the user needs to manually
verify the content. In our experience, GYRUS works well with most text boxes for default
text typing. Additionally, GYRUS can support text-editing features such as cut/copy/paste,
automatic spell correction, selection of text from a combo box, etc.
2.3.4 Network Traffic Monitoring
After GYRUS captures the user’s intent using the UI Monitor and the Secure Overlay, the
second part of implementing WYSIWYS is to ensure that the traffic generated by the
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Figure 2: An example WYSIWYS applicable operation: adding a comment on a post on Facebook.
After typing a message for the comment and pressing the ENTER key, the application generates
network traffic which goes to the URL: https://www.facebook.com/ajax/ufi/add-comment.php.
Between the on-screen text and the outgoing network traffic, there is a direct mapping of user-intended
content.
monitored application matches what GYRUS expects based on the captured user intent.
GYRUS assumes that there is a simple mapping between the captured user intent and the
outgoing traffic. In other words, the network protocol used in the application must transmit
the information displayed to the user directly or with simple modifications (e.g., text
represented in XML, or a standard encoding such as Base64 and URL encoding). Even
though this assumption does not hold for all applications, we argue that many everyday
applications are mostly text-based and have very simple processing to generate outgoing
network traffic based on the text input from users. Figure 2 shows an example of a simple
mapping between user input and network traffic content.
Finally, note that GYRUS only inspects specific types of messages under the protocol
used by the protected application(s). GYRUS will not interfere with any traffic outside of
this scope. Even for traffic originating from target applications, GYRUS will only check (and
potentially block) traffic that contains user-generated content. For example, for SMTP and
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instant messenger protocols, we only check commands for sending messages. For HTTP(S)
traffic, we only inspect individual URLs that submit user-intended contents, such as posting
Twitter messages, adding comments on Facebook, or sending money on Paypal. In §2.4, we
will describe how to identify such traffic using the User Intent Signature.
2.3.5 Target Applications
Not all traffic that is observed by GYRUS can be traced back to some user action that
explicitly expresses her intent to create such traffic. For example, when the user tries to
load a web page in the browser, she probably has no knowledge about what further HTTP
requests will automatically be generated to download all the images on the loaded pages.
In addition to these automatic requests, if the text content of the application is represented
using a complex encoding on the network protocol, (e.g., evaluating some functions or
encryption), GYRUS cannot infer expected output of network traffic. As such, in this work,
our focus is on traffic that contains rich semantics about the user’s intent, and we consider
cases where the user does not have a clear understanding of what traffic their action will
create to be out of scope. Furthermore, we are particularly interested in traffic that is related
to transactions that could create long lasting harmful effects to the user (e.g., financial loss).
Examples of such transactions include:
• Transferring money through an online financial service.
• Modifying text-value fields (e.g., the speed of a turbine, or the water level in a nuclear
power plant) of the SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.
• Sending a message through an e-mail client, or an internet messaging (IM) application.
• Posting a status update or comment message through an online social network.
Examples of applications suitable for GYRUS include email clients, instant messaging
applications, various online social networks, and online financial services. We will further
illustrate how GYRUS can protect critical actions of these applications in §2.5. Our results
indicate that the proposed idea of WYSIWYS is very effective in stopping these applications
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from being used to send manipulated traffic by the malware, thus blocking many traditional
venues to profit from compromising hosts. In other words, GYRUS can protect sensitive
transactions with rich user-generated semantics from malware on the host. For example,
GYRUS can prevent botnet malware from sending spam e-mails and instant messaging
spam, launching impersonating attacks such as spear phishing, and preventing malware that
transfers money from an online banking account.
2.4 Design and Implementation
2.4.1 Architecture
GYRUS employs a virtual machine based isolation mechanism; therefore, its architecture is
separated into two parts. GYRUS puts all trusted monitoring modules in either dom-0 or the
hypervisor, while dom-U remains untrusted. The architecture of GYRUS is summarized in
Figure 3. GYRUS is composed of several key components:
Authorization Database. The Authorization DB stores authorization vectors, which
contain sufficient information to validate outgoing traffic based on a user’s intent. An
authorization vector is generated by the Central Control and allows us to temporally decouple
capturing user intent from the actual enforcement of the WYSIWYS policy at the network
interface. At this level, our monitoring is independent of the internal logic of the application.
Input events that trigger network traffic (e.g., clicking SEND in an e-mail client or pressing
the ENTER key in the text box of an instant messenger application) will invoke the Central
Control to create an authorization vector based on the captured intended content and save
it to the authorization database. Later, when the outgoing traffic is generated from the
application after processing user input, the traffic will be analyzed in the Network Monitor,
which will look up the database for evidence of user intent. Our Network Monitor will
authorize the traffic only if there exists a matching authorization vector. Otherwise, it will
drop the packet. Moreover, this decoupling enables GYRUS to handle asynchronous, or
scheduled traffic like e-mail queued to be sent at a later time.
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Network Monitor. The Network Monitor is a transparent proxy with a built-in monitoring
capability. This component inspects all traffic under the monitored protocol. If outgoing
traffic is using a protocol corresponding to any of the applications protected by GYRUS, the
traffic is inspected by querying the Authorization DB to see if the traffic is intended by the
user. Unintended traffic is blocked. We also note that the Network Monitor will allow all
traffic from other protocols (i.e., not being monitored) to pass through without inspection.
User-Intent Signature. The User-Intent Signature captures all the application-specific
logic in GYRUS. The signatures are expressed in a language that we designed specifically for
Gyrus. It covers three categories of information: the condition that triggers network traffic,
the required UI structure data for capturing content-intent, and the content of the monitored
traffic, which will be matched with UI data.. This user-intent signature language represents
our effort to simplify and provide structures to the development of per-application logic
under GYRUS.
Central Control. The Central Control contains the logic that runs the other elements. Its
main task is to process intercepted hardware input events. Upon arrival of these events, the
Central Control will query the UI monitor to see if the event signifies a user intent to send
the currently displayed content out to the network. If so, the Central Control will query
the Secure Overlay and the list of active User-Intent Signature to generate an authorization
vector for the expected traffic and save it in the Authorization DB. The hardware input event
will then be delivered to dom-U, finally reaching its intended destination: a user-driven
application. Since the Central Control does not modify any inputs, it does not change the
user experience beyond adding an imperceptible delay (see Table 2).
In summary, the workflow of GYRUS can be described as follows (Figure 3): The UI
Monitor communicates with the Secure Overlay to keep the information displayed in the
overlay up-to-date (0). A hardware input event reaches the Central Control (1). Then, the
Central Control queries the UI Monitor to see if this input triggers network traffic or not
(2). If it does, the Central Control queries the Secure Overlay (3) to create an authorization
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Figure 3: Workflow of Gyrus upon receiving a traffic-triggering event. Grayed and solid-lined areas
are trusted components, while dotted lines indicate untrusted components.
vector that describes the user-intended outgoing traffic and save it to the Authorization
DB (4). At the same time, the intercepted input event is passed to dom-U (4’). After the
application inside dom-U gets the input, it generates the outgoing network traffic (5). The
traffic is intercepted and inspected by the Network Monitor. The network monitor then
queries the Authorization DB to determine if the intercepted traffic matches user intent (6).
The traffic will be allowed to be sent if it matches an authorization vector. Otherwise, traffic
is blocked, and GYRUS raises the alarm to notify the user of a likely attack attempt (7).
2.4.2 Implementation
We implemented our prototype of the GYRUS framework using a Linux/KVM host running
Ubuntu 12.04.2 LTS and a dom-U guest virtual machine running Windows 7 SP1. We
note that the GYRUS architecture is not limited to this particular software stack. We chose
KVM and Windows to demonstrate GYRUS in a traditional desktop environment. In gen-
eral, GYRUS only requires three platform capabilities: intercepting input & network events,
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accessing UI objects, and drawing a secure overlay UI. Therefore, GYRUS could be imple-
mented on a variety of different platforms. For example, GYRUS could use BitVisor [144]
as a lightweight secure hypervisor or could use the Dalvik VM [8] on Android as isolation
and hardware event-capturing instrument. Similarly, the UI Monitor is not limited to the UI
Automation on the Microsoft platforms. Other accessibility frameworks – such as ATK [62]
and XAutomation [147] on Linux, and NSAccessiblity [107] on Mac OS X – could replace
it. Finally, GYRUS could be implemented using a thin-client model with the trusted client
terminal [109] and a network monitor on the remote host.
In-Guest UI Monitor. Since our implementation of the UI monitor is primarily based on
the UIAutomation library from Microsoft, we begin with a brief description of this library
before presenting details about the UI monitor.
UI Automation. The UIAutomation library represents the UI structure of every window
in the system as a tree of UI objects. The root of the tree is the desktop, lower level nodes
correspond to individual windows, and further down nodes correspond to components
of a window (e.g., buttons, edit boxes, etc.). This tree is similar to the document object
model (DOM) tree in a web browser. Each UI object contains data that describe the
visual aspects of the corresponding components (e.g., size, visibility, textual content). The
UIAutomation library exposes this tree to calling programs through a set of functions that
facilitate traversing and querying the tree (e.g., we can search for nodes in the tree with
certain properties, or at a particular location on screen), and allows us to access all properties
of the nodes. Furthermore, the UIAutomation library also allows calling programs to listen
for changes in both the structure of the tree as well as properties of individual nodes.
As mentioned in §2.3, the UI monitor is a component that runs in dom-U, and it serves
two purposes: one is to determine if a keyboard/mouse input event 4 signifies the user’s
intent to send something over the network. And the other is to provide information to the
4Input event here is not the real hardware input event. All of the hardware input is handled by Central
Control, and the UI Monitor receives a signal from the Central Control when an event arrives.
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secure overlay to display up-to-date user generated text in target applications. In other words,
implementation of this component needs to provide two primitive operations: identifying
the object targeted by an input event and extracting UI properties from text boxes of interest.
Identifying UI Objects. To check if the current input generates network traffic, the
UI Monitor first looks for the UI object that receives the current input. For a mouse click
event, the UI Monitor calls a Windows API named ElementFromPoint to get the object that
is currently located under the cursor to determine if the click signifies a user’s intent to
generate outgoing traffic. For the keystroke events, we use the GetFocusedElement API to
retrieve the currently focused object (which is also the target of the current input). Upon
retrieving the target object for the input event, we can determine if it is a button or a text
box of interest by querying the UIAutomation library for the properties of this object. The
application-specific logic required for determining the traffic-triggering event is configured
in a User Intent Signature (e.g. checking if it is a button with its name being Send on an
e-mail client). Upon receiving an event that generates traffic, the UI Monitor collects UI
structure information specified in the User Intent Signature then uses this to inform the
Secure Overlay that the traffic-triggering event has occurred. The Secure Overlay also
receives the details about what operation and which application triggered the event, and the
content from UI data required to generate an authorization vector. A point worth noting
here is that we block all updates to the Secure Overlay when we query the UI monitor.
This prevents any malicious updates on visible data right before the event, even with the
prediction of user’s behavior on traffic-triggering event. Additionally, we ensure that the
query to the UI monitor completes before the actual input is delivered to the application
inside the dom-U, so it will not interfere the application’s behavior §2.6.1 presents a more
detailed security analysis of GYRUS.
Extracting Text and UI Structure Data. To support the Secure Overlay, the UI Moni-
tor needs to extract the user-intended text and associated UI properties. First of all, before
extracting the currently displayed text, the UI Monitor registers the text box to the Secure
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Overlay to track its properties. Whenever a text box is in focus, the UI Monitor will assign it
a unique ID based on the AutomationID, an identifier from UIAutomation, of the UI object.
This identifier will be used for updating properties of the overlaid text boxes, and indicating
which text boxes are needed for generating an authorization vector. At the same time, it
extracts the required properties from the text box to support overlaying. To get the screen
location of the text box, we query its BoundingRectangle property. For text boxes that
support properties such as rich text, formatting, text selection, and scrolling, we extract them
from the TextPattern object. Finally, the UI Monitor captures user-intended text from the
Value property of a target text box. For text boxes with hidden content (e.g., scrolled-out
text), the Value and TextPattern properties together provide the complete content and
useful position information. The Secure Overlay will be notified of all extracted data, along
with its identifier, to enable displaying this information back to the user.
To handle updates to the target text box, once we register a text box, we add an event
handler to subscribe the PropertyChangedEvent of the target object for its Value property
once we register a text box to the Secure Overlay. In the event handler, we send the updated
content to the overlay. This method will update the Secure Overlay whenever the user edits
the text. Finally, we register to listen for the change in position of the caret object and
forward this information to the overlay so that we can display the caret correctly.
In addition to getting properties for the target text box object, the UI Monitor tracks
windowing events when multiple target applications are involved. In particular, we adopted
the policy of only displaying the text content of the currently focused window on the overlay;
this policy significantly simplifies our implementation and only has a small impact on the
usability of our system 5. Although overlaid text boxes for background applications are
not displayed, the Secure Overlay maintains previously captured user-intended text while
5Alternatively, we could keep track of the visible region of each target application by implementing a
mirror display device driver. We have successfully implemented this functionality, but have not yet integrated
it with the rest of our system.
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it is visible, and disables its update while it is hidden 6. Therefore, GYRUS can protect the
integrity of the content of text boxes in background applications even if it is not shown on
the screen. To handle window focus change, we listen for the system-wide FocusChanged
and WindowClosed events from the UIAutomation library. In the handler of these events,
we signal the Secure Overlay to hide the content of the window that is closed or has lost
focus and to display the content of the newly focused window. We also listen for the
EVENT_SYSTEM_MOVESIZEEND event and send the Secure Overlay the updated location of the
textual content of the target application whenever it is moved or resized. Finally, we choose
not to listen for events related to window creation but only handle newly opened applications
when the text boxes of interest in these applications first receive focus.
Secure Overlay and Central Control. We implemented both the Secure Overlay and the
Central control components as Java programs that run in dom-0. Since the implementation
of the Central Control is quite simple, we will not present the details here. However, some
implementation details of the Secure Overlay warrant further discussion.
The Secure Overlay has two primary tasks. First, it is responsible for securely displaying
the user-generated text, as captured by the UI monitor in dom-U. This part mainly involves
some UI/graphics programming and some bookkeeping to group captured text in the same
window together for proper handling of windowing events (in particular, when a window
gains or loses focus, we need to show or hide all captured text for this window). Our
experiments show that the UI monitor provides us with sufficiently rich information to
provide a seamless user experience; captured text is rendered without noticeable a difference
in terms of location, size, font and color (including background color for highlighting text).
The second task for the secure overlay is to capture and reconstruct the user’s intent
based on all the textual content that is displayed in the overlay window. By doing this, we
can determine what the user-intended outgoing traffic should look like when the user finally
6 Allowing updates while invisible would prevent reflective verification. If an update is made, the text box
will be marked as being “dirty” and will not be used for creating an authorization vector until the user sees the
updated content by moving focus into corresponding application
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decides to commit what she has typed to the network. Upon receipt of a traffic-triggering
event, the UI Monitor will send the tag name of the User Intent Signature, along with
identifiers for the text boxes that are required to reconstruct a user’s intent to the Central
Control. Based on the tag-matching with a User Intent Signature, the Central Control
extracts text content for each corresponding text box from the Secure Overlay, builds an
authorization vector with them, and saves it to the Authorization DB.
For creating an authorization vector, the Secure Overlay should maintain the user-
intended text. In the case where all the user-generated text is displayed on the screen,
the Secure Overlay can easily maintain the user-intended text. However, the task is more
complicated if the text is displayed in a text box with a scrollbar. In this case, the UI Monitor
is still able to capture all the text in the text box; however, reflective verification will not
work for the text that has been scrolled out of view. As such, malware in dom-U can modify
the invisible parts of the text without the user noticing. To solve this problem, the Secure
Overlay keeps track of changes in the content captured by the UI monitor and only considers
updates to the target text box that satisfy the following criteria as valid:
• Updates cannot occur at multiple non-consecutive locations (i.e., the difference be-
tween the old version and the new version of some captured text can only be the result
of inserting or deleting a single character/chunk of text).
• Updates can only occur in the visible part of the text (i.e., the point where the character
or chunk of text is inserted or deleted must be visible before the update occurs).
• If a chunk of text is inserted, the end of the chunk must be visible after the update.
Similarly, if a character is inserted, the character must be visible after the update.
• If a chunk of text is deleted, the text following the deleted chunk must be visible after
the update. Similarly, if one character is deleted, the character that follows must be
visible after the update.
If the UI Monitor reports updates that violate the above condition, the Secure Overlay
will draw a red border over the corresponding text box to let the user know of the violation.
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In this case, the user should check the text displayed by the overlay to determine if GYRUS
correctly captured her intent. If it was, she then commit the input to the network. The above
design allows us to correctly and securely handle typical operations like typing, deleting
text using “backspace”, copy-and-paste, deleting/replacing a chunk of highlighted text, even
autocomplete and auto-spell-correction. The only caveats we know of are: 1) “Find and
replace all”, and 2) if the user pastes a chunk of text that is too long to be displayed all
at once, some of the pasted text will not be visible in the entire process, and is subject to
illegitimate modifications by malware. In these cases, the best practice will be for the user to
scroll through the pasted text to ascertain the correctness (and we believe this is a reasonable
practice, even if not for security reasons).
Authorization DB. The Authorization DB saves the user intent captured by the Secure
Overlay at the time when we capture an input event that signifies the user wants to send
something out to the network, and is queried by the Network Monitor when the monitor
observes actual outgoing traffic of the corresponding protocol. To allow an efficient lookup,
we implement the Authorization DB as a hashtable stored in Ruby, indexed by a data
structure called authorization vector, which captures both the exact content of the expected
outgoing traffic as well as the expected protocol used to send the content. We also associate
each key in the hashtable with a numeric value which indicates how many messages matching
that key can be sent, so we can handle scenarios where the user intends to send the same
message for multiple times.
Network Monitor. The Network Monitor is implemented as a set of transparent proxies,
one for each protocol of interest. Each of these proxies has deep packet inspection capability,
and we used iptables to redirect all of the traffic of each monitored protocols’ port to the
corresponding proxy for inspection. For SMTP and YMSG, we used stand-alone proxy
software proxsmtp [156] and IMSpector [78], respectively. For HTTP, even though there
exists a transparent proxy with the capability of ICAP [48] handling such as Squid [158], we
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wrote our own implementation because of performance issues 7. For SSL/TLS encapsulated
protocols (e.g., HTTPS, and SMTP TLS), we use the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) approach
to decrypt the traffic to be analyzed, and re-encrypt it afterward. In particular, we created a
self-signed CA certificate and CA-signed wild-card certificate, and inject the CA certificate
to dom-U as a trusted CA. With these certificates, GYRUS can impose itself as the server
at the setup phase for SSL connections, and be able to decrypt any subsequent traffic from
dom-U to the actual server. Finally, we note that this MITM approach is not an invention
of our own, but is widely used approach for deep packet inspection (DPI) with various
intrusion detection/prevension systems (IDSs/IPSs) [140].
User-Intent Signature. As we have mentioned in §2.1, an approach that tries to model
and enforce correct behavior of applications will inevitably have some per-application logic.
To make this development process as painless as possible, we created our own language for
specifying the per-application logic as well as the programs to interpret the specifications.
We call specifications under our language User-Intent Signatures, and we express these
signatures in the JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) format. Each user intent signature
contains eight JSON object fields, and the names of the fields are: TAG, WINDOW, DOMAIN,
EVENT, COND, CAPTURE, TYPE, and BIND. In the following, we will give a brief description of
each with its intended purpose. Please refer to Figure 5, and Figure 6 for examples of user
intent signature as well as more specifics of the signature language. Before starting, we first
note that the TAG field in this signature is for assigning a unique signature name.
Identifying Traffic Event and Focused Application. Our monitor component, the
UI Monitor, uses this signature to identify traffic-triggering input events. To specifying a
traffic-generating event in a User Intent Signature, the signature writer can set the EVENT
field. This field will contain the value of required hardware input event. For example, it
could be LCLICK to indicate a left mouse click on the send button of an e-mail client or
7 Because Squid does not support multi-threading for traffic relaying, it can cause severe delays when a
web browser loads a web page.
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Figure 4: UI structure of Windows Live Mail. Tree structure on the left is from Inspect.exe. 0
indicates event-receiving object (send button), +2 and +3 indicate the 2nd and the 3rd sibling from
the origin (a negative number indicates the previous sibling). P is a symbol for a parent, and C refers
to a child.
ENTER for reacting on pressing the return key on the message dialog of an instant messenger
application. This field only partially defines the traffic-triggering event. It should be linked
with application-specific, operation-specific information to correctly identify if the input
will be delivered to the specified application. For correctly figuring out the details from an
input receiving application, we use the tree-structure information of UI from UI Automation,
in addition to a simple indicator such as the name of the window for stand-alone apps
or domain name of currently visiting page URL in web-apps. Figure 5 shows how the
signature is constructed to detect a Windows Live Mail application. In the compose view
of the application, its window name is always ATH_Note, so the WINDOW field indicates this
information. The sub-components in the UI tree-structure are – starting from the event
receiving object – a button named “Send this message now”, text edit boxes for the To
and Subject fields, and a content pane for the e-mail message text. Figure 4 illustrates
how UI Automation manages this tree-structure. Note that the COND section lists all of the
conditions of the tree-structure. For internal fields, the number indicates the relative distance
from an event receiving object as a sibling on the tree. So 0 means the object specified
triggered the event, and +2 or +3 indicates the next siblings at the specified distance (a
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1 {
2 "TAG" : "LIVEMAILCOMPOSE",
3 "EVENT" : "LCLICK",
4 "WINDOW" : "ATH_Note",
5 "COND" : {
6 "0" : {
7 "CONT" : "BUTTON",
8 "NAME" : "Send this message now"
9 },
10 "+2" : {
11 "CONT" : "EDIT",
12 "NAME" : "To:"
13 },
14 "+3" : {
15 "CONT" : "EDIT",
16 "NAME" : "Subject:"
17 },
18 "P-1CCCCCCCCC" : {
19 "CONT" : "PANE"
20 }
21 },
22 "CAPTURE" : {
23 "A" : "+2.value",
24 "B" : "+3.value",
25 "C" : "P-1CCCCCCCCC.value"
26 },
27 "TYPE" : "SMTP",
28 "BIND" : {
29 "METHOD" : "SEND",
30 "PARAMS" : {
31 "to" : "A",
32 "subject" : "B",




Figure 5: User Intent Signature for sending e-mail on Windows Live Mail.
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1 {
2 "TAG" : "FBCOMMENT",
3 "EVENT" : "ENTER",
4 "DOMAIN" : "www.facebook.com",
5 "COND" : {
6 "0" : {
7 "NAME" : "Write a comment...",
8 "CONT" : "EDIT"
9 },
10 "P-1" : {
11 "CONT" : "IMG"
12 }
13 },
14 "CAPTURE" : {
15 "A" : "0.value"
16 },
17 "TYPE" : "WEB",
18 "BIND" : {
19 "URL" : "www.facebook.com/ajax/ufi/add_comment.php",
20 "METHOD" : "POST",
21 "PARAMS" : {




Figure 6: User Intent Signature for posting comments on Facebook Web-app.
negative number indicates the previous sibling at the distance). P and C refers to a parent
and a child, respectively.
For the UI Monitor, when an input comes, we iterate over all signatures that have an
EVENT field with the current input, and check the UI tree-structure conditions to determine
whether current input triggers traffic or not. If it does, as our workflow goes, the required
data will be sent to Central Control to generate an authorization vector.
The Network Monitor also uses this signature for determining whether the current packet
is monitored or not. The TYPE field specifies the monitored protocol. Its value can be a
protocol name (e.g., SMTP for e-mail client and WEB for web-apps). Since network monitor
only traps some transactions for each protocol, to bind a signature to a certain transaction, we
use the METHOD field under BIND to specify the desired transaction for non-web protocols 8,
and both the METHOD and the URL 9 fields are used for web-apps (METHOD is for distinguishing
8 We assigned natural names for each operation. The line "METHOD" : "SEND" in Figure 5 means that the
signature should only monitor the sending operation in the SMTP protocol.
9 Similar to the remote procedure call, a URL in a web-app is analogous to invoking a function on the host,
so a URL can indicate a particular transaction.
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GET and POST messaging in web-apps).
Specifying User-Intended Text. The User Intent Signature is also responsible for
indicating which text boxes correspond to the user’s intent, for generating authorization
vectors. With the UI Monitor, it uses the CAPTURE field to indicate text boxes that contain
user-intended text. In this field, the left-side key value is assigned alphabetically to simplify
text matching in for network packets, and the right-side indicates the location of the target
text box on the UI tree-structure and any required properties for it. According to this
information, the UI Monitor transmits a unique identifier of target text boxes to the Central
Control, and then the Central Control extracts a user verified text from the Secure Overlay,
and then the Central Control finally creates an authorization vector. The vector will be in a
form that can be reconstructed within the Network Monitor.
For the Network Monitor, it refers to the PARAMS field to extract content from the packet.
The left-side key value for this is a natural name for the stand-alone protocol or the URL
parameter for web-apps. The right-side value has an alphabet value that is previously
assigned in the CAPTURE field, which is used to link captured text boxes to each parameter
within the current packet. Since an authorization vector is created with the knowledge of the
PARAMS field, the Network Monitor can reconstruct the correct vector using only this packet
and signature data. After reconstructing the vector, we query the authorization DB to check
for proof of previously established user intent.
2.5 Application Case Studies
In this section, we will present our experience in using GYRUS to protect existing applications.
Our experiments cover traditional, stand-alone applications as well as web applications.
For stand-alone applications, we studied how to apply GYRUS to Windows Live Mail and
Digsby (an instant messaging client). For web applications, we picked the following from
the top 25 sites according to Alexa [3]: GMail, Facebook and Paypal, and for our studies,
we assume these web applications are accessed using Microsoft Internet Explorer 10. We
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argue that these applications represent some of the most important ones in daily life. We
base this argument on the Pew Internet survey called “What Internet Users Do On A Typical
Day” [130], which lists sending/reading emails, using online social networking, doing online
banking, and sending instant messages among the 20 things most people do on a daily basis.
We also observe that the remaining of the listed popular activities mostly involve users
getting information from the Internet, and does not require the transmission of any user
generated content, and thus are not the target for GYRUS protection.
The focus of the following discussion is on how we can specify the per-application
logic necessary for GYRUS protection for each of the target applications using a User Intent
Signature. We believe our experience shows that the User Intent Signature language makes
this task very manageable.
Constructing User Intent Signature. Construction of a User Intent Signature is two
folded as GYRUS decouples capturing of the user intent and monitoring of the network
traffic. The UI part of the signature can be constructed intuitively. First, we arrange the UI
as it would be used for composing user-generated content. Then we identify an input event
that triggers traffic and the associated text boxes that contain user-intended text through a
visual inspection of the UI. Next, with the help of a tool called inspect.exe from the UI
Automation library, we can identify the tree-structure and other details of the UI. Finally, this
information is used to construct the definition distinguishing the application that receives
input events.
The second part, the network side, requires an understanding of the underlying protocol
that the application uses for network communication. In particular, we need to identify
which traffic we should intercept for monitoring, and discover how the user-intended text is
formatted within the packet. In this section, we provide examples of applications that can
be protected by GYRUS, and we demonstrate how the User Intent Signature simplifies the
process for supporting a new application.
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2.5.1 Windows Live Mail
Application Specification. Windows Live Mail is a stand-alone email client, and the focus
of our experiment is to use GYRUS to make sure that any outgoing e-mail messages (i.e.,
through SMTP) are intended by the user. The user interacts with a compose window to write
a message. The window has a Send button that user will click when the user decides to send
the message. And there are several text boxes reserved for a list of recipients (e.g., To, Cc,
etc.), and the message Subject. Finally, the window has a rich text pane at the bottom, to
compose the content of the message.
Event and Intended Text. The traffic will be generated after the user clicks the Send
button. On the event, GYRUS will extract user-intended texts from the To, Subject, and the
message body text pane.
Network Traffic Specification. Outgoing traffic will be sent through the SMTP protocol,
and we are specifically interested in the portion of the SMTP exchange responsible for
sending a message. All user-generated text will directly be shown as the same text in the
traffic, and GYRUS will extract each field to query to the Authorization DB.
Constructing Signature. We show the signature for this application in Figure 5. The
input event that triggers traffic creation is pressing the Send button. So we set the EVENT
field to LCLICK. To distinguish the application window, we set WINDOW field to the classname
of the e-mail composing window, which is ATH_Note in this case. To improve the event
condition that detects the application, we list all UI objects that are required to capture user
intent in COND section. Starting from the event receiving object, the Send button, the text
box for recipients is the second sibling, and the text box for the subject is the third sibling.
So we mark them as +2, +3, respectively. Locating the rich text pane used for the message
also requires tree-traversal. In our scheme, it is located at P-1CCCCCCCCC. Since we need to
capture the contents of all text boxes and the pane, in the CAPTURE field, we assign temporary
variables to each UI object as A, B, and C.
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For the network monitor, we set the protocol by assigning SMTP in the TYPE field, and
SEND in the METHOD field, and bind each of the variables assigned during the CAPTURE stage
to protocol specific variables.
2.5.2 Digsby: Yahoo! Messenger & Twitter
Application Specification. Digsby is a stand-alone client for accessing multiple instant
messengers and online social network services within one application. In our experiments,
we focus on using GYRUS to protect the outgoing communication to Yahoo Messenger and
Twitter. Communications to other messengers/online social network services can easily be
covered as long as we have the corresponding proxy for handling the network traffic. We
would simply require one user intent signature for each supported protocol. For both Yahoo
Messenger and Twitter, Digsby provides a simple GUI. The user interacts with a messaging
dialog window, which has a text box for the message at the bottom. After typing a text
message, the user can send the message by pressing the ENTER key while still focused in the
message text box.
Event and Intended Text. The traffic will be generated after pressing the ENTER key. At
this time, GYRUS will extract user-intended text from the message text box at the bottom of
the dialog.
Network Traffic Specification. For Yahoo Messenger, outgoing traffic will be sent
through the Yahoo! Messenger (YMSG) protocol. Similar to the e-mail case, we are only
interested in the portion of the protocol that contains the message. The user-intended text
will be encapsulated with HTML tags for formatting, so GYRUS will extract the text and
then query the authorization DB. For Twitter, Digsby will communicate with its server
through an HTTP REST API. The network monitor needs to watch for POST requests to
https://api.twitter.com/1/statuses/update.json. In this case, the user-intended
text will be encoded with URL encoding, so the extracted text will be queried to the
authorization DB after proper decoding.
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Constructing Signature. Pressing the ENTER key after typing a message triggers out-
going network traffic. Looking up the class name of the dialog window, Digsby uses
wxWindowClass for Yahoo Messenger and wxWindowClassNR for Twitter. To improve the
event conditions of the UI structure, in addition to checking whether current input is deliv-
ered to the text box for a message, we also check if it has a pane object as its siblings. Since
we need to capture user-intended text from the message text box, we assign the variable A
to it for the CAPTURE field. On the network side, we set the protocol type as YMSG and WEB
respectively. We set the METHOD field as SEND for YMSG, and POST for Twitter. Variable A
for the intended text will be bound to a variable called message in YMSG, and status for
Twitter.
2.5.3 Web-App: GMail
Application Specification. The workflow of GMail is very similar to that of Windows
Live Mail. It has a Send button on top of the compose screen10, along with To, Subject, and
the message pane.
Network Traffic Specification. On clicking the Send button, an e-mail message will
be sent through a POST method URL https://mail.google.com/mail. The GMail
application accesses the URL for multiple purposes, however, the URL only serves for
sending an e-mail message when the URL set with a URL parameter act=sm. The user-
intended text is transmitted in the to, subject, and body parameters of the POST request.
Constructing Signature. Because the left-click on the mouse is the traffic-triggering
event, we set the EVENT field as LCLICK. For the application UI condition, we use the
domain name mail.google.com as a window identifier, along with the relative positions
of text boxes to the Send button. For the network traffic, the trap condition is the URL
https://mail.google.com/mail with parameter condition act=sm. At the Network
Monitor, UI variables in the CAPTURE field will be matched with POST parameters named
10 We ran GYRUS with the old version of GMail composing UI, which was available until July 2013.
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to, subject and body.
2.5.4 Web-App: Facebook
Application Specification. We focus on three transactions in the Facebook application:
posting a status update, posting a comment, and sending a message. For the status update,
the user types a message in the text box and clicks the Post button. This is similar to the
e-mail applications. For adding a comment and sending a message, the user presses the
ENTER key after composing her message, which is analogous to the Digsby example.
Network Traffic Specification. For the status updates, traffic goes to https://www.
facebook.com/ajax/updatestatus.php, and the user-intended text is transmitted in the
POST variable xhpc_message_text. Adding a comment goes to https://www.facebook.
com/ajax/ufi/add_comment.php, and the user-intended text is transmitted in the POST
variable comment_text. Finally, sending a message goes to https://www.facebook.
com/ajax/mercury/send_messages.php, and the user-intended text is transmitted in
the POST variable message_batch[0][body].
Constructing Signature. The traffic-triggering event is LCLICK for status updates, and
ENTER for the others. Identifying the application and expected transaction for each event
is challenging because all three transactions are done in the same window so we cannot
distinguish each transaction using only the domain name. Therefore we can distinguish each
transaction using additional UI structure checks. We link camera, location, and emoticon
menu icons as siblings for distinguishing status update, link profile image and the shadow
text “Write a comment” for adding a comment, and link an icon name with “Add more
friends to chat” and conversation history objects as siblings for sending a chat message.
2.5.5 Web-App: Paypal
Application Specification. Using GYRUS with Paypal enables a validation of the integrity
of the amount of money sent to someone. On the “transferring money” page, after he types
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the username or e-mail address of the recipient and the amount of money to transfer in
the text boxes, the user clicks the Continue button to send the money. The workflow is
analogous to our e-mail examples, with the primary difference being that the message is the
amount of money to be transferred in this case.
Network Traffic Specification. After clicking the Continue button, the traffic will be
sent to https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/webscr if its POST parameter has the
following value: cmd=_flow. The user-intended text will be placed in the POST parameters,
email and amount.
Constructing Signature. The event is set to LCLICK, and the application condition will
check domain www.paypal.com and whether the UI tree-structure has all participating
text boxes as siblings. The traffic trap condition for the Network Monitor should be set
as https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-bin/webscr, and its POST parameter named
cmd=_flow. Finally, variables for captured text for the amount of money and the recipient
will be linked to the POST parameters amount and email, respectively.
2.5.6 Discussions
In cases where multiple applications use the same protocol, we need one User-Intent
Signature for each application using that protocol. While this may seem a lot of work,
defining the correct behavior of applications of interest is still much more scalable than
endlessly (re)modeling (new) attack/malware behavior.
As we’ve shown in the examples above, the language we have devised not only allows
us to support new applications easily but it also cleanly separates the per-application logic
from the core GYRUS framework. With this language, the process of specifying the User
Intent Signature for an application only requires knowledge about the UI (and the structure
of the UI object tree exposed by the UI Automation library for that application, which can
be obtained using standard tools like Inspect [119] from Microsoft) and some knowledge
about the network protocol used by the application, but no further details about the internals
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Table 1: List of activities where Gyrus can help to protect the corresponding network transactions,
from the survey ‘What Internet Users Do Online [131]’, by Pew Research Center.
Activity % of Users
Send or read e-mail 88
Buy a product 71
Use a social networking site 67
Buy or make a reservation for travel 65
Do any banking online 61
Send instant messages 46
Pay to access or download digital content 43
Post a comment to online news groups 32
Use Twitter 16
Buy or sell stocks, bonds, or mutual funds 11
of the application (as compared to if we used VM introspection techniques to extract user
intent).
Although it is easy to construct a signature for supporting a new application, managing a
large collection of signatures could cause overhead. However, we argue that its overhead is
far less than that of traditional IDS and anti-virus software. While traditional approaches
require following up all newly discovered attacks, GYRUS defines user-intended, correct
system behaviors and is therefore attack-agnostic.
The term attack-agnostic here does not mean that GYRUS is immune to all kinds of
attacks. GYRUS only makes assumptions about the attacker’s goal, but not how they achieve
this goal. That is, once a user intent signature is defined, no matter how the attack evolves,
the protection mechanism of GYRUS still works. In this work, we focus on protecting
the integrity of text content that is typed by the user, while other kinds of attacks such as
confidentiality of data are out of scope.
Regarding application support, GYRUS can generally support any application that sends
user-generated text content from the monitored host, if its network traffic has a direct or
simple mapping with on-screen text content. Table 1 shows the result of a survey that
indicates what typical users are doing on the Internet, done by Pew Internet. According to
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the survey results, 88% of users send e-mail, 67% of them send their text content to online
social network (OSN) sites, and 61% of users use online banking. Moreover, all activities
listed in Table 1 can be supported by GYRUS. Clearly, GYRUS can protect a significant
portion of day-to-day user activities on the Internet and can have a large impact on security.
While the focus of GYRUS is text-based applications, it can be easily extended to handle
image/video attachments. In particular, GYRUS can adopt Access Control Gadgets [133]
to capture the user’s intent to attach a particular file, compute a checksum of that file and
have our network proxy match any attached file against the checksum. The only way this
mechanism would fail is when an attacker/malware knows a priori which file the user will
attach and changes it in advance, which we consider being unrealistic.
One limitation of GYRUS is that it cannot protect an application where the user-intended
text is represented in a proprietary format or in some complicated encoding on the traffic.
At least, not without significantly more effort to reverse engineer the format. This can be a
problem when extending GYRUS to more general transactions such as writing data on the
filesystem. There have been recent and promising advances in verifiable computation and
tools such as probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP) and fully-homomorphic encryption
(FHE) are becoming practical. When these technologies come to practice, GYRUS can verify
if the result of the traffic is actually from the user-intended input, by running application
logic along with these computation proof mechanisms.
Additionally, for applications with complex encodings mentioned above, we believe that
it would be possible to have GYRUS perform the slightly more complicated transformation
on the captured user intent and match the result with the outgoing traffic. Though we
should be careful not to expand the TCB too significantly, adding the support of the specific
transformations of some of the most popular applications should be quite doable.
In our threat model, GYRUS only protects the integrity of the text based on a user’s
intent, and it does not protect confidentiality. An attacker could steal a user’s credentials
(e.g., Cookie and ID/Password), and then perform protected transactions on a different
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host without GYRUS protections. Thus, GYRUS works better when the host is equipped
with Hardware Security Module (HSM) such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and a
Smartcard, and the server-side of the application supports mutual authentication. However,
while we consider the defense against stealing credential to be out of scope, we would point
out that this problem can be solved by using GYRUS. The way is, in the dom-0, GYRUS can
intercept and modify the password that the user has just entered (and so malware in dom-U
can only get the incorrect password), and correct the subsequent outgoing traffic for the
actual login to use the unmodified, correct password.
Finally, like any other system that tries to model benign behavior, GYRUS is vulnerable to
false positives caused by errors in the user intent signatures (false negatives are also possible,
but should be a lesser concern, as we will argue in the next section). However, false positives
only happen when we fail to specify in our signatures some of the user actions that signifies
the intent to generate outgoing traffic, or if our signatures specify a wrong way for capturing
user intent. We believe both scenarios should be rare because an application should not have
too much variance in its UI nor should it provide too many ways for performing the same
operation for the sake of application’s usability. Similarly, the correctness of the way we
capture user intent for an application should be easy to establish with simple testing, and
this should suffice to guarantee that we will continue to capture user intent correctly unless
the application changes its UI (which, again, for usability reasons, is less likely to happen).
2.6 Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of our evaluation of the security, usability, and
performance of GYRUS when using it to protect the applications studied in §2.5.
2.6.1 Security
New security frameworks should be secure against both current and future attacks. Here, we
consider both scenarios for GYRUS by running existing attack samples and by analyzing the
framework’s security properties.
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Resilience Against Existing Attacks. GYRUS is attack-agnostic by design, however,
to demonstrate that we implemented the system correctly, we tested GYRUS’ ability to
stop attacks against the specific applications discussed in §2.5. For Windows Live Mail,
we executed Win32:MassMail-A, a mail spammer malware, while the mail client is under
GYRUS’ protection. The dom-0 network monitor successfully catches and blocks all out-
going SMTP traffic generated by the malware. For Yahoo! Messenger protocol, we ran
ApplicUnwnt.Win32.SpamTool.Agent. BAAE, a messenger spamming malware. GYRUS
blocks all of the messages generated by this malware. For Facebook, we executed a com-
ment spamming malware, TROJ_GEN.RFFH1G1, and it has no success in sending out attack
traffic. We have also tested the effectiveness of GYRUS against Javascript-based attacks (like
XSS, CSRF) targeting web applications. In particular, we injected forged Javascript code
that automatically submits malicious content into the GMail, Facebook and Paypal pages.
In all cases, GYRUS successfully blocked all malicious traffic from these attacks. Finally,
for each tested application, we tried to perform the normal operations protected by GYRUS
with the corresponding attacks running in the background. In each case, Gyrus allows the
legitimate, user generated traffic to go through while stopping all attacks.
Resilience Against Future Attacks. Next, we will evaluate how well GYRUS can handle
future attacks designed against it. All security guarantees will be void if assumptions in
our threat model are violated. However, we believe those are standard assumptions widely
accepted by the security community. Thus we will not discuss violations of the assumptions.
However, we do note that even though existing hypervisors are becoming more complicated,
it is possible – and, in fact, encouraged – to build custom hypervisors or security operating
systems for use with GYRUS to achieve higher assurance [96, 35, 162].
The next avenue for attack is the UI monitor that runs in the untrusted dom-U. However,
we believe GYRUS is quite robust against errors in the UI monitor. First of all, because
of the protections provided by the Secure Overlay, attackers are limited to misplace user-
generated, albeit unintended content in traffic allowed by GYRUS (e.g., switching the subject
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and content of an email message, take user’s comment to one story on Facebook as his/her
outgoing comment on another story, etc.). Secondly, our policy of only displaying (on
the overlay) the content of the window which currently has focus, the mistakenly sent
out content must be from the “correct” application. Additionally, we believe that we can
further harden GYRUS against such attacks by specifying a restriction on the position of the
content to be sent out in relation to the event that triggers the outgoing traffic (e.g., the text
displayed on the overlay cannot be too far away from the coordinate of the mouse click).
A compromised UI monitor can also mislead GYRUS to believe a mouse click signifies the
user’s intent to send out something (i.e. stealing a click). However, once again thanks to
the Secure Overlay, the unintended outgoing traffic will have its content entirely entered by
the user (i.e., this could cause a premature output of the content). Therefore, the attacker
will have very little control over what is sent. Finally, we believe that our policy concerning
what kind of update to text boxes the UI monitor can report provides very good protection
to data that are currently off-screen.
Similarly, poorly written user intent signatures can be problematic. However, thanks
to the use of the Secure Overlay, we believe problems with a user intent signature are
limited to mistaking hardware events as user intent to send something and will have the
same adverse effect as a misbehaving UI monitor stealing a click. In conclusion, we believe
the Secure Overlay (and the WYSIWYS policy) leaves an attacker with very limited options
for attacking GYRUS. Anything sent out by a protected application using a targeted protocol
must be typed, and seen by the user. All the attacker can do is to use content intended for
one purpose (under the same application) for another, and the cases where this can cause a
user any real harm should be very rare.
2.6.2 Usability
From our experience of protecting the applications studied in §2.5, GYRUS has no noticeable
effect on their usability. In GYRUS, user-interaction is mediated by the internal components
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of GYRUS: Input handler and Secure Overlay. For interposing user input before delivering it
to the application, GYRUS does not incur noticeable delay (see Table 2.6.3 for the evaluation
results).
Since GYRUS only overlays text boxes in our target applications, it will not change the
user’s workflow or the look-and-feel of the other parts of the application. Furthermore,
GYRUS displays (on the secure overlay) text with the same font face, size, and color as
the underlying application. Finally, we have confirmed that the edit box drawn by GYRUS
supports not only simple text editing like typing, selection, and copy & paste, but also
application-specific text editing features like auto-completion and spelling correction. So
we are confident that GYRUS will not affect the user’s experience with the application
being monitored. Furthermore, since GYRUS only checks (and potentially blocks) traffic
that perform specific actions under specific protocols of interest 11, our experience shows
that GYRUS does not interfere with background networking programs such as BitTorrent
and RSS feeds. GYRUS can also handle scheduled jobs that have a time gap between a
user’s interaction and the resulting generation of network traffic, thanks to our use of the
Authorization DB for the capturing of user intent from the actual inspection of traffic. For
example, in the case of an e-mail application, if the system has no connectivity to the
Internet, the mail will be queued on the scheduler, and later this scheduler will generate
network traffic when connectivity is re-established. Our experiments show that GYRUS can
handle this situation correctly and allow the delayed email as a user would expect.
2.6.3 Performance
In this section, we present our results of measuring the two kinds of delay that GYRUS can
cause: delay in processing user input through the keyboard/mouse and delay in sending out
network traffic. We performed all the experiments presented in this section on a commodity
laptop: a Lenovo Thinkpad-T520, equipped with a dual-core Intel Core i5 2520m and 8GB
11 For example, GYRUS only checks HTTP traffic for sending emails under GMail, but not that for reading
emails.
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Table 2: Latency introduced by Gyrus while processing the input. The data for user-interaction was
collected during the use case evaluation.
Actions Average STDV Median Max
Typing 39ms 21ms 34ms 128ms
ENTER 19ms 6ms 17ms 43ms
LCLICK 43ms 15ms 41ms 79ms
Focus Change 21ms 19ms 17ms 158ms
Move & Resize 21ms 16ms 16ms 85ms
of RAM. The dom-U runs 3 logical cores with 7GB of RAM, while dom-0 has 1 logical
core and 1GB of RAM.
Interaction Overhead. In the worst case, the user will experience the following delay for
every keyboard/mouse input:
• The Central Control will need to query the UI monitor in dom-U to see if this event
signifies the user’s intent to send out something.
• The Secure Overlay will have to wait for the UI monitor to provide any information
about how this input changes the display.
Both of these will add to the time from the user press a key/click to mouse to when he/she
can see the effect of his/her input on the secure overlay.
To determine if this turn around time for processing user input under GYRUS is still in
acceptable range, we performed the following study:
• First, we typed a document without generating any input that signifies an intent to
send out network traffic, and measured the time from the Central Control first observe
each input to the time the Secure Overlay is updated to reflect the input.
• Second, we measured the same turn around time for mouse events that result in focus
change, resize and movement of the window of a target application.
• Finally, we also measured the time needed for the UI monitor to confirm that an input
event signifies user intent to send out traffic.
Table 2 shows the results of our experiments. To provide some context for interpreting the
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Table 3: Network latency for HTTP connections.
Cases KVM Gyrus Overhead
Single (A) 101.7ms 102.3ms +0.6ms (.5%)
Single (B) 31.20ms 32.30ms +1.1ms (3.5%)
Web Page 897.5ms 951.3ms +53.8ms (6%)
Download 51.1MB/s 49.3MB/s –1.8MB/s (3.5%)
results, we note that prior research suggests that acceptable range of such turn around time
for interaction with the human is 50-150ms [145]. Thus, our experiments show that on
average case, users can smoothly interact with a system protected by GYRUS.
Network Latency. We have also measured the network latency caused by GYRUS (as
compared to the system that runs KVM without GYRUS) for three different cases:
• The time to establish an HTTP connection (and we used two test sites),
• The time to load a web page with dynamic content, measured by The Chromium’s
Page Benchmark extension [149],
• The effective bandwidth of a system, obtained by measuring the time to download a
550MB disk image from the Debian repository through HTTP.
To measure the overhead introduced by our Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) proxy for
HTTPS connections, we did two tests:
• Download 15KB of web-page data from a public website, and
• Download a 32MB file from a remote HTTPS server.
We repeated all experiments for ten times, and Table 3 and Table 4 shows the average results
of the experiments.
Comparing the results from a KVM Guest versus GYRUS running on it, GYRUS only
introduces around 1 ms of single response delay, less than 6% (53.8 ms) of delay for web
page loading, and less than 4% overhead on the network bandwidth, for HTTP connection.
For HTTPS, there exists CPU time overhead from an additional connection per each session
for MITM on establishing, encrypting, and decrypting the contents. From our experiment,
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Table 4: Network latency for HTTPS connections (with Man-In-The-Middle proxy).
Cases KVM Gyrus Overhead
Single Request 90.72ms 94.50ms +3.78ms (4%)
Download 37.40MB/s 35.23MB/s –2.17MB/s (5.8%)
it incurs 4 ms of delay on getting access to a single webpage data, and adds less than 6%
of bandwidth overhead on downloading of file content. Evaluation results for the network
latency show that GYRUS has very little overhead, at worst 6% on both bandwidth and
loading a webpage.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the GYRUS framework and showed how it can be used
to distinguish between human and malware generated network traffic for a variety of
applications. By combining the secure monitoring of hardware events with an analysis
leveraging the accessibility interface within dom-U, we linked human input to observed
network traffic and used this information to make security decisions. Using GYRUS, we
demonstrated how to stop malicious activities that manipulate the host machine to send
malicious traffic, such as spam, social network impersonation attacks, and online financial
services fraud. Our evaluation demonstrated that GYRUS successfully stops modern malware,
and our analysis shows that it would be very challenging for future attacks to defeat it. Finally,
our performance analysis shows that GYRUS is a viable option for deployment on desktop
computers with regular user interaction. GYRUS fills an important gap, enabling security
policies that consider user intent in determining the legitimacy of network traffic.
46
CHAPTER III
MIMESIS AEGIS: A MIMICRY PRIVACY SHIELD
3.1 Motivation
A continuously increasing number of users now utilize mobile devices [151] to interact
with public cloud services (PCS) (e.g. Gmail, Outlook, and WhatsApp) as an essential part
of their daily lives. While the user’s connectivity to the Internet is improved with mobile
platforms, the problem of preserving data privacy while interacting with PCS remains
unsolved. In fact, news about the US government’s alleged surveillance programs reminds
everybody about a very unsatisfactory status quo: while PCS are essentially part of everyday
life, the default method of utilizing them exposes users to privacy breaches, because it
implicitly requires the users to trust the PCS providers with the confidentiality of their data.
But such trust is unjustified, if not misplaced. Incidents that demonstrate a breach of this
trust is easy to come by:
• PCS providers are bound by law to share their users’ data with surveillance agen-
cies [28],
• it is the business model of the PCS providers to mine their users’ data and share it
with third parties [15, 2, 17, 51],
• operator errors [43] can result in unintended data access, and
• data servers can be compromised by attackers [74].
To alter this undesirable status quo, solutions should be built based on an updated trust
model of everyday communication that better reflects the reality of the threats mentioned
above. In particular, new solutions must first assume PCS providers to be untrusted. This
assumption implies that the PCS providers control all other entities, including the apps that
users installed to engage with the PCS, must also be assumed untrusted.
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Although there are a plethora of apps available today that come in various combinations
of look and feel and features, we observed that many of these apps provide text commu-
nication services (e.g. email or private/group messaging categories). Users can still enjoy
the same quality of service1 without needing to reveal their plaintext data to PCS providers.
PCS providers are essentially message routers that can function normally without needing to
know the content of the messages being delivered, analogous to postmen delivering letters
without needing to learn the actual content of the letters.
Therefore, applying end-to-end encryption (E2EE) without assuming trust in the PCS
providers seems to solve the problem. However, in practice, the direct application of
E2EE solutions onto the mobile device environment is more challenging than initially
thought [160, 142]. A good solution must present clear advantages to the entire mobile
security ecosystem. In particular it must account for these factors: 1) the users’ ease-of-use;
hence acceptability and adoptability; 2) the developers’ efforts to maintain support; and 3)
the feasibility and deployability of the solution on a mobile system.
From this analysis, we formulate three design goals that must be addressed coherently:
1. For a solution to be secure, it must be properly isolated from untrusted entities. It is
evident that E2EE cannot protect data confidentiality if plaintext data or an encryption
key can be compromised by architectures that risk exposing these values. Traditional
solutions like PGP [148] and newer solutions like Gibberbot [61], TextSecure [126],
and SafeSlinger [52] provide good isolation, but force users to use custom apps, which
can cause usability problems (refer to (item 2)). Solutions that repackage/rewrite
existing apps to introduce additional security checks [166, 20] do not have this property
(further discussed in §3.2). Solutions in the form of browser plugins/extensions also
do not have this property (further discussed in §3.2), and they generally do not fit
into the mobile security landscape because many mobile browsers do not support
extensions [32], and mobile device users do not favor using mobile browsers [22]
1 the apps’ functionalities and user experience are preserved
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to access PCS. Therefore, we rule out conventional browser-plugin/extension-based
solutions.
2. For a solution to be adoptable, it must preserve the user experience. We argue that
users will not accept solutions that require them to switch to different apps to perform
their daily tasks. Therefore, simply porting solutions like PGP to a mobile platform
would not work, because it forces users to use a separate and custom app, and it
is impossible to recreate the richness and unique user experience of all existing
text routing apps offered by various PCS providers today. In the context of mobile
devices, PCS are competing for market share not only by providing more reliable
infrastructure to facilitate user communication but also by offering a better user
experience [83, 141]. Ultimately, users will choose apps that feel the most comfortable.
To reduce interference with a user’s interaction with the app of their choice, security
solutions must be retrofittable to existing apps. Solutions that repackage/rewrite
existing apps have this criterion.
3. For a solution to be sustainable, it must be easy to maintain and scalable: the solution
must be sufficiently general-purpose, require minimal effort to support new apps,
and withstand app updates. In the past, email was one of the very few means of
communication. Protecting it is relatively straightforward because email protocols
(e.g. POP and IMAP) are well defined. Custom privacy-preserving apps can therefore
be built to serve this need. However, with the introduction of PCS that are becoming
indispensable in a user’s everyday life, a good solution should also be able to integrate
security features into apps without requiring reverse engineering of the apps’ logic
and/or network protocols, which are largely undocumented and possibly proprietary
(e.g. Skype, WhatsApp, etc.).
This chapter introduces Mimesis Aegis (M-AEGIS), a privacy-preserving system that
mimics the look-and-feel of existing apps to preserve their user experience and workflow
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on mobile devices, without changing the underlying OS or modifying/repackaging existing
apps. M-AEGIS achieves the three design goals by operating at a conceptual layer we call
Layer 7.5 (L-7.5) that is positioned above the existing application layer (OSI Layer 7 [82]),
and interacts directly with the user (popularly labeled as Layer 8 [92, 53]).
From a system’s perspective, L-7.5 is a transparent window in an isolated process that
interposes itself between the Layer 7 and 8. The interconnectivity among these layers is
achieved using the accessibility framework, which is available as an essential feature of
modern operating systems. Note that utilizing accessibility features for unorthodox purposes
have been proposed by prior works [129, 85] that achieve different goals. L-7.5 extracts the
GUI information of an app below it through the OS’s user interface automation/accessibility
(UIA) library. Using this information, M-AEGIS is then able to proxy user input by rendering
its own GUI (with a different color as a visual cue) and subsequently handle those input
(e.g., to process plaintext data or intercept user button click). Using the same UIA library,
L-7.5 can also programmatically interact with various UI components of the app below on
behalf of the user (refer to Figure 3.3.3 for more details). Since major software vendors
today have pledged their commitment towards continuous support and enhancement of
accessibility interface for developers [117, 9, 68, 5], our UIA-based technique is applicable
and sustainable on all major platforms.
From a security design perspective, M-AEGIS provides two privacy guarantees during
a user’s interaction with a target app: 1) all input from the user first goes to L-7.5 (and is
optionally processed) before being passed to an app. This means that confidential data and
user intent can be fully captured; and 2) all output from the app must go through L-7.5 (and
is optionally processed) before being displayed to the user.
From a developer’s perspective, accessing and interacting with a target app’s UI compo-
nents at L-7.5 is similar to that of manipulating the Document Object Model (DOM) tree of
a web app using JavaScript. While the DOM tree manipulation only works for browsers,
UIA works for all apps on a platform. To track the GUI of an app, M-AEGIS relies on
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Figure 7: This diagram shows how M-Aegis uses L-7.5 to transparently reverse-transform the
message “deadbeef” into “Hi there”, and also allows a user to enter their plaintext message “Hello
world” into M-Aegis’s text box. To the user, the GUI looks exactly the same as the original app.
When the user decides to send a message, the “Hello world” message will be transformed and relayed
to the underlying app.
resource ID names available through the UIA library. Therefore, M-AEGIS is resilient to
updates that change the look and feel of the app (e.g. GUI position or color). It only requires
resource id names to remain the same, which, through empirical evidence, often holds true.
Even if a resource id changes, minimal effort is required to rediscover resource id names
and remap them to the logic in M-AEGIS. From our experience, M-AEGIS does not require
developer attention across minor app updates.
From a user’s perspective, M-AEGIS is visible as an always-on-top button. When it is
turned on, users will perceive that they are interacting with the original app in plaintext
mode. The only difference is the GUI of the original app will appear in a different color to
indicate that protection is activated. This means that M-AEGIS preserves subtle features that
contribute towards the entire user experience such as spell checking and in-app navigation.
However, despite user perception, the original app never receives plaintext data. Figure 7
gives a high-level idea of how M-AEGIS creates an L-7.5 to protect user’s data privacy when
interacting with Gmail.
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For users who would like to protect their email communications, they will also be
concerned if encryption will affect their ability to search, as it is an important aspect of
user productivity [159]. For this purpose, we designed and incorporated a new searchable
encryption scheme named easily-deployable efficiently-searchable symmetric encryption
scheme (EDESE) into M-AEGIS that allows search over encrypted content without any
server-side modification. We briefly discuss the design considerations and security concerns
involved in supporting this functionality in Figure 3.3.3.
As a proof of concept, we implemented a prototype M-AEGIS on Android that protects
user data when interfacing with text-based PCS. M-AEGIS supports email apps like Gmail
and messenger apps like Google Hangout, WhatsApp, and Facebook Chat. It protects data
privacy by implementing E2EE that passes no plaintext to an app while also preserving the
user experience and workflow. We also implemented a version of M-AEGIS on the desktop
to demonstrate the generality of our approach. Our initial performance evaluation and user
study show that users incur minimal overhead in adopting M-AEGIS on Android. There is
imperceptible encryption/decryption latency and a low and adjustable false positive rate
when searching over encrypted data.
In summary, these are the major contributions of this chapter:
• We introduced Layer 7.5 (L-7.5), a conceptual layer that directly interacts with users
on top of existing apps. This is a novel system approach that provides seemingly
contrasting features: transparent interaction with a target app and strong isolation
from the target app.
• We designed and built M-AEGIS based on the concept of L-7.5, a system that preserves
user privacy when interacting with PCS by ensuring data confidentiality. Essential
functionalities of existing apps, especially search (even over encrypted data), are also
supported without any server-side modification.
• We implemented two prototypes of M-AEGIS, one on Android and the other on
Windows, with support for various popular public cloud services, including Gmail,
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Facebook Messenger, Google Hangout, WhatsApp, and Viber.
• We designed and conducted a user study that demonstrated the acceptability of our
solution.
3.2 Related Work
Since M-AEGIS is designed to achieve the three design goals described in §3.1 while
seamlessly integrating end-to-end encryption into user’s communication, we discuss how
well existing works achieve some of these goals and ow they differ from M-AEGIS. As far
as we know, no existing work achieves all the three design goals.
Standalone Solutions. There are many standalone solutions that aim to protect user
data confidentiality. olutions like PGP [148] (including S/MIME [47]), Gibberbot [61],
TextSecure [126], SafeSlinger [52], and FlyByNight [106] provide secure messaging and/or
file transfer through encryption of user data. These solutions provide good isolation from
untrusted entities. However, since they are designed as standalone custom apps, they do
not preserve the user experience and require users to adopt a new workflow on a custom
app. More importantly, these solutions are not retrofittable to existing apps on the mobile
platform.
Like M-AEGIS, Cryptons [45] introduced a similarly strong notion of isolation through
its custom abstractions. However, Cryptons assumes a completely different threat model
that trusts PCS, and requires both server and client (app) modifications. Thus, Cryptons
could not protect a user’s communication using existing messaging apps while assuming the
provider to be untrusted. We also argue that it is non-trivial to modify Cryptons to achieve
the three design goals that we mentioned in §3.1.
Browser Plugin/Extension Solutions. Other solutions that focus on protecting user
privacy include Cryptocat [98], Scramble! [17], TrustSplit [51], NOYB (None of Your
Business) [71], and SafeButton [100]. Some of these assume different threat models and
achieve different goals. For example, NOYB protects a user’s Facebook profile data while
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SafeButton tries to keep a user’s browsing history private. Most of these solutions try to
be transparently integrated into user workflow. However, since these solutions are mostly
based on browser plugins/extensions, they are not applicable to the mobile platform.
Additionally, Cryptocat and TrustSplit require new and independent service providers to
support their functionalities. However, M-AEGIS works with the existing service providers
without assuming trust or requiring modification to server-side communication.
Repackaging/Rewriting Solutions. There is a category of work that repackages/rewrites
an app’s binary to introduce security features, such as Aurasium [166], Dr. Android [87],
and others [20]. Our solution is similar to these approaches in that we can retrofit our
solutions to existing apps and still preserve user experience, but is different in that M-AEGIS’
coverage is not limited to apps that do not contain native code. Additionally, repackaging-
based approaches suffer from the problem that they will break app updates. In some cases,
attackers can circumvent the security of such solutions because the isolation model is unclear,
i.e., the untrusted code resides in the same address space as the reference monitor (e.g.,
Aurasium).
Orthogonal Work. Although our work focuses on user interaction on mobile platforms
with cloud providers, we assume a very different threat model than those that focus on
more robust permission model infrastructures and those that focus on controlling/tracking
information flow, such as TaintDroid [49] and Airbag [163]. These solutions require hanges
to the underlying app, framework, or the OS, but M-AEGIS does not.
Access Control Gadgets (ACG) [133] uses user input as permission granting intent to
allow apps to access user owned resources. Although we made the same assumptions as ACG
to capture authentic user input, the design of ACG aims to provide a different threat model
and security goal than ours. Furthermore, ACG requires a modified kernel but M-AEGIS
does not. Persona [13] presents a completely isolated and new online social network that
provides certain privacy and security guarantees to the users. While related, it differs from
the goal of M-AEGIS. Frientegrity [55] and Gyrus (in §2) focus on different aspects of
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integrity protection of a user’s data. Tor [44] is well known for its capability to hide a user’s
IP address while browsing the Internet. However, it focuses on anonymity guarantees while
M-AEGIS focuses on data confidentiality guarantees. Off-the-record messaging (OTR) [25]
is a secure communication protocol that provides perfect forward secrecy and malleable
encryption. While OTR can be implemented on M-AEGIS using the same design architecture
to provide these extra properties, it is currently not the focus of our work.
3.3 System Design
3.3.1 Design Goals
In this section, we formally reiterate our design goals. We posit that a good solution must:
• Offer good security by applying strong isolation from untrusted entities (defined in
§3.3.2).
• Preserve the user experience by providing users transparent interaction with existing
apps.
• Be easy to maintain and scale by devising a sufficiently general-purpose approach.
Above all, these goals must be satisfied within the unique set of constraints found in the
mobile platform, including user experience, transparency, deployability, and adoptability
factors.
3.3.2 Threat Model
In-Scope Threats. We begin with the scope of threats that M-AEGIS is designed to protect
against. In general, there are three parties that pose threats to the confidentiality of users’
data exposed to public cloud through mobile devices. Therefore, we assume these parties to
be untrusted in our threat model:
• Public cloud service (PCS) providers. Sensitive data stored in the public cloud can be
compromised in several ways:
1. PCS providers can be compelled by law [1] to provide access to a user’s sensitive
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data to law enforcement agencies [28];
2. The business model of PCS providers creates a strong incentive for them to
share/sell user data to third parties [15, 2, 17, 51];
3. PCS administrators who have access to the sensitive data may also compromise
the data, either intentionally [28] or not [43]; and
4. Vulnerabilities of the PCS can be exploited by attackers to exfiltrate sensitive
data [74].
• Client-side apps. Since client-side apps are developed by PCS providers to allow a
user to access their services, we consider these apps as untrusted.
• Middle boxes between a PCS and a client-side app. Sensitive data can also be
compromised when it is transferred between a PCS and a client-side app. Incorrect
protocol design/implementation may allow attackers to eavesdrop on plaintext data or
perform Man-in-the-Middle attacks [50, 14, 40].
M-AEGIS addresses the above threats by creating L-7.5, which it uses to provide end-to-
end encryption (E2EE) for user private data. We consider the following components as our
trusted computing base (TCB): the hardware, the operating system (OS), and the framework
that controls and mediates access to hardware. In the absence of physical input devices (e.g.,
mouse and keyboard) on mobile devices, we additionally trust the soft keyboard not to leak
the keystrokes of a user. We rely on the TCB to correctly handle I/O for M-AEGIS and to
provide proper isolation between M-AEGIS and untrusted components.
Additionally, we also assume that all the components of M-AEGIS, including L-7.5 that
it creates, are trusted. The user is also considered trustworthy under our threat model in
his intent. This means that he is trusted to turn on M-AEGIS when he wants to protect the
privacy of his data during his interaction with the PCS.
Out of Scope Threats. Our threat model does not consider the following types of attacks.
First, M-AEGIS only guarantees the confidentiality of a user’s data, but not its availability.
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Therefore, attacks that deny access to data (denial-of-service) either at the server or the client
are beyond the scope of this work. Second, any attacks against our TCB are orthogonal to
this work. Such attacks include malicious hardware [95], attacks against the hardware [161],
the OS [88], the platform [154] and privilege escalation attacks (e.g., unauthorized rooting
of a device). However, note that M-AEGIS can be implemented on a design that anchors its
trust on trusted hardware and hypervisor (e.g. Gyrus [85] and Storage Capsules [24]) to
minimize the attack surface against the TCB. Third, M-AEGIS is designed to prevent any
direct flow of information from an authorized user to untrusted entities. Hence, leakages
through all side-channels [153] are beyond the scope of this work.
Since the user is assumed to be trustworthy under our threat model to use M-AEGIS
correctly, M-AEGIS does not protect the user against social-engineering-based attacks. For
example, phishing attacks to trick users into either turning off M-AEGIS and/or entering
sensitive information intounprotected UI components are beyond the scope of this work.
Instead, M-AEGIS deploys best-effort protection by coloring the UI components in L-7.5
differently from that of the default app UI.
The other limitations of M-AEGIS, which are not security threats, are discussed in
§3.6.2.
3.3.3 M-Aegis Architecture
M-AEGIS is architected to fulfill all of the three design goals mentioned in §3.3.1. Providing
strong isolation guarantees is first. To achieve this, M-AEGIS is designed to execute in a
separate process, though it resides in the same OS as the target client app (TCA). Besides
memory isolation, the filesystem of M-AEGIS is also shielded from other apps by OS app
sandbox protection.
Should a greater degree of isolation be desirable, an underlying virtual-machine-based
system can be adopted to provide even stronger security guarantees. However, we do not
consider such design at this time as it is currently unsuitable for mobile platforms, and the
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Figure 8: The figure on the left illustrates how a user perceives the Gmail preview page when
M-Aegis is turned on. The figure on the right illustrates the same scenario but with M-Aegis turned
off. Note that the search button is painted with a different color when M-Aegis is turned on.
adoption of such technology is beyond the scope of this work.
The main components that make up M-AEGIS are as follows.
Layer 7.5 (L-7.5). M-AEGIS creates a novel and conceptual layer called Layer 7.5 (L-7.5)
to interpose itself between the user and the TCA. This layer allows M-AEGIS to implement
a true end-to-end encryption (E2EE) without exposing plaintext data to the TCA while
maintaining the TCA’s original functionalities and user experience, fulfilling the second
design goal. L-7.5 is built by creating a transparent window that is always-on-top. This
technique is advantageous in that it provides a natural way to handle user interaction, thus
preserving user experience without the need to reverse engineer the logic of TCAs or the
network protocols used by the TCAs to communicate with their respective cloud service
backends, fulfilling the third design goal.
There are three cases of user interactions to handle. The first case considers interactions
that do not involve data confidentiality (e.g., deleting or relabeling email). Such input does
not require extra processing/transformation and can be directly delivered to the underlying
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TCA. Such click-through behavior is a natural property of transparent windows and helps
M-AEGIS maintain the look and feel of the TCA.
The second case considers interactions that involve data confidentiality (e.g., entering
messages or searching encrypted email). Such input requires extra processing (e.g., encryp-
tion and encoding operations). For such cases, M-AEGIS places opaque GUIs that “mimic”
the GUIs over the TCA, which are purposely painted in different colors for two reasons: 1)
as a placeholder for user input so that it does not leak to the TCA, and 2) for user visual
feedback. Mimic GUIs for the subject and content as seen in Figure 9 are examples of this
case. Since L-7.5 is always on top, this provides the guarantee that user input always goes
to a mimic GUI instead of the TCA.
The third case considers interactions with control GUIs (e.g. send buttons). Such input
requires user action to be “buffered” while the input from the second case is being processed
before being relayed to the actual control GUI of the TCA. For such cases, M-AEGIS creates
semi-transparent mimic GUIs that register themselves to absorb/handle user clicks/taps.
Again, these mimic GUIs are painted with a different color to provide a visual cue to a user.
Examples of these include the purple search button in the left figure in Figure 8 and the
purple send button in Figure 9. Note that our concept of intercepting user input is similar to
that of ACG’s [133] in capturing user intent, but our application of the user intent differs.
UIA Manager (UIAM). To be fully functional, M-AEGIS requires certain capabilities that
are not available to regular apps. First, although M-AEGIS is confined within the OS’ app
sandbox, it must be able to determine with which TCA the user is currently interacting.
This information allows M-AEGIS to invoke specific logic to handle the TCA, and helps
M-AEGIS clean up the screen when the TCA is terminated. Second, M-AEGIS requires
information about the GUI layout for the TCA it is currently handling. This information
allows M-AEGIS to accurately render mimic GUIs on L-7.5 to intercept user I/O. Third,
although isolated from the TCA, M-AEGIS must be able to communicate with the TCA to
maintain functionality and ensure user experience is not disrupted. For example, M-AEGIS
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must be able to relay user clicks to the TCA, eventually send encrypted data to the TCA,
and click on TCA’s button on behalf of the user. For output on the screen, it must be able to
capture ciphertext so that it can decrypt it and then render it on L-7.5.
M-AEGIS extracts certain features from the underlying OS’s accessibility framework,
which are exposed to developers in the form of User Interface Accessibility/Automation
(UIA) library. Using UIA, M-AEGIS is not only able to know which TCA is currently
executing, but it can also query the GUI tree of the TCA to get detailed information about
how the page is laid out (e.g., location, size, type, and resource-id of the GUI components).
More importantly, it can obtain information about the content of these GUI items.
Exploiting UIA is advantageous to our design as compared to other methods of informa-
tion capture from the GUI, e.g., optical character recognition (OCR). Besides having perfect
content accuracy, our technique is not limited by screen size. For example, even though the
screen size may prevent full text to be displayed, M-AEGIS is still able to capture text in its
entirety through the UIA libraries, allowing us to apply decryption to ciphertext comfort-
ably. We thus utilize all these capabilities and advantages to build a crucial component of
M-AEGIS called the UIA manager (UIAM).
Per-TCA Logic. M-AEGIS can be extended to support many TCAs. For each TCA of
interest, we build per-TCA logic as an extension module. The per-TCA logic is responsible
for rendering the specific mimic GUIs according to information it queries from the UIAM.
Therefore, per-TCA logic is responsible for handling direct user input. Specifically, it
decides whether the user input will be directly passed to the TCA or be encrypted and
encoded before doing so. This decision ensures that the TCA never obtains plaintext data
while user interaction is in plaintext mode. Per-TCA logic also intercepts button clicks so
that it can then instruct UIAM to emulate the user’s action on the button in the underlying
TCA. Per-TCA logic also decides which encryption and encoding scheme to use according
to the type of TCA it is handling. For example, encryption and encoding schemes for
handling email apps would differ from that of messenger apps.
60
Cryptographic Module. M-AEGIS’ cryptographic module is responsible for providing
encryption/decryption and cryptographic hash capabilities to support our searchable en-
cryption scheme (described in detail later) to the per-TCA logic so that M-AEGIS can
transform/obfuscate messages through E2EE operations. Besides standard cryptographic
primitives, this module also includes a searchable encryption scheme to support search
over encrypted email that works without server modification. Since the discussion of any
encryption scheme is not complete without encryption keys, the Key Manager is also a part
of this module.
Key Manager. M-AEGIS has a key manager per TCA that manages key policies that
can be specific to each TCA according to user preference. The key manager supports a
range of schemes, including simple password-based key derivation functions (of which we
assume the password to be shared out of band) to derive symmetric keys, which we currently
implement as default, to more sophisticated PKI-based scheme for users who prefer stronger
security guarantees and do not mind the additional key set-up and exchange overheads.
However, the discussion about the best key management/distribution policy is beyond the
scope of this work.
Searchable Encryption Scheme (EDESE). There are numerous encryption schemes that
support keyword search [65, 146, 64, 29, 39, 23, 93]. These schemes exhibit different
tradeoffs between security, functionality, and efficiency, but all of them require modifications
on the server side. Schemes that make use of inverted index [39] are not suitable, as updates
to inverted index cannot be practically deployed in our scenario.
Since we cannot assume server cooperation (consistent with our threat model in §3.3.2),
we designed a new searchable encryption scheme called easily-deployable efficiently-
searchable symmetric encryption scheme (EDESE). EDESE is an adaptation of a scheme
proposed by Bellare et al. [19], with modifications similar to that of Goh’s scheme [64] that
is retrofittable to a non-modifying server scenario.
We incorporated EDESE for email applications with the following construct. The
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idea for the construction is simple: we encrypt the document with a standard encryption
scheme and append HMACs of unique keywords in the document. We discuss the specific
instantiations of encryption and HMAC schemes that we use in §3.4.1. To prevent leaking
the number of unique keywords we add as many dummy keywords as needed. We present
this construction in detail in the full version of this work [102].
In order to achieve higher storage and search efficiency, we utilized a Bloom filter
(BF) to represent the EDESE-index. In essence, a BF is a data structure that allows for
efficient set-inclusion tests. However, such set-inclusion tests based on BFs are currently not
supported by existing email providers, which only support string-based searches. Therefore,
we devised a solution that encodes the positions of on-bits in a BF as Unicode strings (refer
to §3.4.4 for details).
Since the underlying data structure that is used to support EDESE is a BF, search
operations are susceptible to false positives matches. However, this does not pose a real
problem to users, because the false positive rate is extremely low and is completely adjustable.
Our current implementation follows these parameters: the length of keyword (in bits) is
estimated to be k = 128, the size of the BF array is B = 224, the maximum number of
unique keywords used in any email thread is estimated to be d = 106, the number of bits set
to 1 for one keyword is r = 10. Plugging in these values into the formula for false positive
calculation [64], i.e., (1− e−rd/B)r, we cap the probability of a false positive δ to 0.0003.
We formally assess the security guarantees that our construction provides. In the full
version of this work [102], we propose a security definition for EDESE schemes and discuss
why the existing notions are not suitable. Our definition considers an attacker who can obtain
examples of encrypted documents of its choice and the results of queries of keywords of its
choice. Given such an adversary, an EDESE scheme secure under our definition should hide
all partial information about the messages except for the message length and the number of
common keywords between any set of messages. Leaking the latter is unavoidable given
that for the search function to be transparent to encryption, the output of a query has to be a
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Figure 9: User still interacts with Gmail app to compose email, with M-Aegis’ mimic GUIs painted
with different colors on L-7.5.
part a ciphertext. But everything else, e.g., the number of unique keywords in a message,
positions of the keywords, is hidden.
Given the security definition in the full version of this work [102], we prove that our
construction satisfies it under the standard notions of security for encryption and HMACs.
3.3.4 User Workflow
To better illustrate how the different components in M-AEGIS fit together, we describe an
example workflow of a user composing and sending an email using the stock Gmail app on
Android using M-AEGIS:
1. When the user launches the Gmail app, the UIAM notifies the correct per-TCA logic of
the event. The per-TCA logic will then initialize itself to handle the Gmail workflow.
2. As soon as the Gmail app is launched, the per-TCA logic will try to detect the state
of the Gmail app (e.g., preview, reading, or composing email). This detection allows
M-AEGIS to create mimic GUIs on L-7.5 to handle user interaction properly. For
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example, when a user is on the compose page, the per-TCA logic will mimic the
GUIs of the subject and content fields (as seen in Figure 9). The user then interacts
directly with these mimic GUIs in plaintext mode without extra effort. Thus, the
workflow is not affected at all. Note that essential but subtle features like spell check
and autocorrect are still preserved, as they are innate features of the mobile device’s
soft keyboard. Additionally, the “send” button is also mimicked to capture user intent.
3. As the user finishes composing his email, he clicks on the mimicked “send” button
on L-7.5. Since L-7.5 receives the user input and not the underlying Gmail app,
the per-TCA logic can capture this event and proceed to process the subject and the
content.
4. The per-TCA logic selects the appropriate encryption key to be used based on the
recipient list and the predetermined key policy for Gmail. If a key cannot be found for
this conversation, M-AEGIS prompts the user (see Figure 10) for a password to derive
a new key. After obtaining the associated key for this conversation, M-AEGIS will
then encrypt these inputs and encode it back to text such that Gmail can consume it.
5. The per-TCA logic then requests the UIAM to fill in the corresponding GUIs on
Gmail with the transformed text. After they are filled, the UIAM is instructed to click
the actual “send” button on behalf of the user. This procedure provides a transparent
experience to the user.
This workflow evidently shows that because of the mimicking properties of M-AEGIS,
the workflow of using Gmail remains the same from the user’s perspective.
3.4 Implementation and Deployment
In this section, we discuss important details of our prototype implementations. We imple-
mented a prototype of M-AEGIS using Java on Android, as an accessibility service. This is
done by creating a class that extends the AccessibilityService class and requesting the
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Figure 10: Password prompt when user sends encrypted mail for a new conversation.
BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE permission in the manifest. This allows us to interface with
the UIA library, building our UIAM. We discuss this in further detail in §3.4.2.
We then deployed our prototype on two Android phones from separate manufacturers,
namely Samsung Galaxy Nexus and LG Nexus 4, targeting several versions of Android, from
Android 4.2.2 (API level 17) to Android 4.4.2 (API level 19). The deployment was done
on stock devices and OSes, i.e., without modifying the OS, Android framework, or rooting.
Only simple app installation was performed. This demonstrates the ease of deployment and
distribution of our solution. We have also implemented an M-AEGIS prototype on Windows
7 to demonstrate interoperability and generality of approach, but we do not discuss the
details here, as it is not the focus of this work.
As an interface to the user, we create a button that is always on top even if other apps are
running on the screen. This overlaying allows us to create a non-bypassable direct channel
of communication with the user besides providing a visual cue of whether M-AEGIS is
turned on or off.
For app support, we use Gmail as an example of an email app and WhatsApp as an
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example of a messenger app. We argue that it is easy to extend the support to other apps
within these classes.
We first describe the cryptographic schemes that we deployed in our prototype, then
explain how we build our UIAM and create L-7.5 on Android, and finally discuss the
per-TCA logic required to support both classes of apps.
3.4.1 Cryptographic Schemes
For all the encryption/decryption operations, we use AES-GCM-256. For a password-based
key generation algorithm, we utilized ccPBKDF2 with SHA-1 as the keyed-hash message
authentication code (HMAC). We also utilized HMAC-SHA-256 as our HMAC to generate
tags for email messages (§3.4.4). These functionalities are available in Java’s javax.crypto
and java.security packages.
For the sake of usability, we implemented a password-based scheme as the default, and
we assume one password for each group of message recipients. We rely on the users to
communicate the password to the receiving parties using out of band channel (e.g. in person
or phone calls). For messaging apps, we implemented an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol to negotiate session keys for WhatsApp conversations. A PGP key is
automatically generated for a user during installation based on the hashed phone number,
and is deposited in publicly accessible repositories on the user’s behalf (e.g., MIT PGP Key
Server [121]). Further discussion about verifying the authenticity of public keys retrieved
from such servers is omitted from this chapter. Since all session and private keys are stored
locally for user convenience, we make sure that they are never saved to disk in plaintext.
They are additionally encrypted with a key derived from a master password that is provided
by the user during installation.
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3.4.2 UIAM
As mentioned earlier, UIAM is implemented using UIA libraries. On Android, events that
signify something new being displayed on the screen can be detected by monitoring follow-
ing the events: WINDOW_CONTENT_CHANGED, WINDOW_STATE_CHANGED, and VIEW_SCROLLED.
Upon receiving these events, per-TCA logic is informed by UIAM. The UIA library presents
a data structure in the form of a tree with nodes representing UI components with the root
being the top window. This tree structure allows UIAM to locate all UI components on the
screen.
Additionally, Android’s UIA framework also provides the ability to query for UI nodes
by providing a resource ID. For instance, we can find the node that represents Gmails search
button by querying for com.google.android.gm:id/search. More importantly, there is no
need to guess the names of these resource IDs. Rather, we use a tool called UI Automator
Viewer [7] (see §3.4.4), which comes with the default Android SDK. Once we found the
node of interest, we can get all the other information about the GUI represented by the node.
This information includes the exact location and size of text boxes and buttons on the screen.
M-AEGIS can programmatically interact with various GUIs of a TCA using the function
performAction(). This function allows it to click on a TCAs button on the users behalf
after it has processed the user input.
3.4.3 Layer 7.5
We implemented Layer 7.5 on Android as specific types of system windows, which are
always-on-top of all other running apps. Android allows the creation of various types of
system windows. We focus on two, TYPE_SYSTEM_OVERLAY and TYPE_SYSTEM_ERROR. The
first is for displaying only and allowing all tap/keyboard events to go to underlying apps. In
contrast, the second type allows for user interaction. Android allows the use of any View
objects for either type of window, and we use this to create our mimic GUIs, and set their
size and location. We deliberately create our mimic GUIs in different colors as a subtle
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Figure 11: The UI Automator Viewer presents an easy to use interface to examine the UIA tree and
determine the resource ID (blue ellipse) associated with a GUI of interest (red rectangle)
visual cue to the users that they are interacting with M-AEGIS, without distracting them
from their original workflow.
3.4.4 Per-TCA Logic
From our experience developing per-TCA logic, the general procedure for development is
as follows:
• Understand what the app does. First, we need to identify which GUIs need to be
mimicked by the TCA logic for intercepting user I/O. For text-based TCAs, this is a
trivial step because the core functionalities that M-AEGIS needs to handle are limited
and thus easy to identify, e.g., buffering users typed texts and sending them to the
intended recipient.
• Using UI Automator Viewer [7], examine the UIA tree for the relevant GUIs of a
TCA and identify signatures (GUI resource IDs) for each TCA state. UI Automator
Viewer allows inspection of the UIA tree through a graphical interface (as seen in
Figure 11), which reduces development time. We rely on UI components that are
unique to individual states (e.g., the “send” button signifies that we are in the compose
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state).
• For each relevant GUI, we need to devise algorithms to extract either the location
and content of ciphertext (for decryption and display), or the type, size, and location
of GUIs we need to mimic (e.g., the subject and content boxes in the Gmail com-
pose UI). Again, this is done through UI Automator Viewer. For example, for the
Gmail preview state, we query the UIA for nodes with ID com.google.android.gm:
/id/conversation_list to identify all the UIA nodes corresponding to the preview
item of individual email, and from those, we can extract all ciphertext on the preview
window through the UIA).
• Create event handlers for controls we mimic on L-7.5. For the Gmail compose state,
we need to listen for click/touch events for the L-7.5 “send” button and carry out the
process described in Figure 3.3.3 to encrypt the email and send the ciphertext to the
underlying TCA.
• Identify ways that each relevant state can be updated. Updates can be handled via the
following method: clear L-7.5, extract all necessary information from the new state,
and then render again. This procedure is equivalent to redrawing all GUIs on L-7.5
based on the detected state.
There are two details worth considering when developing per-TCA logic. First, careful
consideration must be given to the type of input data fed to TCAs. Since most TCAs only
accept input data in specific formats, e.g., text, they do not support the input of random byte
sequences as valid data. Therefore, encrypted data must be encoded into text format before
feeding it as input to a TCA. Conventionally, base64 encoding is used for this purpose.
However, base64 encoding consumes too much on-screen real estate. To overcome this, we
encoded the binary encrypted data into Chinese Japanese Korean (CJK) Unicode characters,
which have efficient on-screen real estate consumption. To map the binary data into the CJK
plane, we process the encrypted data at the byte granularity (28). For each byte, its value is
added to the base of the CJK Unicode representation, i.e., 0x4E00. For example, byte 0x00
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will be encoded as ‘一’, and byte 0x01 will be represented as ‘丁’.
Second, M-AEGIS can only correctly function if it can differentiate between ordinary
messages and encrypted messages. We introduce markers into the encrypted data after
encoding. In particular, we wrap the subject and content of a message using a pair of curly
braces (i.e. {, }).
Next, we describe implementation details that are specific to these classes of apps. We
begin by introducing the format of message we created for each class. Then we discuss
other caveats (if any) that are involved in the implementation.
Email Apps. We implemented support for Gmail on our prototype as a representative app
of this category. We create two custom formats to communicate the necessary metadata to
support M-AEGIS’ functionalities:
• Subject: {Encode(IDKey||IV ||Encrypt(Subject))}
• Content: {Encode(Encrypt(Content)||Tags)}
A particular challenge that we faced in supporting decryption during the Gmail preview
state is that only the beginning parts of both the title and the subject of each message are
available to us. Additionally, the exact email addresses of the sender and recipients are not
always available, as some are displayed as aliases, and some are hidden due to lack of space.
The lack of such information makes it impossible to automatically decrypt the message even
if the corresponding encryption key actually exists on the system.
To solve these problems, when we encrypt a message, we include a key-ID (IDKey) to
the subject field (as seen in the format described above). Note that since the key-ID is not
a secret, it need not be encrypted. This way, we will have all the information we need to
decrypt the subtext displayed on the Gmail preview correctly.
The Tags field is a collection of HMAC digests that are computed using the conversation
key and keywords that exist in a particular email. It is then encoded and appended as part of
the content that Gmail receives to facilitate encrypted search without requiring modification
to Gmail’s servers.
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Messenger Apps. We implemented support for WhatsApp on our prototype as a represen-
tative app of this category. The format we created for this class of apps is simple, as seen
below:
• Message: {Encode(IV ||Encrypt(Message))}
We did not experience additional challenges when supporting WhatsApp.
3.5 Evaluations
In this section, we report the results of experiments to determine the correctness of our
prototype implementation, measure the overheads of M-AEGIS, and user acceptability of
our approach.
3.5.1 Correctness of Implementation
We manually verified M-AEGIS’s correctness by navigating through different states of
the app and checking if M-AEGIS creates L-7.5 correctly. We manually verified that the
encryption and decryption operations of M-AEGIS work correctly. We ensured that plaintext
is properly received at the recipient’s end when the correct password is supplied. We
manually verified the correctness of our searchable encryption scheme by introducing
specific search keywords. We performed the search using M-AEGIS and found no false
negatives in the search result.
3.5.2 Performance on Android
The overhead that M-AEGIS introduced to a user’s workflow can be broken down into two
factors: 1) the additional computational costs incurred during encryption and decryption
of data, and 2) the additional I/O operations when redrawing L-7.5. We measure overhead
by measuring the overall latency presented to the user in various use cases. We found that
M-AEGIS imposes negligible latency to the user.
We exercised all test cases on a stock Android phone (LG Nexus 4), with the following
specifications: Quad-core 1.5 GHz Snapdragon S4 Pro CPU, equipped with 2.0 GB RAM,
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running Android Kit Kat (4.4.2, API level 19). Unless otherwise stated, we repeated each
experiment for ten times and took the averaged result for reporting.
For our evaluation, we only performed experiments for the setup of the Gmail app
because Gmail is representative of a more sophisticated TCA, and thus indicates worst-case
performance for M-AEGIS. Messenger apps incur fewer overheads given their simpler TCA
logic.
Previewing Encrypted Email. There are additional costs involved in previewing encrypted
emails on the main page of Gmail. The costs are broken down into times taken to 1) traverse
the UIA tree to identify preview nodes, 2) capture ciphertext from the UIA node, 3) obtain the
associated encryption key from the key manager, 4) decrypting ciphertext, and 5) rendering
plaintext on L-7.5. We measure these operations as a single entity by running a macro
benchmark.
For our experiment, we ensured that the preview page consists of encrypted emails (a
total of six can fit on-screen) to demonstrate worst-case performance. We measured the time
taken to perform all operations. We found, on average, it takes an additional 76 ms to render
plaintext on L-7.5. Note that this latency is well within expected response time (50 - 150
ms), beyond which a user would notice the slowdown effect [145].
Composing and Sending Encrypted Email. We measured the extra time taken for
encrypting a typical email and building our searchable encryption index for it. We used the
Enron Email Dataset [34] as a representation of typical emails. We randomly picked ten
emails. The average number of words in an email is 331, of which 153 are unique. The
shortest sampled email contained 36 words, of which 35 are unique. The longest sampled
email contains 953 words, of which 362 are unique.
With the longest sampled email, M-AEGIS took 205 ms in total to both encrypt and
build the search index. Note that this includes the network latency a user will perceive while
sending an email, regardless of their use of M-AEGIS.
Searching on Encrypted Emails. A user usually inputs one to three keywords per search
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operation. The latency experienced when performing a search is negligible. This is because
the transformation of the actual keyword into indexes requires only the forward computation
of one HMAC, which is nearly instantaneous.
3.5.3 User Acceptability Study
This section describes the user study we performed to validate our hypothesis of user
acceptability of M-AEGIS. Users were sampled from a population of college students. They
must be able to operate smartphones proficiently and have had previous experience using
the Gmail app. Each experiment was conducted with two identical smartphones, i.e., Nexus
4, both running Android 4.3, installed with the stock Gmail app (v. 4.6). One of the devices
had M-AEGIS installed.
The setup of the experiment is as follows. We asked the user to perform a list of tasks:
previewing, reading, composing, sending, and searching through email on a device that
is not equipped with M-AEGIS. Participants were asked to pay attention to the overall
experience of performing such tasks using the Gmail app. This experiment served as the
control experiment.
Participants were then told to repeat the same set of tasks on another device that was
equipped with M-AEGIS. This experiment was done with the intention that they were able to
mentally compare the difference in user experience when interacting with the two devices.
We queried the participants if they found any difference in previewing, reading, sending,
and searching email, and if they felt that their overall experience using the Gmail app on the
second device was significantly different.
We debriefed the participants about the experiment process and explained the goal of
M-AEGIS. We asked them whether they would use M-AEGIS to protect the privacy of their
data. The results we collected and report here are from 15 participants.
We found that no participants noticed major differences between the two experiences
using the Gmail app. One participant noticed a minor difference in the email preview
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interface, i.e., L-7.5 did not catch up smoothly when scrolled. A different participant noticed
a minor difference in the process of reading email, i.e., L-7.5 lag before covering ciphertext
with mimic GUIs. There were only two participants that found the process of sending email
differed from the original. When asked for details, they indicated that the cursor when
composing email was not working properly. After further investigation, we determined
this was a bug in Android’s GUI framework rather than a fundamental flaw in M-AEGIS’s
design.
Despite the perceived minor differences when performing particular tasks, all partic-
ipants indicated that they would use M-AEGIS to protect the privacy of their data after
understanding what M-AEGIS is. This feedback implies that they believe that the overall
disturbance to the user experience is not large enough to impede adoption.
Since we recruited 15 users for this study, the accuracy/quality of our conclusion from
this study lies between 80% and 95% (between 10 and 20 users) according to findings
in [54]. We intend to continue our user study tto validate our acceptability hypothesis further
and to continuously improve our prototype based on received feedback.
3.6 Discussions
3.6.1 Generality and Scalability
We believe that our M-AEGIS architecture presents a general solution that protects user data
confidentiality, which is scalable in the following aspects:
Across Multiple Cloud Services. There are two main classes of apps that provide
communication services, email and messenger apps. By providing functionality for apps in
these two categories, we argue that M-AEGIS can satisfy a large portion of mobile security
user needs. The different components of M-AEGIS incur a one-time development cost. We
argue that it is easy to scale across multiple cloud services because the per-TCA logic that
needs to be written is minimal per new TCA. This should be evident through the five general
steps highlighted in §3.4.4. Additionally, the logic we developed for the first TCA (Gmail)
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serves as a template/example to implement support for other apps.
Across App Updates. Since the robustness of the UIAM construct (§3.4.2) gives M-AEGIS
the ability to track all TCA GUIs regardless of TCA state, M-AEGIS can easily survive app
updates. Our Gmail app support has survived two updates without requiring major efforts to
adapt.
Resource ID names can change across updates. For example, when upgrading to Gmail
app version 4.7.2, the resource ID name that identifies a sender’s account name changed.
Using UI Automator Viewer, we quickly discovered and modified the mapping in our TCA
logic. Note that only the mapping was changed; the logic for the TCA does not need to be
modified. This is because the core functionality of the updated GUI did not change (i.e., the
GUI associated with a sender’s account remained a text input box).
3.6.2 Limitations
As mentioned earlier, M-AEGIS is not designed to protect users against social-engineering-
based attacks. Adversaries can trick users into entering sensitive information to the TCA
while M-AEGIS is turned off. Our solution is best effort by providing distinguishing visual
cues to the user when M-AEGIS is turned on, and its L-7.5 is active. For example, the mimic
GUIs that M-AEGIS creates a different color. Users can toggle M-AEGIS’ button on or off
to see the difference (see Figure 8). Note that M-AEGIS’s main button is always on top and
cannot be drawn over by other apps. However, we do not claim that this entirely mitigates
the problem.
One of the constraints that we faced while retrofitting a security solution to existing
TCAs (not limited to mobile environments) is that data must usually be of the right format
(e.g., strictly text, image, audio, or video). For example, Gmail accepts only text (Unicode-
compatible) for an email subject, but Dropbox accepts any type of files, including random
blobs of bytes. Currently, other than the text format, we do not yet support other types of user
data (e.g., image, audio, and video). However, this is not a fundamental design limitation of
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our system. Rather, it is because of the unavailability of transformation functions (encryption
and encoding schemes) that works for these media types.
Unlike text, the transformation/obfuscation functions in M-AEGIS for other types of data
may also need to survive other process steps, such as compression. It is normal for TCAs to
perform compression on multimedia to conserve bandwidth and/or storage. For example,
Facebook is known to compress/downsample the image uploads.
The confidentiality guarantee that we provide excludes risks at the end points themselves.
For example, a poor random number generator can potentially weaken the cryptographic
schemes M-AEGIS applies. It is currently unclear how our text transformations will affect a
server’s effectiveness in performing spam filtering.
Our system currently does not tolerate typographical error during the search. However,
we would like to point out that this is an unlikely scenario, given that soft keyboards on
mobile devices utilize spell check and autocorrect features. Again, this is not a flaw in our
architecture. Rather, it is because of the unavailability of encryption schemes that tolerate
typographical error search without requiring server modification.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented Mimesis Aegis ( M-AEGIS ), a new approach to protect private
user data in public cloud services. M-AEGIS provides strong isolation and preserves user
experience through the creation of a novel conceptual layer called Layer 7.5 (L-7.5), which
acts as a proxy between an app (Layer 7) and a user (Layer 8). This approach allows
M-AEGIS to implement true end-to-end encryption of user data while achieving three goals:
1. Plaintext data is never visible to a client app, any intermediary entities, or the cloud
provider;
2. the original user experience with the client app is preserved completely, from workflow
to GUI look-and-feel; and
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3. the architecture and technique are general to a large number of apps and resilient to
app updates.
We implemented a prototype of M-Aegis on Android that can support a number of popular
cloud services (e.g., Gmail, Google Hangout, Facebook, WhatsApp, and Viber). Our user
study shows that our system preserves both the workflow and the GUI look-and-feel of
the protected applications, and our performance evaluations show that users experienced
minimal overhead in utilizing M-Aegis on Android. As the industry’s follow-up after
releasing the implementation detail of M-Aegis, many internet messenger company take
the route to apply a true end-to-end (i.e., user-to-user) encryption on their messaging
services. For example, in the year of 2016, WhatsApp applied a user-to-user, perfect forward
secrecy encryption to its application and also released a whitepaper that describes their
implementation for public verification. While we are hoping the other internet messenger
vendors to adopt such approach, M-Aegis could be a soultion to apply before the vendors
moving towards implementing more secure messengers.
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CHAPTER IV
A11Y ATTACKS: EXPLOITING ACCESSIBILITY IN OPERATING
SYSTEMS
4.1 Motivation
On August 9, 1998, the United States Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to
eliminate barriers to electronic and information technology for people with disabilities [150].
Effective June 21, 2001, the law is enforced on the development, procurement, maintenance,
or use of electronic and information technology by the federal government [114]. Driven
by this requirement, OS vendors [117, 9, 69] have included accessibility features such as
on-screen keyboards, screen magnifiers, voice commands, screen readers, etc. in their
products to comply with federal law.
Assistive technologies, especially natural language voice processors, are gaining widespread
market acceptance. Since the iPhone 4S, Apple has included in iOS a voice-based personal
assistant, Siri, which can help the user complete a variety of tasks, such as placing a call,
sending a text, and modifying personal calendars. Google also added a similar feature, Voice
Action, to its Android platform. Furthermore, wearable devices such as Google Glass use
voice as the primary interaction interface.
In general, adding new features into modern complex OSes usually introduces new
security vulnerabilities. Accessibility support is no exception. For example, in 2007, it
was reported that Windows Vista could be compromised through its speech recognition
software [127]; in 2013, a flaw was discovered in Siri that allowed the bypass of an iPhone’s
lock screen to access photos and email [46]. As more and more people are using accessibility
features, security issues caused by such vulnerabilities can become more serious.
In this work, we present the first security evaluation of the accessibility support of
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commodity OSes. Our hypothesis is that alternative I/O subsystems such as assistive
technologies bring a common challenge to many widely deployed security mechanisms in
modern OSes. Modern OSes support restricted execution environments (e.g., sandboxes)
and ask for the user’s approval before applying a security sensitive change to the system (e.g.,
User Access Control (UAC) on Windows [118] and remote view on iOS [18]). However,
accessibility support usually offers interfaces to programmatically generate user inputs, such
as keystrokes and mouse clicks, which essentially enables the interface to act like a human
being. Consequently, it might be pOSesible to bypass these defense mechanisms and abuse
a user’s permissions by generating synthesized user inputs. Similarly, attackers may also be
able to steal security sensitive information displayed on the screen through the accessibility
interfaces.
To verify our hypothesis, we examined the security of accessibility on four commodity
OSes: Microsoft Windows 8.1, Ubuntu 13.10, iOS 6, and Android 4.4. We were able
to identify twelve 1 attacks 2 that can bypass many state-of-the-art defense mechanisms
deployed on these OSes, including UAC, the Yama security module, the iOS App sandbox,
and the Android sandbox.
When designing new interfaces that provide access to computing systems, one must
ensure that these new features do not break existing security mechanisms. However, current
designs and implementations of accessibility support have failed to meet this requirement.
Our analysis shows that current architectures for providing accessibility features make it
extremely difficult to balance compatibility, usability, security, and (economic) cost. In
particular, we found that security has received less consideration compared to the other
factors. Under current architectures, there is not a single OS component that has all
the information necessary to enforce meaningful security policy; instead, the security of
accessibility features depends on security checks implemented in the assistive technology,
1We discovered eleven new attacks, and we cover an attack for Siri that was released in public as exploitation
of accessibility in OS.
2 Disclosure: we reported all vulnerabilities that we found to the OS vendors.
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the OS, and the applications. Unfortunately, in our evaluation, we found that security
checks are either entirely missed or implemented incorrectly (or incompletely) at all levels.
Based on our findings, we believe a fundamental solution to the problem will involve a
new architecture that is designed with security in mind. Proposing this new architecture
is beyond the scope of our work. Instead, we propose several recommendations that work
under current architectures to either make the implementation of all necessary security
checks easier and more intuitive or to alleviate the impact of missing/incorrect checks. We
also point out some open problems and challenges in automatically analyzing a11y support
and identifying security vulnerabilities.
In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We performed a security evaluation of accessibility support for four major OSes:
Windows, Ubuntu Linux, iOS, and Android;
• We found several new vulnerabilities that can be exploited to bypass many state-of-the-
art defense mechanisms deployed on these systems, including UAC and application
sandboxes;
• We analyzed the root cause of these vulnerabilities and proposed a number of recom-
mendations to improve the security of a11y support;
• We showed that the current architectures for providing accessibility features are
inherently flawed because no single OS component can implement a security policy:
security checks at the assistive technology, the OS, and the application must be
implemented correctly; failure in any of these checks introduces vulnerabilities.
4.2 Overview of Accessibility
In this section, we give a brief overview of accessibility in operating systems, and explain















Alt. input through a11y 
Alt. output through a11y 
Regular 
Input Devices Screen 
Output 





Figure 12: A general architecture for implementing accessibility features. Supporting an accessibility
feature creates new paths for I/O on the system (two dotted lines), while original I/O from/to hardware
devices (e.g., keyboard/mouse and screen) is indicated on the right side.
4.2.1 Accessibility Features
In compliance with the amended Rehabilitation Act, software vendors have incorporated
various accessibility features into their systems. In this work, we define computer accessi-
bility (a11y) features as new I/O subsystems that provide alternative ways for users with
disabilities to interact with the system. For example, for visually impaired users, text-to-
speech based Narrator (on MS Windows), VoiceOver (on OS X), and TalkBack (on Android)
provide an output subsystem that communicates with the user through speech. For hearing
impaired users, accessibility features like captioning services turn the system’s audio output
into visual output. Similarly, some systems can alert the user about the presence of audio
output by flashing the screen. For users with motor disabilities, traditional mouse/keyboard
based input systems are replaced by systems based on voice input. In general, we can see
these accessibility features as implemented within an OS architecture in Figure 12.
There are also accessibility features that use traditional I/O devices (e.g., the screen,
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mouse, and keyboard), but make them easier for users with disabilities to interact with the
system. Examples of such features include:
• Magnifier in Windows, which enlarges certain portions of the screen;
• High Contrast in Windows, which provides higher contrast for easy distinction of user
interfaces; and
• On-screen keyboard, sticky keys, filter keys, assisted pointing, and mouse double-click
speed adjust to allow input requiring less movement.
4.2.2 Accessibility Libraries
In addition to pre-installed accessibility features, most OS vendors provide libraries for
third parties to implement their own accessibility features. This makes it possible to create
new alternative I/O subsystems based on other I/O devices (e.g., a braille terminal). In this
case, the assistive technology part in Figure 12 is a program developed by the third party.
Examples of these libraries include:
• UI Automation in Microsoft Windows,
• The accessibility toolkit (ATK) and Assistive Technology Service Provider Interface
(AT-SPI) in Ubuntu Linux,
• AccessibilityService and related classes in Android, and
• The (public) NSAccessibility and (private) UIAutomation frameworks in iOS.
For all the discussions that follow, we will refer to these libraries as accessibility libraries.
In general, the accessibility libraries provide the following capabilities as APIs:
• Notifications on changes to the system’s display (e.g., new window popped up, content
of a window changed/scrolled, change of focus, etc.);
• Ways to probe what is displayed on various UI elements (e.g., name of a button,
content of a textbox, or static text displayed);




For the rest of this chapter, we will use the term assistive technology (AT) to refer to the
logic that runs in user space to provide any of the following functionality:
• (F1) processing user input from alternative input devices, “understanding” what the
user wants and turning it into commands to the OS for control of other applications
(or the OS itself);
• (F2) receiving information about the system’s output and presenting it to users using
alternative output devices.
Usually an assistive technology makes use of an accessibility library to obtain required
capabilities for implementing a new accessibility feature.
4.3 Security Implications of A11y
In this section, we discuss new attack paths due to accessibility features in computing
systems and correspondingly the required security checks for securing accessibility support.
For the rest of this chapter, we adopt the threat model where the attacker controls one user
space process with access to the accessibility library, and we do not assume any other special
privilege for this malicious process.
4.3.1 New Attack Paths
The first functionality (F1) of AT allows users to control the system through alternative input
devices, which is inherently dangerous from a security perspective. While modern OSes
provide increasingly restricted isolation between applications, accessibility support provides
a way to bypass this isolation and control other applications on the system.
To prevent malware from abusing security sensitive privileges of the user, OSes also
deploy defense mechanisms such as User Account Control (UAC) [118] in Windows,
remote view [18] in iOS, and ACG [133], with the policy of “ask for user consent explicitly



















User Input Prompt Dialog 
Figure 13: A workflow for the traditional mechanism to seek user consent before performing
privileged operations.
is usually represented by a certain input event (e.g., click on a button), the capability to
programmatically generate input events also breaks the underlying assumption of these
security mechanisms that input is always the result of user action.
The ability of AT to monitor and probe the information currently being displayed on the
screen (F2) is also problematic because it provides a way to access certain security sensitive
information, e.g., plaintext passwords usually not displayed on the screen (e.g., most OSes
show only scrambled symbols in the password box).
Based on the above observations, we argue that accessibility interfaces provide malware
authors with these new paths of attacks:
• (A1) Malware implemented as AT penetrates the OS security boundary by obtaining
new capabilities of controlling applications;
• (A2) Malware exploits the capability of generating interaction requests to bypass
defense mechanisms or escalate its privilege;
























Figure 14: Required security checks for an AT as a new input subsystem. User input is passed to
the AT first, moved to OS through accessibility libraries, then the synthetic input is delivered to the
application. Grayed boxes indicate security checks required by each entity that receives the input.
access otherwise unavailable information.
4.3.2 Required Security Checks
To evaluate how a platform could be secure against these new attack paths, we propose two
reference models of required checks: one for handling alternative input (Figure 14) and the
other for handling output (Figure 15).
The key to securely handling alternative input is to validate whether the input is truly
from the user. To achieve this goal, we argue that three checks (gray boxes in Figure 14)
along the input path are necessary: within the AT, in the OS, and at the application level.
First, an AT should validate whether the input is from the user. Otherwise, attacks can be
launched by synthesizing the input format of this AT. For example, malware can transform
malicious operations into synthetic voice (e.g., via text-to-speech, TTS) and drive the natural
language user interface to control other applications (A1) or escalate its privilege (A2).




















Figure 15: Required security checks for an AT as a new output subsystem. The application is
required to decide which input can transit through the accessibility library. Then the AT receives the
output to deliver it to the user. Grayed boxes indicate the checks required by OS and the application.
should have control over what applications an AT can control. For example, interaction
requests from untrusted AT to security sensitive processes such as system services and
system settings should not be forwarded. Otherwise, privilege escalation would be feasible
(A2). Additionally, the access control policy should be consistent with other access control
mechanisms to prevent a malicious AT from obtaining new capabilities (A1).
Third, the OS should provide the flexibility to allow an application to specify a fine-
grained security policy on how to handle interaction requests from an AT. More specifically,
the OS should 1) allow the application to distinguish input from real hardware and input
from AT; and 2) allow the application to set its own callback functions to handle input events
from AT. More importantly, when no customization is provided, the default setting should
align with the platform’s default security policy.
These three checks are complementary to each other for the following reasons. First,
for AT-like natural language user interfaces for motor disabled people, it has to be able to
control all applications and the underlying system; the only viable check is within the AT
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itself. Second, as not all ATs are trustworthy, the OS-level check is necessary to prevent
malicious AT from compromising the system. Third, OS-level access controls are not aware
of the context of each non-system application, so the application level check provides the
last line of defense for an application to protect itself from malicious ATs (A1).
Similarly, to securely handle alternative output and prevent information leakage (A3),
two checks (gray boxes in Figure 15) should be performed. The application level check
allows the application to specify what information is sensitive so it will not be available to
AT. Again, we must emphasize that when no customization is provided, the default setting
should align with the platform’s security policy. The OS-level check prevents untrusted ATs
from acquiring sensitive information specific to the system.
4.4 Security Evaluation of A11y
In this section, we first describe our evaluation methodology and then present the results of
the security evaluation on major platforms: Microsoft Windows, Ubuntu Linux, iOS, and
Android. The specific versions of the evaluated systems are: Windows 8.1, Ubuntu 13.10,
iOS 6 and Android 4.4 on the Moto X 3.
4.4.1 Evaluation Methodology
Given an OS platform, we evaluate the security of the accessibility features it offers as
follows:
• We studied the availability of the built-in assistive technologies and the accessibility
library on the platform. For built-in assistive technologies, we focused on the availabil-
ity of a natural language user interface because it provides the most powerful control
over the system. For the accessibility library, we focused on whether an application
needs special privileges to use the library; if so, we focused on how such privileges
3 For Windows, Ubuntu, and Android, we tested the latest release version as of November 2013. Attacks




• Using our input validation model (Figure 14), we examined the input handling process
of the analyzed platform. When a check is missing or flawed, we try to launch
attacks exploiting the missing or flawed check. Specifically, if the built-in natural
language user interface lacks input validation or if the validation can be bypassed,
we try to escalate our malware’s privilege through synthetic voice. If the OS-level
check is missing and there is a security mechanism that requires user consent, we try
to escalate our malware’s privilege by spoofing the mechanism with synthetic input.
If the OS-level check is not missing, we assess whether its access control policy is
consistent with other security mechanisms; if not, we evaluate what new capabilities
become available. If the application level check is missing or flawed, we examine
whether accessibility support provides us new capabilities.
• Using our output validation model (Figure 15), we examined the output handling
process of the analyzed platform. If the OS-level check is missing, we try to read
the UI structure of other applications. If the application level check is missing, we
examine whether new capabilities become available. In particular, since most of the
displayed information is available through screenshots, we try to steal a password
because it is usually not displayed in plaintext. We assume obtaining any other
(potentially sensitive) information as plaintext via AT is no harder than reading a
password.
4.4.2 Availability of Accessibility Features
Table 5 summarizes the availability of a natural language user interface and accessibility
libraries on the four platforms. Natural language user interfaces are available on all platforms
except Ubuntu; accessibility libraries are available on all studied platforms 4.
For natural language user interfaces, both Speech Recognition and Touchless Control
4 On iOS, there is no accessibility library, but the UIAutomation framework provides most capabilities that
we require.
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Table 5: A list of available accessibility libraries and natural language user interfaces on each
platform. * indicates the feature requires special setup/privilege.
Platform Natural Language User Interface Accessibility Libraries
Windows Speech Recognition* UIAutomation
Ubuntu None ATK, AT-SPI
iOS Siri UIAutomation*
Android Touchless Control* AccessibilityService*
for the Moto X5 require initialization (training) before first use. Siri can be enabled without
any setup. Although Speech Recognition on Windows requires initialization, this step
can be bypassed by modifying the values of a registry sub-key at HKEY_CURRENT_USER
/Software/Microsoft/Speech. Since this key is under HKEY_CURRENT_USER, it is writable
by any unprivileged process.
For accessibility libraries, both desktop environments (Windows and Ubuntu Linux) have
no privilege requirements for using the libraries. Thus they are available to any application.
On iOS, the UIAutomation framework, though not a full-fledged accessibility library,
provides the functionality to send synthesized touch and button events. Since this framework
is part of the private API set, its usage is forbidden by apps in the Apple App Store. However,
as demonstrated in an attack to iOS [157], the enforcement can be bypassed.
Unlike other platforms, Android’s accessibility library (AccessibilityService) is available
only after the following requirements are met: first, the app must declare the use of the
permission BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE. Second, the user must explicitly enable the app
as an accessibility service. When changing accessibility settings, a user is prompted with a
dialog that displays what kind of capabilities will be granted to the AccessibilityService,
which is very similar to the app permission system. Nonetheless, users are prone to
enable permissions when apps provide step-by-step instructions. In particular, we find that
there are more than 50 apps on the Google Play store that declare use of permissions for
AccessibilityService, and two of them [63, 132] have been downloaded by more than ten
5 For the natural language user interface on Android, we try to analyze Touchless Control which is only
available on the Moto X, due to the lack of a privileged natural language user interface in Android by default.
89
Table 6: The status of input validation on each platform. * indicates the check enforces a security
policy that is different from other security mechanisms.
Platform Assistive Tech. Check OS Level Check Application Level Check
Windows None UIPI* None
Ubuntu N/A None None
iOS 6 None None None
Android Authentication Permission* None
million users combined.
4.4.3 Vulnerabilities in Input Validation
Table 6 summarizes the examination results of each platform when checked against our
input reference model (Figure 14). There are two common problems across all analyzed
platforms.
Missing or flawed input validation within AT. Natural language user interfaces usually
have more privileges than normal applications; most of them lack authentication for voice
input. Moreover, some accept self-played input (sending audio from the built-in speaker
to a microphone), making it possible to inject audio input through text-to-speech (TTS).
Although Touchless Control on the Moto X tries to authenticate its input, the authentication
can easily be bypassed with a replay attack. As a result, an attacker can obtain the privileges
of the natural language user interface (attack #1, #5, #9).
Control of other applications. At the application level, no platform provides a precise
way to check whether the input event is from the hardware or from the accessibility library.
Moreover, at the OS level, although Windows and Android have access controls for AT,
their protections are not complete. This allows a malicious AT to control most applications
the same way as a human user would. Specifically, a malicious AT can send input events
to make other applications perform security sensitive actions (attack #4, #6, #7, #10) and
spoof security mechanisms that require user consent (attack #2, #3, #8).
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Implementation of attacks. We tested all Windows-based attacks by implementing proof-
of-concept malware. For controlling apps on Ubuntu Linux, iOS 6, and Android, we checked
the capability of sending synthetic input to other applications by writing sample code for
sending basic user interactions such as clicking a button, and writing content into a textbox.
For iOS, we also wrote code to test for special UI windows such as passcode lock, password
dialog, and remote view. For Touchless Control, we implemented sample malware that
records sound in the background; we then sliced the authentication phrase from it manually
and replayed the slice within the malware. For Siri, we manually performed the same attack.
4.4.3.1 Windows
The OS-level check applied to the accessibility library on Windows is called User Interface
Privilege Isolation (UIPI) [116]. UIPI is a mandatory access control (or mandatory integrity
control (MIC) in Microsoft’s terminology) that sets an integrity level (IL) for every process
and file, and enforces a relaxed Biba model [21, 115]: no write/send to a higher integrity
level. The integrity levels (IL) are divided into five categories: Untrusted, Low, Medium,
High, and System.
Regular applications run at Medium IL, while processes executed by an active adminis-
trator runs at High IL. As an MIC, the IL of a process is inherited by all of its child processes
and takes the minimum privilege when two or more ILs are applied on the process.
UIPI prevents attackers from sending input to higher IL processes. For example, malware
cannot spoof UAC through a synthesized click because normal programs including malware
run at either Medium IL (when launched by the user) or Low IL (when launched by a
browser, i.e., drive-by attacks), while the UAC window runs at System IL. Furthermore,
malware cannot take control of applications that are executed by the administrator, which
has a higher IL (High IL).
Unfortunately, the protection provided by UIPI is not complete: since most applications
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are running at the same Medium IL as malware, UIPI allows malware to control most other
applications via AT. Furthermore, the lack of security checks at the assistive technology and
application levels results in more vulnerabilities: missing input validation in the built-in nat-
ural language user interface allows privilege escalation attacks through Speech Recognition
(attack #1); missing application level checks enables escalation of privilege (attack #2), and
theft of user passwords (attack #3).
Attack #1: privilege escalation through Speech Recognition. Control of Speech Recog-
nition is security-sensitive for several reasons. First, although there is a setup phase, it can
be bypassed as mentioned in §4.4.2. After setup, any process can start Speech Recognition.
Second, Speech Recognition always runs with administrative privilege (High IL) regardless
of which process runs it. This allows it to control almost all other applications on the system,
including applications running with administrative privileges. Because of these “features”
of Speech Recognition and the problems mentioned previously (i.e., no input validation, and
accepting self-played voice), malware running at Medium or even Low IL can escalate itself
to administrative privilege through synthetic voice.
Figure 16 shows the workflow of the privilege escalation attack from a Medium IL
malware. The first step is to launch Speech Recognition through CreateProcess() with
the argument sapisvr.exe -SpeechUX. Second, the malware launches the msconfig.exe
application through CreateProcess(). Since msconfig.exe is an application for an admin-
istrator to manage the system configuration, it automatically runs at High IL. While malware
cannot send input events to this process (prevented by UIPI), Speech Recognition can. After
launching msconfig.exe, the malware can use voice commands to launch a command shell
by choosing an item under the Tools tab of msconfig.exe. This is accomplished by playing
a piece of synthetic speech “Tools, Page Down, Command Prompt, Launch!”. Once the
command shell that inherits the High IL from msconfig.exe is launched, the malware then
says “cd” to its directory, says its own executable name and “Press Enter” to be executed
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1. Invoke Speech Recognition Commander 
2. Invoke msconfig.exe (run as HIGH IL) 
3. Play artificial speech using text-to-speech library  
Tools!	  Page	  Down!	  
Command	  Prompt!	  
Launch!	  
4. Administrative Command Prompt has launched 
5. Execute Stage-2 Malware by Speech 
(Run as HIGH IL) 
Type	  D,	  Type	  I,	  Type	  R	  
Press	  ENTER!	  
Figure 16: The workflow of privilege escalation attack with Windows Speech Recognition.
with administrative privileges.
Attack #2: privilege escalation with Explorer.exe. Explorer.exe is a special process in
Windows that has higher privilege than its running IL. Unlike other Medium IL processes,
Explorer.exe has the capability of writing to High IL objects such as the System32 directory.
Although this capability is protected by a UAC-like dialog (Figure 17), i.e., Explorer.exe
asks for the user confirmation before writing to a system directory of Windows, the dialog
belongs to Explorer.exe itself. Since this action requires user consent, the application
should check whether the input comes from the user or AT. However, there is no such check.
As a result, malware can overwrite files in system directories by clicking the confirmation
dialog through the accessibility library.
Some system applications in system directories are automatically escalated to the ad-
ministrative privilege at launch. On Windows, when a process tries to load a DLL, the
dynamic linker first looks for the DLL from the local directory where the executable resides.
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Figure 17: A dialog that pops-up when Explorer.exe tries to copy a file to a system directory. The
dialog runs at the same Medium IL as Explorer.exe. Thus, any application with Medium IL can
send a synthetic click to the “Continue” button and proceed with writing the file.
Once malware injects malicious DLLs into the directory containing these applications, it
can obtain the administrative privilege when the applications are run, thus bypassing UAC.
An example of such an application is sysprep, which will load Cryptbase.DLL from the
local directory. By sending synthetic clicks to Explorer.exe and injecting a malicious
Cryptbase.DLL, malware can achieve privilege escalation.
Attack #3: stealing passwords using Password Eye and a screenshot. On Windows,
passwords are protected in several ways. They are not shown on the screen; and even with
real user interactions, the content in a password box cannot be copied to the clipboard.
Furthermore, as will be described in detail in Table 7, it is also not possible to retrieve
password content directly through the accessibility library. However, the lack of input
validation on the password box UI component opens up a method of stealing the plaintext of
a password.
Starting with Windows 8, Microsoft introduced Password Eye as a new UI feature to
give visual feedback to users to correct a typo in a password input box (Figure 18). This
“Eye” appears when a user provides input to a password box, and clicking it will reveal the
plaintext of the password. Unfortunately, since Password Eye cannot distinguish hardware
input from a synthetic input, malware can click it as long as UIPI permits. Again, since
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A) Before clicking Eye B) After clicking Eye 
Figure 18: Password Eye on the Gmail web application, accessed with Internet Explorer 10. In
Windows 8 and 8.1, this Eye is attached to password fields not only for web applications but also for
regular applications. By left-clicking the Eye, the box reveals its plaintext content.
most applications run at the same IL as malware, malware can send a left-click event to
reveal the content of the password dialog (Figure 18) and can extract it from a screenshot.
4.4.3.2 Ubuntu Linux Desktop
Since Ubuntu does not have a built-in natural language user interface, we only consider the
attacks enabled by missing checks in the OS or an application. The missing check at the OS
level allows malware to control any application and thus break the boundary enforced by
other security mechanisms (attack #4). The missing check at the application level does not
provide additional capabilities beyond those already provided by the missing OS level check.
Attack #4: bypassing the security boundaries of Ubuntu. Since neither the OS nor
applications authenticate input, malware can send a synthetic input to any application in
the GUI, i.e. the current X Window display. The display here does not mean the physical
display (i.e., a monitor screen) of the device; rather, it refers to the logical display space
(e.g., :0.0) of the X Window Server.
In this setting, the lack of security checks for input breaks two security boundaries in
Ubuntu. The first violation is regarding user ID (UID) boundaries. Regardless of the UID
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of the display service, a launched process will run with the UID of the user who launched
it. For example, if a non-root user runs a GUI application with sudo (e.g., sudo gparted
or a GUI shell with root privileges), the application runs in the same display space of the
non-root user account, even though it runs as the root UID. Since AT-SPI allows control of
any application running on the logical display space, malware with a non-root UID can send
synthetic input to control other applications, even those with root privileges.
Second, process boundaries can be bypassed by sending a synthetic input. Starting with
Ubuntu 10.10, Ubuntu adopted the Yama security module [36] to enhance security at the
kernel level. In particular, one feature in Yama prohibits a process from attaching to another
process using the ptrace() system call, unless the target process is a descendant of the caller.
Thus, a process cannot attach or read/write other processes’ memory if the target process is
not created by itself or its descendants. However, malware can bypass this restriction: it can
write values or perform UI actions to change application status through synthetic inputs or
interfaces available by AT-SPI such as settextvalue() and invokemenu().
4.4.3.3 iOS
iOS 6 lacks security checks at all levels. Missing input validation in its natural language
user interface, Siri, allows an attacker to abuse its privileges to perform sensitive operations
and access sensitive information (attack #5). Furthermore, missing OS-level checks allows
malware to 1) bypass sandbox restrictions to control other apps (attack #6), 2) spoof the
remote view mechanism to programmatically authorize access permissions to sensitive
resources (attack #7), and 3) bypass password protection (attack #8).
Finally, since there are no available checks at the application level, synthetic input from
a malicious app cannot be prevented or detected by the targeted application.
Attack #5: bypassing passcode lock using Siri. 6 iOS allows several security-sensitive
6 We note that this attack on Siri was not originally discovered by us. The attack has been publicly known
since September 2013 [46], but we include this in this chapter due to the importance of its security implications
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actions to be carried out through Siri even when the device is locked with a passcode.
Such actions include making phone calls, sending SMS messages, sending emails, posting
messages on Twitter and Facebook, checking and modifying the calendar, and checking
contacts by name. Since there is no input validation, any attacker who has physical access
to the iOS device can launch the attack without any knowledge of the passcode.
Attack #6: bypassing the iOS sandbox. App sandboxing [10] in iOS enforces a strict
security policy that strongly isolates an app from others. The data and execution state of an
app is protected so that other apps cannot read or write its memory, or control its execution
(e.g., launching the app). However, the lack of OS-level security checks on accessibility
makes it possible for malware to control other apps by sending synthesized input.
With synthetic touch, malware can perform any actions available to a user, such as
launching other apps, typing keystrokes, etc. That is, malware can steal capabilities of other
apps across the app sandbox.
Attack #7: privilege escalation with remote view. . In addition to app sandboxing, iOS
protects its security sensitive operations with the remote view mechanism [18]. Protected
operations include sending email, posting on Twitter or Facebook, and sending SMS. Remote
view works as follows: when an app tries to access any protected operation, the underlying
service (which is a different process) pops up a UI window to seek user consent. For
example, if an app wants to send an email, it invokes a remote function call to the email
service, which would then pop up a confirmation window. The email message can only be
sent after the user clicks the “Send” button in the pop-up window.
Remote view is considered an effective defense mechanism to prevent misuse of sensitive
operations. However, the lack of input validation in iOS allows malware to send synthetic
touches to spoof user input to remote view and execute these privileged operations.
on built-in AT.
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Figure 19: Screenshot of passcode and password input in iOS. For passcode (left), typed numbers
can be identified by color differences on the keypad. For the password (right), iOS always shows the
last character to give visual feedback to the user.
Attack #8: bypassing password protection on iOS.
Another protection mechanism in iOS is passwords. This is utilized in two system apps:
the lock screen and the App Store.
The lock screen prevents any unauthorized access to the device and is applied not only
to UI events, but also to security data such as KeyChain and encrypted files. Moreover,
once the screen is locked, all touch events are blocked; thus malware is no longer able to
manipulate apps other than the lock screen.
The App Store asks for an Apple ID and password for each purchase. Although malware
can generate “clicks” to initiate the purchase, without knowing the password, it is not
possible to finish the transaction.
Unfortunately, since iOS always displays the last character of a passcode/password in
plaintext (Figure 19) and background screenshots can be taken through the private API call
createScreenIOSurface in UIWindow class, it is possible to steal the user’s passcode and
password. With a stolen password, since both the lock screen and the App Store accept




The Android platform has the most complete input validation among the four evaluated
platforms. First, Touchless Control [123], a natural language user interface for the Moto X,
utilizes voice authentication: the user is required to register his/her voice with Touchless
Control at first boot; the app then constantly monitors microphone input for the fixed authen-
tication phrase “OK Google Now” from the user. Once the command is captured, it checks
whether the phrase matches the voice signature extracted from the registered phrase; if so, it
then launches the Google Now application to execute a voice command. Nonetheless, like
other non-challenge-response-based authentication, this voice authentication is vulnerable
to replay attacks (#9).
Second, as discussed in §4.4.2, Android requires explicit user consent to acquire ac-
cessibility capabilities. However, its protection is incomplete. Specifically, Android has
no runtime security check for AT. Once an app is allowed to be an AT, it can leverage
the accessibility library to create a new inter-process communication (IPC) channel that is
not protected by the ordinary Android permission system (#10). As a result, a malicious
AT can easily achieve the same effect as capability leakage attacks [56, 31, 41, 70, 164]
and information leakage attacks [84, 167]. Moreover, unlike UIPI, Android’s OS level
access control on accessibility does not protect system apps. In particular, we found that our
malware can change system settings through AT, which offers us many powerful capabilities.
The only missing check in Android is at the application level. Similar to the iOS case,
we did not find new capabilities beyond what is enabled due to inconsistent OS-level checks.
Attack #9: bypass Touchless Control’s voice authentication. Fragile authentication
for AT leads to a vulnerability in Touchless Control on the Moto X. In particular, voice
authentication can be bypassed by a replay attack shown in Figure 20. First, an attacker can
build malware as a background service that constantly monitors sound from the microphone.
As the phrase “OK Google Now” is the only authentication phrase, the user is likely




1. Record authentication phrase in background 
OK,	  Google	  
Now!	  
2. Play authentication phrase when the user is away. 
Call	  
Alice!	  
3. Command Touchless Control with Text-to-Speech API 
Figure 20: The workflow of the attack on the Moto X’s Touchless Control. Malware in the
background can record a user’s voice, and replay it to bypass voice authentication.
recorded, the malware can play the recorded phrase through the device speaker to activate
Touchless Control. Since Touchless Control accepts self-played sound from the speaker to
the microphone, it subsequently launches Google Now. After this, the malware can play
arbitrary commands using the default TTS library for Google Now. Since there is no further
authentication for the command phrase, the malware can utilize a variety of commands to
make phone calls, send SMS, send email, set alarms, and launch applications.
Attack #10: bypassing Android sandboxing and more. Sandboxing in Android [6]
provides isolation between apps to protect memory and filesystem access, and prohibits an
app from interfering with the execution of other apps. Furthermore, its permission system
restricts an app’s access to sensitive resources.
However, once an app is activated as an AT, there are no further restrictions. A malicious
AT can then read UI structure (including location, type, text, etc.) of the whole system and
deliver user actions to any UI element, such as the click of a button, a scroll up or down, a
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Table 7: The status of output validation on each platform. * means the check enforces an inconsistent
security policy.





cut/copy/paste of text, a change of focus, and expand/dismiss of UI. Therefore, malware
can control other apps as if it is the user. Malware can abuse the permissions of other apps,
e.g., even without network permission, our malware can control the Gmail application to
exfiltrate stolen data.
Additionally, malware can change system settings such as user-configurable settings,
and install/uninstall apps. Moreover, malware can programmatically enable developer mode
(e.g., by sending seven synthetic clicks) which can put a device at risk for further infection.
4.4.4 Vulnerabilities in Output Validation
Table 7 summarizes the evaluation results of each platform compared against our output
reference model in Figure 15. iOS does not support alternative output, so its result is omitted
in this section.
Across all platforms, only Windows enforces an OS-level check (UIPI) for output.
However, since UIPI does not have any protection among applications in the same IL,
Windows suffers from the same UI-level attacks described below.
Reading UI state of other applications. All platforms except iOS allow an AT to access
UI structures. The library provides not only the metadata for the UI such as the type of
element, location, and size but also the content of the UI element. Hence, a malicious AT
can monitor other applications in a fine-grained manner. For example, malware can detect
the current state of the target application using 1) available UI structures, 2) UI events such
as change of focus, movement of a window, and change of contents, and 3) user interaction
events. With these capabilities, malware can spy on every action a user takes, as well as
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maintain an accurate status of an application.
All three platforms (Windows, Ubuntu, and Android) protect the plaintext content of the
password in a password dialog box by default. However, in Ubuntu, AT-SPI fails to block all
paths for retrieving the plaintext of the password (#11). Android can be configured to allow
reading keystrokes on password dialog boxes; this can be enabled by malware implemented
as an AT (as mentioned in #10).
Implementation of attacks. For extracting passwords in Ubuntu (attack #11), we im-
plemented proof-of-concept malware that looks for authentication windows, obtains the
plaintext, and prints out the plaintext on the console using AT-SPI. For attack #12, we
implemented malware that enables the speaking of passwords via accessibility services and
registers itself as the TTS subsystem for the accessibility service. In this two-fold manner,
malware can receive and transmit the contents of a password to an attacker.
4.4.4.1 Windows
With UIPI, Windows is the only platform where the OS applies access control to the reading
of UI structures. Although UIPI prohibits accessing the structures of an application that has
higher IL than the caller, access on the same or lower IL is still permitted.
The application level output check exists for password boxes by default, which disallows
1) obtaining the password via WM_GETTEXT or ValuePattern in UI Automation, and 2)
copying the password via WM_COPY or by generating a Ctrl-C input event. Therefore, malware
cannot steal passwords through the accessibility library.
4.4.4.2 Ubuntu Linux Desktop
In Ubuntu, the application level check for passwords exists, but its implementation (in ATK)
is inconsistent with the UI (in GTK).
Attack #11: stealing sudoer passwords from authentication dialogs. On Ubuntu, we
found a password stealing vulnerability using AT-SPI. The security checks at the OS level
are incomplete. For a password box, there exists an API call, gettextvalue(), on the
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Figure 21: The administrator authentication dialog of GNOME on Ubuntu 13.10. This dialog asks
for the password of the current user to gain root permissions.
Linux Desktop Testing Project (LDTP, a wrapper over AT-SPI and ATK). It throws a “Not
Implemented” exception when called, meaning that reading passwords through this API is
unavailable. However, AT-SPI missed security checks on a critical accessibility function
of a password box: copytext(). Although physically or synthetically pressing Ctrl-C does
not copy the value of a password box, copytext() from AT-SPI does copy the plaintext
of a password to the clipboard. The clipboard then can provide the plaintext content of a
password. Figure 21 shows a sudo dialog that is vulnerable to this attack. Once the sudoer’s
password is acquired in this manner, malware can easily gain root privileges.
4.4.4.3 Android
While Android prohibits reading of password content from its accessibility service, this can
be disabled via user preferences. In conjunction with the vulnerability of input validation
(attack #10), this restriction can easily be bypassed.
Attack #12: keylogger on Android. Although Android provides protections for accessing
the plaintext of a password, incomplete protections at the OS-level lead to a vulnerability.
Once an app is enabled as an AT (see Attack #10 for detail), the app can change any settings
on the device without user consent. Android provides an option called “Speak passwords”
in its accessibility settings. If enabled, keystrokes on a password box are delivered through
the text-to-speech (TTS) processor. We register malware as a TTS output application. Once
registered, the malware can receive password contents via the OS-level accessibility service.
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4.5 Discussions
In this section, we explain how accessibility libraries are making it possible to implement our
attacks, discuss the limitations of our attacks, analyze the root causes of the vulnerabilities,
and consider open problems for future work.
4.5.1 Complexity of Accessibility Attacks
As we mentioned in section §4.2, accessibility libraries provide three capabilities: 1)
obtaining events representing UI change, 2) providing a way of programmatically prob-
ing/accessing UI widgets, and 3) synthesizing inputs to UI widgets.
With these functionalities, an attacker can create malware capable of performing suc-
cessful attacks with a degree of relative ease when compared to other non-AT methods that
achieve the same ends. As an example, we will describe how the “Password Eye” attack
(#3) can be implemented using accessibility libraries. To achieve the “Password Eye” attack,
malware needs to: 1) detect when the user types a password, 2) identify the UI “eye” and
click on it, and 3) locate the password field to grab its text in a screenshot. To determine
whether the user is typing a password, we can use the first capability of the accessibility
libraries to keep track of which UI component is currently focused. In particular, on the
Windows platform, this can be easily achieved by registering an event handler in the plat-
form’s accessibility framework that receives the focused UI element at any change of focus.
After being handed a focused element, we can check whether the element is a password box
with an “eye” by assessing its properties reported by the accessibility libraries. For example,
a TRUE value of isPassword property indicates a password box. Once we determine that the
focused element is a password box, we can use the second capability of the accessibility
libraries to get the “eye” button. In particular, since we know the relative position of the
focused text box and the “eye” button, we can walk the UI widget tree provided by the
accessibility library and calculate the position of the “eye”. Then, we can use the third
capability to click it. Finally, the handle to the focused password box we obtained in the
104
first step can also be used to retrieve the location of the box on the screen and also allow
us to grab the actual password typed from a screenshot. A point worth noting here is that
developing attacks using accessibility libraries is very similar to how one manipulates DOM
(Document Object Model) objects using Javascript in a web page.
One may point out that the same attack can be achieved on the Windows platform by
sending traditional Windows Messages (such as WM_CLICK), or using tools such as AutoIt.
However, we argue that the use of the accessibility library greater ease and reliability.
In particular, without the first capability of the accessibility libraries, one may need to
constantly probe the current state of UIs to determine if the user is typing a password.
Secondly, while it might be trivial to use a hardcoded coordinate to click the “eye” button in
a testing environment such as AutoIt, this strategy will be very fragile in a real attack; factors
such as variation in screen size and resizing/moving of the target window may break the
hardcoded approach in a real attack. Using hardcoded locations to extract a password from
screenshots will face a similar issue. Even though it may be possible to reliably implement
our attacks without accessibility libraries, this implementation would be more complex and
require greater effort on the part of the author.
4.5.2 Limitations of the Attacks
Since attacks through accessibility libraries perform actions over user interfaces, they have
an inherent limitation in that they are not stealthy. For example, if the target application is
running in the foreground when an attack is unfolding, the user may recognize visual cues
of the attack, such as button presses, an opening of a new UI window, etc. Furthermore,
attacks via voice commands play sounds, and are thus audible; or they fail if the speaker is
turned off.
However, we argue that these attacks can be launched in a stealthy way. First, malware
can detect whether the user is using the device or not. For desktop machines, the presence of
a user can be detected by monitoring physical keystroke or mouse movement. Malware can
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exploit a time period when the user is absent to launch UI-intensive attacks. If necessary, the
malware can blank the screen when launching the attack, because screen sleep after some
period of non-use is a natural and expected behavior of the system. For mobile devices,
prior research works [135, 165, 73] discussed how to track the user’s behavior using an app
on the device. With the help of various sensors, such as the camera, face proximity detector,
GPS location, accelerometer, etc., malware can determine when the user is not watching the
screen, away from the device, or when the device is in the user’s pocket. It can then launch
an attack without being exposed.
Second, UI actions can be delivered in the background for some platforms. Thus, an
attack can be carried out even when the user is actively using the device. In Windows, once
a handle to a UI widget is obtained while it is in the foreground, it can still be manipulated
even when it is in the background or minimized. In Linux, probing the UI of a minimized
application is possible. Furthermore, in the worst case, malware can move a window to
nearly off the screen, so that the user does not notice any UI change. In our experiment, if
any pixel of an app is visible on the screen 7, there is no limitation on probing or performing
actions on it.
Third, it is possible to make the attacks on natural language user interfaces stealthy with
the help of hardware. Common audio devices such as the Realtek HD Audio device and other
sound card devices’ drivers provide functionality called Stereo Mix. Stereo Mix sends the
output of system sound to an internal microphone input. Enabling this functionality does not
require any special privilege. Malware can play audio internally to deliver text-to-speech
audio to a natural language user interface. The attack succeeds without outputting audio to
speakers and also works when there is no speaker device at all.
Finally, our experience with OS vendors shows that these threats will be taken seriously.
In the May of 2013, before presenting an attack [103] that takes advantage of private APIs
for synthesizing touches and taking screenshots on iPhone, we informed Apple of our
7 For example, while all other pixels are invisible, only one pixel of the window is visible.
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1 // On real touch event
2 public boolean onTouchEvent(MotionEvent event) {











14 // On a11y request for click
15 boolean performAccessibilityActionInternal(int action,
16 Bundle arguments) {
17 // ...
18 switch (action) {
19 case AccessibilityNodeInfo.ACTION_CLICK:
20 {
21 if (isClickable()) {








Figure 22: Code that handles the real input (above), and code that handles the a11y input (below) for
click, in View.java of Android. The same function performClick() is used to handle both requests.
attack. In the August of 2013, the exploited vulnerabilities were removed from the then
newly-released iOS 7.
4.5.3 Root Causes, and Design Trade-offs
We strongly believe that to eliminate a11y related vulnerabilities fundamentally, a new
architecture for providing accessibility features is necessary. However, proposing such an
architecture is out of the scope of this work; instead, we present the findings of our root
cause analysis to illustrate why security checks spread across the AT, OS, and application
tend to fail, and to show some of the trade-offs taken in the current implementation of
accessibility features.
The first identified root cause is the emphasis on availability/compatibility of a11y
support in all the studied systems. In every case we have studied, native UI widgets include
logic to handle requests from accessibility libraries, and UI widgets provided by OS are
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1 static void gtk_entry_copy_clipboard (GtkEntry *entry) {
2 GtkEntryPrivate *priv = entry->priv;
3 // ...
4 // ### security check for password box ###
5 if (!priv->visible)
6 {
7 // do not copy text to clipboard





Figure 23: Code that handles copying of text (pressing Ctrl-C) in GTK. Inside the function, GTK
checks the security flag priv->visible to decide whether or not to provide selected text to the
clipboard. If GtkEntry is set as a password box (if the flag is true), then the text will not be copied.
usually built to reuse the same interfaces/channels to handle both real user inputs and a11y
inputs. As a result, it is very hard for an application to distinguish a11y inputs from real user
inputs. This design choice enables many attacks by accepting and processing synthesized
input as if it is a real input (A28). For instance, in Android, physically tapping a UI widget
with a finger will invoke the performClick() function. Equally, on an a11y request, the
same performClick() function is invoked (see Figure 22 for details). In Windows, just
like the real user input, clicks generated by UIAutomation are delivered as a Windows
Message WM_CLICK. Similarly, for Ubuntu and iOS, a11y requests take the same path as
I/O requests within the UI widget. While this means all applications that use the native
UI widgets automatically and naturally work with the requests from accessibility libraries,
such design also imposes a default security policy that makes every widget available to all
ATs. As we can see in attack #2 and #3, this is too permissive policy. Furthermore, in all
the studied systems, if the application/UI developers were to instead implement their own
policy regarding how an application should process requests from accessibility libraries,
they would have to implement their own UI widgets (usually by “subclassing” the native
ones), and this comes with a non-trivial cost.
Second, from both technical and economic perspectives, it is challenging to perform
complete validation and authentication for certain inputs introduced by AT. As a result, new
8Please refer to §4.3.1 New Attack Paths for details.
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1 // A11y code snippet
2 void atk_editable_text_copy_text (Editable e, int start, int end) {
3 AtkEditableText *text;
4 // ...
5 *(iface->copy_text) (text, start_pos, );
6 // calls gtk_entry_accessible_copy_text()
7 }
8
9 static void gtk_entry_accessible_copy_text(AtkEditableText *t,
10 int start, int end) {
11 GtkEditable *e;
12 // ...
13 gchar *str = gtk_editable_get_chars (e, start, end);
14 // ...
15 }
16 // A11y code end, calls functions in Gtk UI
17
18 // Gtk code snippet
19 gchar* gtk_editable_get_chars (GtkEditable *e,
20 int start, int end) {
21 return (editable)->get_chars (e, start, end);
22 // calls gtk_entry_get_chars()
23 }
24
25 // Final function that returns text content
26 gchar* gtk_entry_get_chars (GtkEntry *e, int start, int end) {
27 gchar *text;
28 text = gtk_entry_buffer_get_text (get_buffer (entry));
29 // ### no security checks at all on getting text ###
30 return g_strndup (text + start_index, end_index - start_index);
31 // return text without checking priv->visible
32 }
Figure 24: Code that handles an accessibility request (ATK) for copying text. ATK internally calls
a function of a module in GTK that supports accessibility. The module then calls a function that
directly interacts with the UI widget (GTK functions). However, the module GtkEntryAccessible
calls a different function gtk_editable_get_chars(), which misses required security checks of the
password box.
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attack vectors become available due to missing security checks on processing input (A2)
and output (A3) requests from ATs or accessibility libraries. For example, in attack #11,
simply pressing Ctrl-C will call gtk_entry_copy_clipboard in which there is a security
check for preventing the text in a password field from being copied (see Figure 23 for
details). However, a different function copytext() will be executed in ATK, which takes a
different execution path without security checks, potentially leading to password leakages.
We suspect that the ATK code was added to the OS by a group of developers who were not
aware of the principles of input validation and complete mediation, or that the ATK code
was added to the OSs only recently and has thus not been through rigorous security code
review and testing when compared to older portions of the OS.
There are also technical and economic reasons for a lack of validation and authentication.
For example, for the cases of attack #1 and #9, the AT needs to check whether the voice
input actually comes from a real user, and also needs to further authenticate the authorized
user. Voice based validation and authentication require non-trivial technical support, with
potentially high research and development costs.
Finally, to improve the usability of ATs, OSs usually have weak access control on
accessibility libraries; while this makes the installation and use of ATs (their intended
purpose) easy, it is not a good security practice. In particular, accessibility libraries can
usually be accessed by any application on a system. For example, in Windows, iOS 6, and
Linux, any program can be an AT without any authorization. This also opens paths for
attacks so that any (malicious) program can abuse accessibility functionalities to launch the
attacks described in this chapter. The exception is Android; it has a setup menu for enabling
an app’s use of the accessibility library, though this check is only performed at initial app
setup.
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4.5.4 Recommendations and Open Problems
Based on the root cause analysis in §4.5.3, we present recommendations on how to alleviate
(if not eliminate) the security risks created by the a11y support. Our recommendations are
intended to work with the current architecture for supporting accessibility features, and thus
are limited by the inherent difficulties that come with this architecture; nonetheless, we
believe they will help the community to improve security for a11y before the introduction of
a complete a11y security policy occurs. We will also discuss some open problems involved
in implementing these recommendations.
Our first recommendation is to have fine-grained access control over which program
can access specific functionality of the accessibility library. From our study, we find that
both Linux and iOS have no such access control at all, while Windows allows all programs
to use the accessibility library to control/read the content of any other program with the
same integrity level. Android appears to be the only system that has access control policy
specific for the accessibility library: the user has to explicitly grant the AT the privilege to
use the accessibility library. However, once this privilege is granted, the AT has full access
to all the capabilities of the accessibility library. In many cases, this violates the principle of
least-privileged access. For example, a screenreader will only need to read the content of
other apps through the accessibility library, but it does not need to be able to interact with
other apps. Based on this observation, we recommend the privilege of using the accessibility
library be at least split into two, one for reading the content of other apps and one for the
more privileged capability of interacting and controlling other apps. While this may present
an extra hurdle for users who need AT, it will only incur a one-time setup cost, which we feel
is an acceptable trade-off for the extra security against misuse of the accessibility library.
Our second recommendation is to provide mechanisms for a UI developer to flag how
different widgets in their UI will handle various requests from the AT, rather than requiring
the UI developer to handle this task themselves. For example, in many UI libraries, a
developer can flag a text field as a password field, and the underlying logic of the UI will
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make the content in the field invisible to both the display and the ATs. However, this
generally appears to be the only instance of such a flag, and it only applies to text fields. We
believe more such flags should be available to specify various a11y related security policies,
and such flags should be made applicable to various kinds of widgets (e.g. attack #2 and #3
can easily be eliminated if a security flag is applicable to buttons). As future work, we will
study what kind of a11y related security policies UI developers usually need to specify, and
what language features are needed for specifying such policy as attributes of widgets in the
UI.
Our final recommendation can be considered a new security component in the current
a11y architecture, and can significantly limit the damage caused by exploitation of a11y-
related vulnerabilities. We propose to extend accessibility support to user-driven access
control mechanisms like UAC in Windows or Remote View in iOS. While this recom-
mendation may not be directly derived from our root cause analysis, we believe it will
fundamentally eliminate many a11y related security issues discussed in this chapter. In
particular, OS vendors should develop versions of access control mechanisms to support
various disabilities. For example, for visually impaired users, the system can read out
(through the speaker) the message seeking permission, and have the user confirm or abort by
clicking the “F” or “J” button on the keyboard (which are tactilely different from all other
keys on the keyboard), and for the users who lack fine motor skills, the permission granting
can be driven by voice recognition. We note that while this approach is not general enough to
support the need for all users with different kinds of disabilities, it will significantly improve
the security for all users that are covered. Furthermore, in the case of voice recognition,
the introduction of a mechanism specifically designed for seeking vocal permission may
significantly simplify the task of authenticating user input (only “yes” or “no” need be
verified, rather than performing general voice recognition), and thus move the burden of
performing voice recognition from the AT developer to the OS vendor (who may have more
resources to research and develop a mechanism that is robust against attack #1 and #9).
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Finally, we acknowledge that our analysis requires significant manual effort and reverse
engineering work and thus is not exhaustive. We will leave it as an open problem to design
systems that can automatically find a11y related vulnerabilities. We believe this will be a
challenging problem for the several reasons. First, automatically detecting a11y functions
and analyzing their related vulnerabilities requires whole system analysis. Since an a11y
request is regarded as an I/O event, it is processed asynchronously. As a result, it is very
hard to find entry points. The complicated execution of a11y logic extends to many different
low-level modules, which usually make use of many (function) pointers. Proprietary OSs do
not provide source code, and so researchers can only perform analysis with the compiled
binary, which makes the task even harder. Second, unlike general programming errors,
confirming a11y related vulnerabilities requires a deep understanding of the semantics of
an application, which significantly limits the scalability of such analysis. We hope that our
work can motivate further studies toward this direction.
4.6 Related Works
Attacks on Windows. In 2007, it was reported that an attacker could control a Windows
Vista machine by playing an audio clip to Speech Recognition [127]. However, since the
attack could not bypass UAC and assumed Speech Recognition was already enabled, it was
considered a minor bug at that time. Compared to this attack, our attack (attack #1) does
not require Speech Recognition to be enabled before the attack, and we can bypass UAC on
Windows 7 through 8.1 (due to policy changes in UAC [122]).
Just before the release of Windows 7, there was a UAC bypass attack [42] that exploited
the special capability of Explorer.exe to write to system directories. In this attack, a
malware process will attach to Explorer.exe, inject code, and exploit its capability to
write to system directories. Our attack #2 follows the same strategy, but instead of using
low-level function WriteProcessMemory() to inject code into Explorer.exe, we used the
accessibility library to simply click the “OK” button.
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Attacks on iOS. Recently, it was reported [46] that Siri in iOS 7 could be exploited to
bypass the lock screen and send email, SMS, post on Twitter and Facebook, make phone
calls, etc. We referred to this attack as attack #5 in the vulnerability section.
Although the accessibility library is a private API that is not usable by regular app
developers, the threat is real. Last year, an attack [157] showed that it is possible to
circumvent the Apple App Store review process by successfully publishing an App Store
app that invoked private API calls.
Attacks on Android. In Android, there have been many attacks on the permissions [56,
31, 41, 70, 164] and private information [84, 167] of an app that demonstrate data leakage
through Android’s IPC channel. To address these problems, researchers have proposed a
number of mechanisms [49, 70, 27, 105]. Unfortunately, since all of the proposed mech-
anisms were focused on the official IPC channel, they are not able to prevent attacks
through accessibility libraries. Furthermore, our attacks can steal the capabilities and private
information of other apps.
4.7 Summary
In compliance with the amendment to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, software vendors have
been continuously adding accessibility features to their OSs. As the technology advances,
accessibility features have become complex enough to comprise a complete I/O subsystem
on a platform. In this chapter, we performed an analysis of the security of accessibility
features on four popular platforms. We discovered vulnerabilities that led to twelve practical
attacks that are enabled via accessibility features. Further analysis shows that the root
cause of the problem is due to the design and implementation of a11y support requiring
trade-offs between compatibility, usability, and security. We conclude with proposing several
recommendations to either make the implementation of all necessary security checks easier,
or to alleviate the impact of incomplete checks.
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CHAPTER V
SGX-USB: ESTABLISHING SECURE USB I/O PATH IN INTEL
SGX
5.1 Motivation
Today’s system is very complex. Even a simple desktop computer consists of a huge software
stack including operating system, device drivers, system daemons and other applications, etc.
Thus protecting the entire software stack of a system is extremely difficult. One promising
approach to protecting a system is to reduce the attack surface by isolating the execution
runtime into a separate environment. History of building secure OS and hypervisors have
evolved into many software-based approaches [113, 137, 112, 97, 125, 99, 30] to provide the
trusted execution environment (TEE) in commodity systems. Recently, Intel has introduced
a new hardware extension, Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) [75], which provides
a hardware-based TEE as an enclave. While software-based TEEs still require either a
trusted hypervisor or a trusted operating system, this hardware TEE implementation offers a
strong security guarantee of not trusting privileged software including operating systems
and hypervisors, by isolating memory and registers at the hardware level [37, 134].
Although Intel SGX is now available in the most of the newly manufactured commodity
x86 processors, this hardware TEE is still limited to server or daemon applications because
Intel SGX cannot support trusted user I/O to its enclave that is running in ring 3, due to the
requirement that I/O handling must be done in ring 0. In order to get benefits from Intel
SGX, we design SGX-USB, which can establishe a secure I/O path between a USB device
and an enclave. In particular, SGX-USB opens a secure channel that can support USB
protocol, which enables supporting for variety of user I/O devices including a keyboard,
mouse, camera, speaker, and display, and even for non-user-facing devices such as a disk.
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To enable a secure channel, SGX-USB places a proxy device that sits in the middle of the
channel and establishes a secure communication channel between an I/O device and the
enclave.
These two devices establish a secure channel that can guarantee the authenticity of end
points, and both the confidentiality and integrity of data channel. establishing a secure
communication channel starts with the remote attestation process that authenticates an
enclave and the proxy device and shares a secret between these two at the same time.
After authenticating and sharing a secret, the proxy device opens a communication channel
between a USB I/O device and an enclave and protect the data transmitted in the channel by
using a derived encryption key from the shared secret. Throughout the remote attestation
process and application of encryption over the channel, SGX-USB can guarantee the three
key security properties: authenticity by remote attestation, and confidentiality and integrity
by encryption. Thus, SGX-USB provides the assurance of user input and allows the enclave
instance to handle commands and data from the user securely. While the currently discussed
applications of Intel SGX only perform the network and the file I/O securely, this new
design enables secure user I/O in the TEE so that Intel SGX can facilitate user-facing trusted
applications, such as authentication manager that securely processes password. Moreover,
we show that constructing an end-to-end trusted I/O channel from one user to another user
over the Internet is possible with SGX-USB; for example, having a video chat over the
Internet. SGX-USB can forward not only the user I/O devices but also general USB I/O
devices through the established secure channel. Its overhead on the bandwidth is around
1%, and added latency is around 11 microseconds, all of which are negligible.
To summarize, we made the following contributions in this chapter:
• We design SGX-USB, which enables the trusted user I/O to an enclave of Intel SGX by
establishing a trusted I/O channel between a USB device and an enclave. The design
of SGX-USB ensures the authenticity of channel end points and the confidentiality
and the integrity of the data that flows through the established secure channel.
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• We extended the Intel SGX remote attestation process to enable authentication and
secret sharing between a remote device and an enclave.
• We implemented a prototype of SGX-USB with commodity hardware, a small board
computer and a desktop computer, to demonstrate the feasibility of the design of
SGX-USB for securely delivering keyboard input to an enclave. Moreover, we present
a potential interesting use case of SGX-USB for video chat, which establishes a
user-to-user trusted I/O channel over the Internet.
The rest of chapter is structured as follows. §5.2 introduces background on Intel SGX and
several related works for building trusted I/O. §5.3 gives a brief overview of SGX-USB and
presents its threat model. §5.4 describes the design of SGX-USB in detail, and §5.5 demon-
strates compelling use cases that are enabled by SGX-USB. §5.7 presents the evaluation
result of our prototype implementation of SGX-USB. §5.8 discusses further considerations
on current design and implementation of SGX-USB.
5.2 Background and Related Work
This section presents backgrounds on Intel SGX that is necessary to understand the problem
that SGX-USB tackles. The contents of this section include the architecture of Intel SGX,
how SGX utilizes I/O devices, and compare SGX with other TEEs.
5.2.1 Intel SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [75, 80, 81, 134] is an extension of the x86 instruc-
tion set architecture (ISA), which provides trusted execution environment (TEE), called
enclaves, as a user-level process.
SGX Threat Model. SGX only includes the processor hardware and the program runs
in an enclave as its trusted computing base (TCB). To maintain the TCB without trusting
an operating system, SGX provides an isolated memory space and execution runtime to
an enclave [37]. SGX prohibits any access to the memory and registers that belong to an
enclave from the execution domain other than the enclave at the architectural level. This
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isolation is applied to all the other programs even including the operating system kernel,
so the access to the runtime of an enclave is strictly prohibited. Moreover, SGX applies
encryption to all of the data that belongs to an enclave to ensure confidentiality and integrity
to protect an enclave from physical attacks such as the cold-boot attack and bus snooping
attack.
Based on this isolation and encryption, an enclave can remain secure from the attacks
that could be originated in operating systems, kernel device drivers, other processes, etc.
Remote attestation. In addition to the isolation and encryption, SGX provides a protocol
for local and remote attestation to ensure the integrity of code and loading parameters of an
enclave instance. An enclave can generate a report of its launching status that contains the
measurement (i.e., hash) of loaded code in the enclave and its security parameters.
The local attestation provides a way of verifying an enclave from the other enclave on
the same hardware. The report of a target enclave will be signed by a hardware key, and the
other enclave can verify the report by using the same key.
The remote attestation lets a verifier placed at a remote location can verify the status
of an enclave. To support remote attestation, Intel provides the Quoting Enclave and Intel
Attestation Service. The Quoting Enclave is a special enclave that can generate a quote,
which is a signed report of an enclave, by going through the similar process to the local
attestation. This quote is signed by the hardware key that is issued by Intel, and Intel
Attestation Service provides APIs for verifying a quote for its validity. Thus, after a remote
verifier obtained a quote from an enclave, it must submit the quote to IAS to check whether
or not the quote is valid.
I/O handling in SGX. Because the design of SGX set the enclave run in the user-space
(i.e., ring 3), the enclave cannot directly handle I/O requests, which typically require kernel
(i.e., ring 0) privilege [37]. Insteads, the application runs outside the enclave handles I/O
request on behalf of the enclave, in cooperation with the operating system in the same way
how a regular process works in the OS.
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Since the actual I/O is handled by the untrusted operating system without having any
protection, the enclave must protect I/O channel by itself to ensure the confidentiality and
the integrity of data transmitted through the channel. Thus, Intel recommends to use the
remote attestation protocol with Diffie-Hellman key exchange [90, 26, 4] to establish a
secure communication channel between an enclave instance and a remote host, and to use
the sealing feature [4] that provides authenticated encryption using hardware-based key
to store data generated by an enclave permanently on the disk. Additionally, many other
research projects that rely on Intel SGX for the confidentiality and the integrity protection
of data utilize Transportation Layer Security (TLS) to provide authenticated encryption to
its network communication channel [16, 94, 143, 77, 11, 136].
User I/O in SGX. Unlike network connections that can negotiate security parameters over
the channel, user I/O devices such as keyboard and mouse, which are dumb I/O devices,
cannot negotiate encryption scheme for establishing a secure communication channel with
an enclave. The other general I/O devices are the same, for example, graphic display devices
(i.e., a GPU), which requires direct memory access (DMA) for processing data, cannot
work with an enclave securely because they do not have a protocol for establishing a secure
communication channel.
Intel provides a trusted output path for audio and video outputs through the protected
audio and video path (PAVP) [79] on the chipset, which encrypts data that is being transmit-
ted in the bus channel. However, its protocol is proprietary and only the Intel HD Graphics
device, which is an integrated GPU to the processor, can support the protocol. Therefore,
regular I/O devices cannot make use of this protocol.
5.2.2 Related Work
Comparing SGX with other TEEs. Prior research projects have developed various TEEs
in both software and hardware platform. For the software-based TEE, security hypervisors
backed by trusted platform module (TPM) such as Flicker [113], TrustVisor [112], and
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more generalized work the Extensible and Modular Hypervisor Framework (XMHF) [155]
provides a trusted hypervisor that can provide a strong guarantee of isolation on the system.
Additionally, seL4, a small, verifiable microkernel that guarantees the correctness of the
system thus it protects and isolates a process in a provable manner. However, these software-
based TEEs still requires trusting a set of privileged software and also limited in supporting
full-fledged applications in their TEE. In contrast, Intel SGX does not trust any privileged
software. Moreover, Intel SGX can run unmodified large applications such as Apache, GCC,
and the R interpreter [152].
For hardware-based TEEs, the ARM architecture introduced TrustZone and AMD
recently added a new feature called secure encrypted virtualization (SEV). Unlike Intel SGX,
ARM TrustZone has a trusted path for I/O. The threat model of TrustZone requires a
separated, trusted operating system, and this operating system handles I/O request for the
applications run on this OS in the secure domain. However, this design requires to include
secure operating system into the trusted computing base (TCB), which will enlarge the
attack surface of the TEE.
The AMD Ryzen processor also provides the TEE through its new feature called secure
encrypted virtualization (SEV). The threat model of SEV is similar to, but a little differs
from SGX. In particular, while SGX does not trust underlying OS but runs an application in
the enclave in ring 3, SEV does not trust underlying hypervisor but runs the entire virtual
machine in ring 0. Although the virtual machine instance of SEV runs in privileged level,
the direct memory access (DMA) area for I/O remains unencrypted because I/O devices
cannot handle the encryption.
Trusted I/O Paths. Zhou et al. [168, 169] have built trusted I/O path in commodity a
commodity x86 system using a small trusted hypervisor and driver. In the first version of the
work [168], they isolated a PCI device from an untrusted OS by using the trusted hypervisor.
However, the design cannot create an end-to-end trusted path from the user to the application
because the application is unprotected and runs outside the TCB. In the second version of the
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work [169], they enabled on-demand, isolated trusted I/O path. On isolating the execution
environment, their approach requires running of a trusted hypervisor, a small, trusted wimpy
kernel and a wimpy application on top of the trusted kernel. In contrast, SGX-USB utilizes
Intel SGX as a hardware-based isolation mechanism and does not require trusted hypervisor
or trusted kernel.
Li et al. [104] have built a trusted I/O path on ARM TrustZone while running device
driver in the insecure domain. However, their protection mechanism relies on the random-
ization of colors on the screen or the randomization of the keyboard layout, all of which are
not directly serving I/O to the TEE nor can support general I/O devices.
Martignoni et al. [110] built a trusted terminal for the applications in the cloud. While
their thin-client implementation looks promising with a small TCB, however, this method
can only be applied to applications running on the cloud machine.
5.3 Overview
SGX-USB aims to establish a trusted communication channel that supports user I/O devices
to an enclave instance of Intel SGX. In particular, SGX-USB opens a secure channel that
can support USB devices because USB can support a variety of user I/O devices including a
keyboard, mouse, camera, speaker, and display, and even for non-user-facing devices such
as a disk. Unfortunately, regular USB devices do not have a capability for negotiating and
applying security parameters to its I/O channel.
To resolve this, SGX-USB places a proxy device that sits in the middle of the channel
and establishes a secure communication channel between an I/O device and the enclave.
Establishing a secure communication channel starts with the remote attestation process
that authenticates an enclave and the proxy device and shares a secret between these two
at the same time. After authenticating and sharing a secret, the proxy device opens a
communication channel between a USB I/O device and an enclave and protect the data
transmitted in the channel by using a derived encryption key from the shared secret.
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The remote attestation process ensures the authenticity of both channel end points, and
applying authenticated encryption ensures that all I/O requests to/from the target USB device
will securely be delivered through the channel; in other words, no system component other
than the enclave can access the I/O data.
5.3.1 Security Guarantees
SGX-USB provides the following security guarantees on a secure communication channel
that it establishes between an enclave and the USB Proxy Device.
• Authenticity: SGX-USB establishes a secure channel only if it can verify its end
points: an enclave and the USB Proxy Device. The I/O request on the channel will be
encrypted with a secret key that is only shared between an authenticated enclave and
an authenticated proxy device.
• Confidentiality: SGX-USB encrypts all I/O request that flows on the channel using
an encryption key that is secure derived from a shared secret. Because the remote
attestation process ensures that no system components other than two end points of
communication channel will get the knowledge of encryption key, no attackers can
obtain plaintext data of I/O requests.
• Integrity: the encryption also guarantees the integrity of I/O request that flows on the
channel. Because SGX-USB uses an authenticated encryption scheme that is resistant
to data modification, the replay attack, and the reordering attack, no attacker can inject
I/O request on the channel.
5.3.2 Threat Model
We make the following assumption on modeling the threat on building SGX-USB to provide
a secure I/O channel from a USB device to an SGX enclave.
• The operating system running on the computer that runs enclaves is untrusted. This
assumption assumes that attacker can compromise the entire software stack except for
the program in an enclave, including applications running on the OS (not an enclave
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application), libraries, drivers, and the kernel.
• We trust the hardware component of Intel SGX (i.e., the processor) and the remote
attestation service (Intel Attestation Service, IAS) provided by Intel. This assumption
let us verify the integrity of the program that runs inside enclave and share secret keys
with an enclave and the USB Proxy Device with authentication.
• We trust the software stack that consists the USB Proxy Device (UPD). The trusted
stack includes the operating system kernel of UPD, the usbip driver [124], system
libraries, and the proxy application runs on the device.
• We assume attackers cannot have the physical access to any of the machine compo-
nents that consists SGX-USB. Moreover, we assume that the hardware devices that
we use for building SGX-USB are trusted. This assumption means that the attacker
does not have the power to access the USB device directly (e.g., the keyboard) or to
implant a hardware backdoor.
The assumption of trusting the components of Intel SGX (both hardware and software)
and not trusting operating system conforms to the typical threat model of Intel SGX.
Although we implement the UPD with commodity OS (i.e., Ubuntu 16.04 LTS), which
contains a large code base, the reason behind this decision is for fast prototyping. We believe
that implementing the UPD with minimal TCB is possible; for example, a UPD can be
implemented by using small trusted hypervisor such as XMHF or using the other TEEs such
as TrustZone; or implemented entirely in hardware. We further discuss on this in §5.8.
5.4 Design of SGX-USB
5.4.1 Architecture
To provide the required security properties to the channel that is established to an enclave, the
SGX-USB system consists of following components: an enclave program, the Remote At-
testation Service Provider (RASP), and the USB Proxy Device (UPD). Figure 25 illustrates






















Figure 25: A diagram that illustrates the architecture of SGX-USB. An application that handles I/O
runs in the enclave. The enclave will authenticate with the remote attestation service provider (RASP)
through the Intel SGX remote attestation process. Intel Attestation Service (IAS) will provide the
verification of a quote generated for an enclave, to verify the authenticity of an enclave. The USB
Proxy Device (UPD) will receive the signed quote then verifies the signatures of the quote, and then
establishes a secure communication channel with the enclave and forward USB I/O devices.
Enclave Program. In SGX-USB, the program that will process I/O must be run in an
SGX enclave. This program can be any application that utilizes the secure I/O channel. For
example, on utilizing a secure I/O channel as a secure method of processing password, a
program that handles the authentication process with user’s password will be running in the
enclave.
Because an enclave of SGX cannot directly handle I/O requests, the enclave communi-
cates through the untrusted part of the program (i.e. ocall) that handles (untrusted) I/O re-
quests such as networking and exchanging unencrypted traffics with the USB Proxy Device.
Over the untrusted channel, an enclave and the USB Proxy Device wrap the channel with
an encryption layer to provide security guarantees on the confidentiality and the integrity of
the data that they stream through the channel.
To share an encryption key and to verify the authenticity of the channel end point,
SGX-USB utilizes the remote attestation process provided by Intel (through Intel IAS)
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to prove its authenticity and integrity of the program in the enclave and verifying the
USB Proxy Device. This process is handled by the remote attestation service provider
(RASP).
Remote Attestation Service Provider (RASP). The RASP handles the verification of the
authenticity and integrity of an enclave program through the remote attestation protocol of
Intel SGX. The RASP is a server program that resides on the network (i.e., on the Internet)
and verifies whether or not the current enclave program is intact. By communicating with the
Intel Attestation Service (IAS) and the enclave, the RASP receives a quote that is generated
by the enclave, which indicates the launching status of the enclave, and sends the quote to
the IAS to get a signed quote. Subsequently, the RASP signs the quote by its private key to
make sure the authenticity of the ECDHE security parameter in the quote, which will be
used for establishing a secure communication channel between the USB Proxy Device and
the enclave.
Intel Attestation Service (IAS). Intel Attestation Service is a part of the remote attestation
infrastructure of Intel SGX. The job of the IAS is to verify a quote generated by the Quoting
Enclave, which is a signed data of a measurement report of an enclave. Because all the
quotes of enclaves are protected by a secret key that is fused in the processor and only Intel
knows, only the IAS can verify the legitimacy of the quote. The RASP verifies the quote
received from an enclave using the IAS to ensure the authenticity of the enclave.
USB Proxy Device (UPD). The USB Proxy Device is a proxy that forwards packets from
USB I/O devices to an enclave through secure communication channels. The UPD sits
between USB I/O devices and the enclave, and it acts as a middle man that creates secure
I/O channel and forwards the I/O requests. To establish the secure channel, the UPD first
shares a secret with the enclave program by following the remote attestation process. After
sharing a secret, the UPD derives an encryption key and apply an encryption layer to the
channel between an enclave and itself to make the channel secure. After establishing a
secure communication channel protected by encryption, the UPD forwards USB packets
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1. SP initiates the remote attestation
2. Enclave sends msg0, msg1, and g_a
3. SP sends msg2, sigRL, and g_b
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Figure 26: The remote attestation process of Intel SGX.
from the target USB device to an enclave, and from an enclave to the target device, vice
versa.
5.4.2 Verifying Authenticity and Sharing Secret through Remote Attestation
Before establishing a secure communication channel between the UPD and an enclave, both
components authenticate each other to check if the each end point of the channel is intact.
Because the regular remote attestation protocol provided by Intel only allows us to verify
an enclave from the RASP, we extended the protocol to let the UPD verify an enclave and
sharing a secret between them.
Intel SGX Remote Attestation. Intel SGX provides a way of attesting the launching status
of an enclave through the remote attestation protocol. Figure 26 illustrates how this process
works. In the following, we describe each step of the protocol.
1. The service provider (the RASP), which is a remote party that requests the verification
of an enclave, initiates the remote attestation process.
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2. The enclave that is being attested gets the request then send msg0, which contains
group ID of an enclave and msg1, which contains the public key (i.e., g_a) parameter
of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) protocol that will be used
for sharing a secret with the service provider at the end of the remote attestation
process.
3. Next, on receiving both msg0 and msg1, the service provider verifies the group ID
(must be 0) in the msg0. If the group ID is zero, then the service provider requests
a revocation list (i.e., SigRL) from the Intel IAS. This SigRL is signed by Intel IAS
and will be used by the enclave for verifying the validity of the service provider.
After processing the messages, the service provider generates msg2, which contains
its public key parameter for the ECDHE key exchange (i.e., g_b).
4. After receiving msg2, the enclave generates a report and gets a quote for the report by
the Quoting Enclave (QE). A report of an enclave includes the measurements (i.e.,
hash) of the launching status of an enclave that only Intel Attestation Service can
verify as well as both of public key parameters (g_a and g_b) for the ECHDE key
exchange. The Quoting Enclave, an enclave that is developed by Intel, will sign the
report, and the enclave sends this quote to the service provider as msg3.
5. Subsequently, the service provider receives msg3 and send it to the IAS to verify
whether the quote is valid or not. Only for the valid quote, the IAS will return a signed
quote with a signature generated by Intel’s private key. The service provider verifies
this signature; if it is valid, the service provider generates a shared secret and then
send the signed quote to the enclave as msg4, by encrypting the signed quote with the
secret key.
6. The enclave also calculates a shared secret and derives an encryption key; then it
decrypts the quote from msg4 using the key and verifies the signature of the quote. In
consequence, the enclave can ensure that it has shared a secret with a service provider
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1. User initiates SGX-USB
2. Enclave sends msg0, msg1, and g_a
3. SP sends msg2, sigRL, and g_b




get Signed Quote5. SP sends signed quote and
    verifiers (encrypted with g_a_b)
6. Enclave sends signed quote (g_a)
Signed Quote (g_a)
7. Send g_c and
   verifier (g_a_c)
8. Enclave sends verifier










Figure 27: An extended remote attestation process for SGX-USB. Steps from 1 to 5 remain the same
as the regular remote attestation of an enclave. Procedures marked with the bold face (Steps 6, 7, and
8) indicate additional procedures for attesting an enclave from the USB Forwarding Device.
that is certified by Intel (because they cannot get the correct signature from IAS unless
Intel does not certify them), and the service provider can ensure that it has shared a
secret with a legitimate enclave instance (because IAS will not sign the quote if an
enclave instance is not legitimate). Note that both the enclave and the RASP have
shared a secret (i.e., g_a_b) through the ECHDE protocol.
SGX-USB Remote Attestation. To share a secret between the UPD and an enclave, we
extended the remote attestation process of Intel SGX. Figure 27 shows the process of the
remote attestation with our extension. We describe the extended part of the process in the
following.
• For the step 1, we changed the process to be user initiated instead of the service
provider.
• After the step 5, the enclave sends the signed quote (decrypted from msg4) to the
UPD.
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• On receiving the signed quote, the UPD verifies if the quote is correctly signed by
the Intel’s private key and the private key of the RASP. Only if both signatures are
verified, the UPD generates an ECDHE parameter and send the public part (i.e., g_c)
to the enclave as msg5, along with the signature of this public parameter and the
public key that can verify the signature. Note that the UPD presents a public key as a
certificate that contains its signature, signed by the RASP.
• On receiving msg5 from the UPD, the enclave verifies the signature of the ECDHE
parameter (i.e., g_c) using the public key of the RASP, to check if the RASP has
certified the signing key. As a result of the process, the UPD has verified that both the
IAS and the RASP have signed the quote (so it is valid), and the enclave has verified
that the signature of the public key parameter (i.e., g_c) is generated by a public key
that is certified by the RASP (so the UPD is certified one). Only if all signatures are
verified, both the enclave and the UPD calculates a shared secret (i.e., g_a_c) and
derives an encryption key that will be used for securing the I/O channel.
5.4.3 Trust Chain and User Verification
Trust Chain. For guaranteeing the authenticity of the channel end points, SGX-USB trusts
two private keys during the remote attestation process. First, we trust the private key of Intel
Attestation Service (IAS) that is used for signing quotes of an enclave. The quote from an
enclave, an evidence of running a correct enclave, can only be verified by Intel IAS. By
trusting Intel IAS, the USB Proxy Device can verify that it currently communicates with a
real, valid enclave instance.
Second, we trust the private key of the remote attestation service provider that signs the
public key of the USB Proxy Device. In this regard, an enclave can verify the validity of the
UPD by checking if the public key of the UPD that signs its ECDHE parameter is issued by
the RASP, by verifying its signature.
User Verification. Although the public key infrastructure and cryptographic operations can
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Figure 28: The user interface for verifying an enclave and its usage, presented in the USB Proxy
Device. Figure on the left shows how the UPD displays the request for establishing a secure channel
to a keyboard from an enclave. The information displayed on the LCD screen indicates the name of
an enclave (i.e., AuthMgr), the name of the requested device (i.e., Keyboard), and application specific
information for indicating the usage of the input (i.e., paypal.com). After clicking the SELECT button
(i.e., the user approves), the screen will show the ’OK’ sign at the end of the second line to indicate
that the secure channel is established.
guarantee the authenticity, the confidentiality, and the integrity of communication channel,
the establishment of the channel must go through the user verification process to ensure that
the use of the channel follows the user’s intent.
To this end, the UPD explicitly display the identity of an enclave (e.g., application name),
the device that the enclave connects to (e.g., keyboard), and the usage of the device (e.g.,
that domain name that the keystrokes will be submitted).
Figure 28 shows an example of the user verification process of SGX-USB on using the
system as a password authentication manager. On the screen, the first line displays the
application name as AuthMgr and the device name as KBD to indicate that the AuthMgr
enclave would like to talk to the keyboard device. In the second line, the UPD will display
how the user input will be used for, in other words, displays the domain name paypal.com
to indicate that the password typed by the user will be submitted to the paypal.com.
To authorize the access, the user can click ’OK’ button on the device (indicated as Select
in Figure 28). The channel will be established only if there is a user approval; otherwise, the













KEY := SHA256 (M)
SMK := KEY[0..16]
SK := KEY[16..32]
Figure 29: The data format for deriving secret key from a shared secret. The key derivation function
uses the SHA-256 message digest algorithm to derive a 16 bytes secret key from a shared secret.
5.4.4 Integrity and Confidentiality: Encrypted Communication Channel
To protect the communication channel between an enclave and the UPD, SGX-USB wraps
the channel with an encryption layer protected by the key that is exchanged during the
remote attestation process. In short, SGX-USB applies the AES-128-GCM scheme, which
is an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) that can protect both data
confidentiality and data integrity.
Key derivation. After finishing the remote attestation process, both an enclave and the
UPD have shared a 256-bit secret through ECDHE protocol using the NIST P-256 curve. To
derive a 128 bit key for an AES encryption, SGX-USB followed the same way on how Intel
derives a secret key in their SDK example; the scheme uses the SHA-256 message digest
algorithm. Figure 29 illustrates how the key derivation function works. By hashing the Key
ID (0 in this case), the 32 bytes shared secret, the Algorithm ID (0 in this case), and two
string literals SGXRAENCLAVE and SGXRASERVER, the derivation function generates a 32 bytes
message digest and uses the latter 16 bytes (SK in Figure 29 for the encryption key.
Encryption Scheme. SGX-USB uses AES-128-GCM for the encryption scheme for the
secure channel. Since the GCM (Galois Counter Mode) is an authenticated encryption with
associated data (AEAD) encryption scheme, we can use one key for protecting both the
confidentiality and the integrity of the data. To encapsulate a plaintext USB packet into an
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Authentication Tag (16 bytes) Payload Size (8 bytes)
Encrypted Payload (<264 bytes)
Excluded from AES-GCM data authentication 
Figure 30: The header format for delivering encrypted payload on trusted I/O channel in SGX-USB.
Authentication Tag will be used for verifying the integrity of both the size field and encrypted
payload. While the AES-128-GCM encryption applied only to the payload, the size field is supplied
as additional data for AES-128-GCM data authentication; thus the encryption scheme protects the
integrity of both encrypted payload and the size field.
encrypted packet, we attach a 24 bytes header on the payload followed by the encrypted
packet payload. Figure 30 shows how the header of a packet in the channel composed.
To send a plaintext USB packet over the secure channel, we first identify the size of
the packet. To protect the integrity of both encrypted text and the size field, we encrypt the
packet payload using the AES-128-GCM encryption scheme. At the same time when the
encryption is being processed, we put the size (8 bytes) field as the additional data to be
authenticated. In this way, the scheme allows us to detect any forgery on both encrypted
data and the size field. As a result of an encryption routine, the scheme will generate a 16
bytes authentication tag that will be verified when decrypting the data to check if the data is
intact. We put this tag at the top of the header to deliver the tag to the other end point.
We process the decryption in a reverse way. After receiving the header data, we initialize
a decryption engine with the secret key, the authentication tag in the header, and the size
field in the header as the additional data to authenticate. The encryption scheme will return
true only if when the secret key and the authentication tag is matched.
Another point that is essential on applying the AES-128-GCM encryption scheme is the
setting of initialization vector (IV). To securely use the encryption scheme, one must not
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reuse the IV for one secret key. To follow such a secure scheme, we set a 12 byte (96bit)
integer counter value starting with zero value for each of sending and receiving side, and
increment IV counter per each en(de)cryption operation. In this regard, the IV will not
be reused if the channel sends less than 296 packets, which is a practically unreachable
number. Additionally, because the IV counter is monotonically increasing on each sending
and receiving side, the scheme is resistant to the replay and the reordering attack.
5.5 Use Cases
This section illustrates potential use cases of SGX-USB. We present examples for applying
SGX-USB on protecting user’s password, and on establishing end-to-end trusted I/O channel
for video chat. Although we only cover these two use cases as examples, theoretically,
SGX-USB can support any USB device since SGX-USB forward USB I/O channel through
established secure communication channel.
5.5.1 AuthMgr: Protecting User’s Password using SGX-USB
Password is an essential user input that requires confidentiality protection because it is a
credential for a What-you-know factor of the authentication. Attackers can impersonate
themselves as a legitimate user if an attacker possesses user’s password. Under typical
operating system settings, there are several ways of attacking the password input. For
attackers with the kernel level privilege, they can easily intercept USB HID messages
to record keystrokes that user types on a password box. Even with the lower, user-level
privilege, attackers can either directly read process memory or build user-level keylogger to
obtain the typed password.
To block such attack pathways, we apply SGX-USB to protect user’s password. Suppose
a user wants to log on to Paypal while his/her machine has already been infected by a kernel
level malware (assuming the highest threat). When the user types a password, the user’s
password can be recorded or stolen from the memory by methods mentioned above.












Figure 31: A diagram that illustrates the end-to-end I/O protection use case of SGX-USB for the
Internet video chatting. The USB proxy device on the user’s machine will forward USB devices
required for video chatting such as camera, microphone, speaker, and display. The video chat
application running in the enclave can securely access these USB devices, and send I/O data through
the secure communication channel over the Internet between the enclaves.
will establish a secure communication channel to an enclave that handles the authentication
process with the password. After the user identifies that the secure channel is established,
the user types his/her password, and user’s keystrokes will be available only to an enclave as
plaintext. Because the secure communication channel ensures that the attackers cannot harm
the confidentiality of the data, the attackers will have no knowledge about the password.
Additionally, Intel SGX guarantees that no program other than the enclave, including the
kernel malware, can read the data in the enclave’s memory; thus the password is protected
from the attack.
After getting the password from the user, the enclave handles the authentication process
to the service using a secure network channel such as HTTPS, which is protected by TLS.
When the service accepts the password and returns a session cookie, the enclave will only
return the cookie as a one-time session token, which will become invalid after the user logs
out after he/she finishes the session, to the user’s web browser.
Although the malware could steal the session cookie from the machine, the password
remains secret to the attacker.
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5.5.2 Internet Video Chatting: A Potential Use Case
SGX-USB can establish not only a trusted I/O channel to an enclave within the machine but
also an end-to-end trusted I/O channel between an enclave in the machine and enclaves over
the Internet. Figure 31 illustrates how the end-to-end trusted I/O channel can work with an
example of video chat over the Internet.
On one end device, the UPD establishes multiple secure communication channels to the
video chat application running in an enclave, and then forwards camera and microphone
devices to the enclave. On the other end device(s), the UPD of a remote machine establishes
secure communication channels to the video chat application running in an enclave, and
then forward display and speaker devices to the enclave. Finally, the enclave on one end
and the enclave on the other end establishes a secure communication channel (through the
authentication method in the video chat service). After all the connections are established,
the video and audio stream data provided by a user at one end can securely be delivered all
the way down to the other end’s display and speaker device.
Because all channels are established with proper authentication (by the remote attestation
process of SGX-USB and the authentication in the video chat application) and protected with
confidentiality and integrity guarantee, any attacker in the middle including OS, untrusted
application, and network and service operators can neither hijack the communication nor
evaesdrop the channel. Moreover, the video chat application is protected by an enclave of
Intel SGX; thus no software attacker can eavesdrop or altering video chat data from memory
or other system resources.
5.6 Implementation
We implemented our prototype of SGX-USB using a desktop machine that supports Intel
SGX and Raspberry Pi 3 model B device, which is a small board computer, and securely
forwarded a keyboard device to an enclave to reflect the AuthMgr use case in §5.5. In the
following, we describe the details of implementation settings.
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Table 8: Source code line count for the software components of SGX-USB.
Component Module Language SLOC
Enclave
Core C++ 571
USB HID Driver (Keyboard) C++ 140
OCALL Layer C++ 125
USB Proxy Device
Remote attestation and Proxying C++ 658




Common Library Crypto, Socket, etc. C++ 2,944
Enclave. We implemented the enclave application that securely processes a user’s password
for login (AuthMgr in §5.5) on a desktop machine equipped with a quad-core Intel Core i7
6700K (4.0Ghz) processor, which supports Intel SGX, attached with 32GB of DDR4 RAM
and running Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS. For the software component for the enclave, we used the
Linux version of the Intel SGX SDK (v1.9), which we can clone the code publicly from
Github. The trusted part of the program consists of 571 lines of C++ code for handling the
establishment of a secure channel including remote attestation and encryption, and 140 lines
of C++ code for handling keyboard input through the USB HID protocol. The ocall layer,
which is untrusted part of the program, for transmitting network packet to the UPD and the
target login service through TLS is composed of 125 lines of C++ code.
USB Proxy Device. We implement the USB Proxy Devices using a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B
device equipped with a quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 (1.2Ghz) processor, attached with 1GB
DDR3 RAM and running Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS for the armv7l architecture. We construct the
communication channel between the desktop machine and the USB Proxy Device using a
Gigabit Ethernet adapter connected to the USB 2.0 port of Raspberry Pi, which supports
around 310Mbps for its maximum throughput. For proxying USB devices to the network
adapter, we use the USBIP [124] project which is included in the Linux kernel. For the part
that handles the establishment of a secure channel including the remote attestation process
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and encryption of packets, we composed it with 658 lines of C++ code. For controlling
the LCD display on the USB Proxy Device, we implemented a Python program that uses
AdaFruit_CharLCD library with 32 lines of code.
Remote Attestation Service Provider. We implemented the remote attestation service
provider (RASP) for handling the Intel SGX remote attestation process using OpenSSL
and libcurl for communicating with the Intel IAS, on a server equipped with Intel Xeon
E3-1271 v3 (3.6Ghz).
5.7 Evaluations
We evaluate SGX-USB by answering the following questions:
• How secure is the I/O communication channel established by SGX-USB? (§5.7.1)
• How much overhead does SGX-USB incur on delivering I/O packets in terms of
throughput and latency? (§5.7.2)
• How long does it take to establish the secure I/O channel through the remote attestation
process? (§5.7.2)
5.7.1 Security
The threat model of SGX-USB excludes the operating system from its trusted computing
base (TCB). So there are several points in the system that attacker can intervene before and
after SGX-USB establishes a secure I/O channel. In the following, we go over attack cases
and show how SGX-USB block such attacks.
Attacks against enclave instances. The first avenue for an attack is to thwart the protection
provided by an SGX enclave instance. Because Intel SGX isolates all memory access from
the entire domain controlled by attackers including operating system, attackers cannot obtain
nor alter the runtime data in the enclave’s memory. Additionally, attackers cannot change
the behavior of an enclave instance because the remote attestation process ensures that the
integrity of the code in the enclave. One possible way would be launching a malicious
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enclave instance and establishing secure I/O channel using this enclave. However, because
the remote attestation process of SGX-USB not only includes the IAS but also utilizes
the RASP, the RASP will not generate a signed quote if the enclave instance (and its
measurement) is not pre-registered to the service. By only using the set of pre-registered
enclave applications, an attacker could launch a disguising attack that invokes a different
enclave instance with the enclave what user wants to use. In such a case, at the final
verification stage of SGX-USB, the user will notice that the name of the malicious enclave
instance is not the enclave that user has his/her intention, so request for establishing secure
I/O channel will be rejected.
Attacks on the remote attestation procedure. Attackers could try to forge an acceptable
message during SGX-USB’s remote attestation process. First, an attacker could attempt
to generate a fake quote; for example, the attacker could present a valid quote message
with a legitimate measurement for a registered enclave while executing a malicious enclave
instance. Nonetheless, this is strictly protected by the Intel SGX hardware and the IAS.
All the measurement reports must be generated by the secret key fused into the processor
hardware, and the quote can only be verified by the Quoting Enclave, which is created by
Intel. Thus, the attacker cannot either generate valid quote with forged message or pass the
verification process of the IAS.
Another avenue of attacking the remote attestation process is to forge the message
generated by the USB Proxy device. Again, forging message requires generating the correct
signature that bounds to the private key of the USB Proxy Device or a private key signed
by the RASP. Without obtaining the private key of these trusted instances, no attacker can
forge the message on the remote attestation process.
Finally, an attacker could attempt to build a fake USB Proxy Device to inject arbitrary
I/O message to an enclave instance. Although we set our threat model to exclude attack-
ers with any physical access to the device, the attacker could obtain an instance of the
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USB Proxy Device if the device available in public. Because current prototype implemen-
tation builds the USB Proxy Device as a small computer instance, the attacker who can
obtain the device can disassemble to leak the private key signed by the RASP and use the
key to build a fake instance of the USB Proxy Device. However, we believe that this is
just an implementation issue; this can be protected by implementing the UPD with the
other TEE or entirely in hardware. We further discuss on other trusted ways of building the
USB Proxy Device in §5.8.
Attacks on the secure channel. Attackers could attempt to decrypt or inject data on the
established secure channel. Unfortunately, the secure channel is protected by a symmetric
encryption scheme, AES-128-GCM, which is an authenticated encryption with associated data
(AEAD). The correct use of the scheme guarantees that no attackers can decrypt or alter the
encrypted data without obtaining the encryption key. To achieve this guarantee, SGX-USB
follows the same way in how Transportation Layer Security (TLS) utilizes the same scheme
as AEAD (e.g., use decrypted data only if tag matches, encrypt only short block, does not
reuse the same IV, etc.). Moreover, because ECDHE key exchange scheme securely derives
the key, attackers can obtain the key only if by breaking the scheme or by forging the key
exchange message, all of which are impossible in SGX-USB construction.
Despite the fact that SGX-USB can guarantee the authenticity of channel end points and
the integrity and the confidentiality of the data on the channel, SGX-USB cannot guarantee
the availability of the channel. We further discuss on this limitation in §5.8.
5.7.2 Performance
We evaluated SGX-USB for the performance of I/O channel in terms of throughput and
latency. Moreover, we provide timing information how long does the establishment of a
secure I/O channel through remote attestation takes.
Throughput and Latency. To evaluate the performance of the secure I/O channel estab-
lished by SGX-USB, we measure the throughput and latency of the channel for various
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Figure 32: The measured throughput of the secure I/O channel for various packet size.
packet sizes. To help understand the result, we note that the maximum packet size of
the USB protocol is 1 KB and typical packet size for USB HID devices is 32–512 bytes.
Although we use a Gigabit Ethernet adapter (max bandwidth 1Gbps) for the communication
channel, the adapter is connected to a USB 2.0 port (max bandwidth 480Mbps) due to the
hardware limitation on the USB Proxy Device so the maximum bandwidth of the channel is
around 310Mbps without any encryption or encapsulation.
Figure 32 depicts the throughput of the secure I/O channel for various packet size and
Table 9 lists detailed numbers.
The smaller packet size incurs more overhead on both encryption process (CPU) and size
(bandwidth). Because SGX-USB applies a separate instance of AES-128-GCM encryption
(i.e., using a different IV) per each packet, the number of required encryption initialization
process is increased for the smaller packet size. Moreover, because SGX-USB adds small
header data (24 bytes) per each packet for transmitting data authentication tag (16 bytes)
and indicating payload size (8 bytes), delivering smaller packet would incur more size
overhead. Furthermore, we deliver USB packets over a TCP connection on the Ethernet link,
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Table 9: The measured throughput of the secure I/O channel for various packet size, in five seconds
of transmission. The throughput measured by the amount of payload data transmitted on the channel
without counting any additional data for encapsulation. W/O encapsulation indicates the channel
throuput when we count the entire amount of data transmitted through the channel including header
information. No encryption indicates the channel throughput when we applyed payload encapsulation
(i.e., adding of the header) but did not apply encryption.
Packet Size (Bytes) 64 128 512 1024 4096 8192
W/O encapsulation (Mbps) 181.3 295.1 309.6 306.8 294.6 292.2
No encryption (Mbps) 84.1 187.0 270.5 286.1 289.4 289.6
AES-128-GCM (Mbps) 57.1 91.5 181.0 222.3 285.3 289.4
Overhead (%) -32.1% -51.1% -35.5% -22.3% -1.4% -0.07%
Table 10: The measured average latency of the secure I/O channel for various packet size, in five
seconds of transmission. No encryption indicates the latency incurred when we applyed payload
encapsulation (i.e., adding of the header) but did not apply encryption.
Packet Size (Bytes) 64 128 256 512 1024 4096 8192
No encryption (usec) 1.74 1.93 2.39 4.64 9.10 35.99 71.53
AES-128-GCM (usec) 2.85 3.51 4.71 7.19 11.71 36.51 71.94
Overhead (usec) +1.11 +1.57 +2.32 +2.55 +2.61 +0.52 +0.41
so additional 50 bytes size overhead is applied per each 1426 byte payload (1426 = 1500
(MTU) - 50 (TCP/Ethernet) - 24 (header)).
Because of these overhead characteristics, SGX-USB demonstrated 57.1 Mbps of
throughput for 64 bytes packets, which is around 18% of the maximum throughput. However,
for 4K bytes packets, the bandwidth became saturated, and the overhead is negligible.
Encapsulating the packet and applying encryption on the packet also incurs overhead on
the channel latency. Figure 33 depicts the throughput of the secure I/O channel for various
packet size and Table 10 lists detailed numbers. Although the latency increases as the packet
size increases, the absolute value of the latency in maximum USB packet size (i.e., 1 KB) is
around 11 microsecond, which is fairly negligible.
141



















Figure 33: The measured average latency of the secure I/O channel for various packet size, in five
seconds of transmission.
Authentication speed. The remote attestation process of SGX-USB requires:
• Two round trips between the enclave and the RASP for delivering msg0, msg1, and
msg2; and msg3 and msg4,
• Two round trips between the RASP and the IAS, one for requesting and receiving
SigRL and the other for and the signed quote,
• One round trip between the enclave and the UPD for exchanging ECHDE parameter
(using the signed quote).
To model a realistic use case, we setup the connection between the enclave and the UPD as
a local network connection, place the RASP on the remote network using the Google Cloud
Platform and using the test IAS server provided by Intel.
The total round trip time for the remote attestation for SGX-USB (Figure 27) from step 1
to step 7, it took in average 553 milliseconds, with standard deviation 31ms for 100 times of
remote attestation trials. This overhead is not that much because the entire process of remote
attestation is one-time cost per each channel; it only happens when the USB Proxy Device
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establishes a new secure communication channel with an enclave.
5.8 Discussions
In this section, we discuss on how SGX-USB can support general I/O, on the performance of
the channel, on the feasibility of hardware implementation of the UPD, on authenticating the
identity of an enclave, and the availability of the channel, which is an unprotected security
property on the channel.
General I/O support with SGX-USB. On forwarding a USB device to a network device,
the prototype design of SGX-USB borrows the implementation of the usbip [124] project
that generally supports all kinds of USB devices, so SGX-USB is. Because the USB protocol
transmits its data as packets, delivering each USB packet as a packet over the IP can be done
by only incurring transformation overhead. Moreover, since we use transmission control
protocol (TCP), which is a reliable protocol, for the data transmission, so there will be no
missing packet on the other end. Therefore, as long as the driver software can run in the
enclave, SGX-USB can support any USB device by forwarding its packet to the enclave.
In addition to USB devices, we believe that SGX-USB can forward devices that support
RDMA (remote direct memory access) protocol through established channel by implement-
ing a driver counterpart in the enclave, because by design, data for RDMA can be delivered
over the network.
Channel Performance. Performance evaluation result of SGX-USB shows that its latency
is in a performant range, but suffers performance bottleneck due to the encryption process.
However, the bottleneck can be removed if the processor supports hardware-based encryption
engine. Starting from newer ARM processors, processor manufacturers other than Intel try
to integrate hardware module that accelerate encryption speed.
Regarding the size overhead of the channel bandwidth, the higher bandwidth would
mostly be used by USB at bulk transfer, which sends a large amount of data split in each
1K byte packet. In such a case, SGX-USB can set a buffer to consolidate multiple USB
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packets into a large chunk (e.g., merging 16 packets into a 16Kbytes packet) only for the
bulk transfer then the overhead will be negligible.
Hardware implementation of the UPD. Although we implemented our prototype of
SGX-USB using a Raspberry Pi, which is a small board computer, we believe that imple-
menting the UPD in hardware or other TEE with smaller TCB is feasible. The hardware
implementation of UPD may include a USB host controller to receive raw packets from I/O
devices, a communication interface to the enclave device, (in any form, e.g. Ethernet or USB
OTG guest device), a cryptographic engine that handles the remote attestation process and
AES encryption, and a small storage that is loaded with trusted public keys and a firmware
that controls the components.
A more flexible design would be utilizing ARM TrustZone. In this case, by implementing
the usbip driver on a small and secure TEE OS for TrustZone, we can significantly reduce
the size of TCB. Moreover, in conjunction with using TPM, we can securely store the code
and the private key of UPD with the data sealing feature; so the attackers with a possession
of the UPD cannot alter the code nor retrieve the private key of the device.
Availability of the channel. We exclude the availability from the security property that
SGX-USB should guarantee for the communication channel. This is an inherent limitation
due to the adoption of the threat model of Intel SGX because Intel SGX excludes the
operating system, which runs as a higher privilege than an enclave, from the threat model.
Although guaranteeing availability cannot be possible under current threat model, un-
trusting the operating system, the user will directly be notified at least when the availability
issue happens (i.e., the device does not work at all). The operating status of the channel will
either be fully working or not and cannot be half-working status because missing any of




In this thesis, we analyzed and protected user I/O in commodity computer systems by
identifying the three key security properties of user I/O: integrity, confidentiality, and
authenticity.
In Chapter §2, we built GYRUS to protects the systems from transmitting non-user-
intended network traffic by preserving the integrity of user input from the user interface
layer to when the input transformed and transmitted to the network device. By protecting
the integrity of user input, GYRUS can cut-off various attack pathways including malware
threats in an attack-agnostic way.
In Chapter §3, we built M-AEGIS to protect user’s private data sending and receiving
on public messaging services by presenting transparent encryption layer between the user
and the application user interface. By protecting the confidentiality of user input/output,
M-AEGIS can provide a true user-to-user encryption to protect user’s private data without
modifying underlying protocols and applications.
In Chapter §4, we examined the user I/O security of popular operating systems regarding
the authenticity of I/O end points. Missing security checks that verify the source and the
destination of user I/O for a system’s accessibility support breaks an essential security
assumption that the input always comes to the user and the output can only be seen by the
user. Failure to authenticate the source of an input let attackers inject input to the system
so that attackers can take over the system as if they are a legitimate user even when the
state-of-the-art security mechanisms fully protect the system. Failure to authenticate the
destination of an output let attackers have access to security-sensitive data such as passwords,
which endangers a user.
145
After identifying the three key security properties of user I/O, in Chapter §5, we built
a trusted I/O channel that guarantees these security properties on using trusted execution
environment. Enabling trusted user I/O path let Intel SGX support user-facing applications
such as authentication manager and end-to-end trusted video chat.
In the following, we conclude by discussing several open problems in user I/O protection.
Open problems. On protecting the integrity of user input, GYRUS is still limited only to
protect text-based user input that only applied with simple transformation. One promising
approach to support arbitrarily complex transformation on user input is to apply probabilisti-
cally checkable proof or homomorphic encryption. However, such cryptographic approach
still suffers massive runtime overhead to be used as a practical solution.
On protecting the confidentiality of user input, M-AEGIS requires a developer’s manual
effort of building the per-TCA logic of an application. Applying machine learning to
automatically learn the UI layout of an application then automatically generating per-TCA
logic would be an exciting direction. Moreover, to support end-to-end encryption other
than text-based user input encounters another challenge. While we could use the Unicode
encoding to place encrypted text to the user interface of a normal application without having
compatibility issue, encrypting and transmitting image, audio, or other multimedia data
requires format preserving encryption even when the application applies a transformation to
optimize the size of content (e.g., image/video compression).
On evaluating the accessibility support in popular systems in the A11Y ATTACK, we
manually analyzed the system and each accessibility component. Building an automated
analysis tool for checking whether or not the information flow of user I/O conforms to a
system’s security policy would be a good direction to resolve such problem. The challenge
on this approach is at the point that the input handling routine is processed asynchronously.
To analyze the system, one must figure out how to exhaustively examine the point that an
input event can be injected and an output event will be generated. Moreover, designing a
new UI framework for securely supporting accessibility would be a great next step.
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